Air Battle Over Lahore 20 September, 1965

Wing Comd Shafiq Chughtai gives a fascinating account of an encounter over the historic city of Lahore

Lahore had earned itself a place of distinction the moment the war started in 1965. On the one hand it became target of enemy attacks, boasts, and propaganda claims, and on the other its citizens became both participants in, and spectators to, PakistanÕs counter-offensive in that theatre. One of the unique spectacles they witnessed, was a rare dogfight between 10 fighter aircraft right over the city. Of these, 4 were PAF Sabres, while the others were 4 Hunters and 2 Gnats of the enemy airforce. Interestingly, it was the last dogfight of the war.

It all started on the evening of 20 September, when four fighter-bombers were ordered up into the air by the air defence controller. Squadron Leader Changezi followed by Flight Lieutenant Anwar-ul-Haq Malik, Jilani and Amanullah lifted off in twoÕs and as they were still climbing, the controller came on the radio: Victor 125, Angels 20, Patrol between Kasur and Lahore. It appears that the enemy mistook this Combat Air Patrol (CAP) for an offensive mission, poised to cross the border, and it started scrambling fighters to intercept our planes over our territory. The ensuing air battle saw the loss of two enemy aircraft, and the number could have been higher, if the enemy had not broken off the engagement, and the Sabres had not been deferred by the fast approaching darkness into giving up their chase of the fleeing enemy.

Maintaining a steady climb, the Sabres set course for Kasur. They levelled off at the planned height and a few minutes later they had reached Kasur-Khemkaran sector. At 20,000 feet with the afternoon haze and glare nothing was visible down below. It was the 14th day of the war and it was long time since our ground forces had captured the important Indian town of Khemkaran, about six miles from Kasur. The fighting was now going on a few miles south of Khemkaran. The Sabres now turned about and headed for Lahore. All was quiet and peaceful, only the steady roar of engines broke the silence. Suddenly Sakesar Radar beamed a warning: ÒFour bogies climbing well inside enemy territory heading northÓ Soon the Sabres were over Lahore. They had been circling over the historic city at a lower height with eyes scanning the air above, behind and ahead, seeking to detect the approach of enemy fighters when out of the corner of his eye Amanullah caught some dark specks below. ÒTwo bandits about 5000 feet below, 11 OÕclock:Ó he yelled on the intercom. With a flick of hands the four fighters jettisoned their spare tanks to get ready for the fight. Except Amanullah, No 4 in the formation, nobody had yet sighted the enemy. On guidance by his wingman, Jilani now spotted the approaching enemy and recognized them as Hunters. The two Sabres peeled over like graceful birds of prey and slashed down, angling towards the enemy. Changezi, the leader, was on the climb when suddenly he spotted two Hunters at 12 OÕclock diving towards Jilani at about 3000 feet. Followed by Malik, who was keeping his ÔtailÕ clear, Changezi streaked down towards the two Hunters.

It was an interesting situation: Two Hunters pursued by two Sabres which in turn were followed by two Hunters, and the end of the line was made up by two Sabres again. The calm air over Lahore was filled with thud-thud of machine-guns and hissing tracers from the fighting aircraft and thousands of Lahorites, despite the air raid warning, came out of the houses to witness the show of death. The formations clashed with a high screaming reaching its crescendo as the fight developed into a melee. The sky over Lahore was a jumble of crisis-crossing, diving climbing fighters. Changezi braced his controls. With eyes fixed on the gun-sight and his spine slightly arched, he veered sharply to the left as his quarry went through a high-G turn. The silhoutte of the ÔbanditÕ had started filling his gun-sight and as it came within range he pressed the button letting out a short burst. The bullets went home and hit the fuselage of the Hunter.

The enemy wavered slightly but continued pursuit of the Sabres ahead. Changezi waited for a brief moment and fired again with the old tenacity of a pilot who feels a kill in his bones. He did a steep turn left, flicking over and then climbing all the time chasing the Hunter as if glued to his tail. The enemy tried all types of evasive tactics but could not throw away the determined Changezi. The diamonds of the gun-sight again closed on the silhoutte and he squeezed the firing button, for about two seconds. This was the end of the Indian. Giving out big plumes of smoke and flames the enemy reeled away and went straight down to his doom. The pilot could not bail out.

In the meantime ChangeziÕs Wing-man, Malik, stopped giving radio calls of Ôtail clearÕ. Changezi called him but could not hear anything. There was lot of radio talk going on between Jilani and Amanullah. He called out but again Ôno contactÕ. At that time Malik was engaged in another death struggle with two supersonic Gnat fighters which had suddenly come out of the blue and pounced upon him as he was keeping ChangeziÕs ÔtailÕ clear. One of the Gnats sneaked near him and gave a long squirt with his guns, and as the bullets landed straight into his right wing, the Sabre lurched. Surprised at this sudden turn of events Malik, who had shot down a Mystere during the historic Battle of Sargodha on September 7, now looked into his mirror and saw another of Gnat fast closing on him with leadersÕ guns blazing. The Sabre was badly hit but Malik kicked the controls and banked hard. The Gnat cut across and got his fire converging at an angle and then veering to meet his line of flight from below, giving Malik another burst, a long burst, sending the Sabre into a threat to spin. Malik brought it straight but dense fumes had started filling his cockpit. He put the aircraft in a shallow dive. Fumes had started getting worse and the controls were not answering properly. The R/T was dead and he set course for the base.

However, on the way the conditions worsened and he had to bail out. By evening he reached his base safely.

The grim dog-fight went on between three Sabres and five enemy fighters (three Hunters and two Gnats). Jilani and Amanullah maintained their chase of the two Hunters despite continuous pecking by Gnats. Amanullah was keeping JilaniÕs ÔtailÕ clear when suddenly he spotted two Gnats closing on him. He broke and after manoeuvring hard he kept himself clear of the attack. While containing the Gnats, one of the Hunters which was being chased by Jilani banked hard and manoeuvred to get behind Amanullah. He closed in and opened fire but the tracers went wide as Amanullah veered sharply to the left. The Hunter shot ahead.

In the meantime Jilani had grimly maintained his chase of the other Hunter. The enemy seemed to be a good pilot and took various evasive tactics through high Gs but Jilani kept his pursuit gradually getting nearer and nearer. His persistence paid off when the shouter of the hunter filled his gun-sight.

As it came within range he moved his finger on top of the firing button and held it down. The Sabre shuddered at the recoil of six machine-guns and a stream of armourpiercing and incendiary bullets slammed into the fuselage of the enemy. The Hunter started spitting smoke and flames as it careered down towards the ground.

Flight Lieutenant Jilani, who had mortally damaged a Gnat in an earlier combat near Ferozepur on September 13, was later awarded Tamgha-e-Basalat.

With two Hunters gone the Indians thought it better part of valour to disengage and leave for home. The three gallant fighters returned to their base safely.

The Spirit of 6th September

PATRON Lt Gen (Retd) SARDAR FS LODI recalls the spirit that symbolises September 6 for Pakistan

6th of September is celebrated each year as the Defence of Pakistan Day. It was on this day in 1965, that India launched her forces and attacked Pakistan across the international border without a warning or a declaration of war. this action of India, which claims to be the largest democracy in the World, was in utter violation of International law, charter of the United Nations and norms of civilized behavior among states. India arrogantly swept aside her international commitments in her desire to subjugate the region.
Even after a lapse of 34 years when a new generation in Pakistan are the decision makers, the memory of IndiaÕs treachery is vivid and uncompromising. At dawn on 6th September Indian forces crossed the border, pushed back the Pakistan Rangers and advanced towards Lahore on two axis. The Indian Army Chief, Gen. J. N. Chaudhry was so confident of defeating the Pakistani troops guarding the area and capturing Lahore that he announced to all and sundry that he would have a large peg of whisky at the Lahore Gymkhana Club in the evening of the 6th. He had reason to be confident as he was known in India as the Òconqueror of Hyderabad in DeccanÓ. It was 17 years earlier that Gen Chaudhry had attacked the princely state of Hyderabad in Deccan, at the head of an armoured division. This was part of IndiaÔs multi-pronged attack by three divisions, inspite of a stand-still agreement that India had signed with the state. But NehruÕs (First Prime Minister of India) new-India had started to proclaim that her agreements and commitments national and international could be violated at will to suit her purpose.

IndiaÕs attack against Lahore was held and beaten back with heavy losses to the attackers. The Pakistan Army units defending on the ground, supported by the Pakistan Air Force were able to blunt the Indian offensive and roll it back. Two days later on 8th September India launched its main attack against Sialkot using its armoured division and other strike formations. What ensued has been described as the largest tank battle since the second World War. It was a hard and bitter struggle fought over many days and nightÕs resulting in casualties on both sides. In the end the Indian main attack was held and severely mauled. Its armoured division was force to withdraw owing to very high losses in men and material. South of Lahore, Pakistan launched its own counter attack and captured IndiaÕs Khem Karan and beyond. This posed a serious threat to the rear of Indian troops facing Lahore.

In the South Pakistan took the initiative to push back Indian troops and enter Indian territory. During the operations India captured about 400 square miles of Pakistan territory but lost around 1600 square miles of its own to Pakistan. The war ended with the mediation effort of the USSR and a peace agreement was signed at Tashkent.

During the 1965 war every citizen of the country was solidly united behind the government, although it was a military one, of Field Marshal Ayub Khan. The national priorities were clear and unambiguous in those days, any danger to the country called for unity and unstinted support to the government and the armed forces. There was no question of any political party or leader taking advantage of the war to berate the government for political or personal gain. This came much later when President AyubÕs health suffered a set back and personal ambitions of those he had brought into prominence came to the fore.

Pakistan emerged from the September 1965 war with India, a strong and self-confident nation, proud of itself and its armed forces. It was a nation that was united in facing the danger from India. National unity and full support for the armed forces in the field is essential for success in war. With the nationÕs support the Armed Forces of Pakistan repulsed IndiaÔs naked aggression across the international border and made her pay a price for it by capturing four times more territory than India and forcing her to accept a ceasefire, return to the negotiating table and to vacate each others territory. It was certainly their finest hour of glory and a day to be remembered by future generations of soldiers and civilians.

After the September 1965 Indo-Pakistan war and the Tashkent Agreement Pakistan relaxed, as peace had been restored. But India prepared anew and six years later in 1971 again attacked across the international border, this time in the Eastern Wing of the country and succeeded in dismembering Pakistan while the World and the United Nations stood by and watched. India has consistently used force as an instrument of her foreign and domestic policy against all her neighbours including China, and internally against her own small states and occupied Kashmir to the detriment of her religious and ethnic minorities. This has been reflected by all the main Human Rights organizations of the World. Recently the New York based Human Rights Watch released its report condemning India for its atrocities in Indian-held Kashmir. This was released during the Kargil fighting a few months back.

This year we celebrate Defence of Pakistan Day after the recent fighting in Indian occupied Kashmir near Kargil. There has been some criticism within the country of the governmentÕs handling of the situation particularly of the Prime MinisterÕs visit to Washington. Unfortunately all the criticism emanates by and large from those political parties in opposition to the government and as such the credibility of their arguments is reduced to that extent. Some writings have appeared, particularly in the English press who fail to understand the Kashmir issue in its proper perspective and there are others who may well be inspired from within or without for reasons better known to them.

Kargil has added a new chapter to the KashmiriÕs 52 years old struggle for emancipation from the suppressive and brutal Indian rule. They have demonstrated their ability to force a decision on Kashmir. Any form of status quo is not acceptable to them any more. It is the opinion of neutral experts at home and abroad that the Kashmir dispute cannot be forced back into cold storage again in view of the determination to fight and die as shown by a few hundred Kashmiris on the outskirts of Kargil under the shadow of a larger conflict. It should now be the concern of the World community to find a solution to the Kashmir dispute under a democratic process, of the will of the people of Kashmir.

During the Kargil conflict the Pakistani troops deployed on the Line of Control in the area came under constant Indian pressure and repeated attacks. They gave a good account of themselves and many were killed defending the frontiers of Pakistan and the honour of their homeland. They fought with great determination and courage blunting and repulsing every enemy attack with considerable losses to the Indians. Pakistan Army COAS has recently mentioned Indian Army losses at about 1700 killed and therefore 3 to 4 times that number wounded. The officers and men of the Pakistan Army and para-military forces fought with the spirit of the September 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, and should be included in our prayers on the 6th of September alongwith all those officers and men of the Forces killed in action since 1948.

The 6th of September should also be a day of thanksgiving. We should all pray for the safety and solidarity of Pakistan and also that God gives us the strength, courage and determination, to protect and safeguard at all costs, the freedom and honour of our homeland.

The Magnificent Bomber Operations
of PAF in Indo-Pak 1965 War

A Bomber Pilot reminisces about PAF operations during the 1965 war

A country without a strong Air Force is at the mercy of any aggressor. Pakistan must build up her Air Force as quickly as possible. It must be an efficient Air Force, second to noneÓ. This advice by the Father of the Nation, the Quaid-e-Azam has been the principle for those who have built the PAF into what it is today and continues to inspire the young generations which follow.

It was an arduous task to build a strong and potent air force made more difficult in the case of Pakistan due to its political, technological and, above all, economic constraints at the time of its birth. Pakistan Air Force since its first day; had to, therefore, strive hard and long to develop into a modern and effective air force. The ability of our airmen was amply tested in two major wars and today we can say, with reasonable confidence, that we are in a position to meet any challenge that may come our way. But, it must be understood that in this day and age of fast-changing technological environment, the struggle ahead may be even harder, more uphill than what was faced by our predecessors.

In 1965 war, the world has seen some historic bombing operations by PAF pilots against different enemy locations. The B-57 bomber wing which was located at Mauripur Base contributed in the war by performing classical bombing operations at Jamnagar, Adampur and Pathankot. All these operations were mostly carried out at night, and required a great deal of concentration and high precision. The sole aim of these operations was to deny the enemy, the use of its airpower, by destroying the airfields from which they were supposed to takeoff.

On 6th September 1965 at 4:30 p.m., a quick twenty minutes final briefing was conducted for the B-57 attack against Jamnagar to be carried out at 6:00 p.m., the same day. This was the second attack at Jamnagar which had earlier been attacked by six F-86 aircraft.

The six B-57 set out in two waves of three aircraft each, flying at 200 feet above ground level. Following the coast line, they soon crossed over into Indian territory, descending even lower to avoid radar detection. Mandvi lighthouse beacon shining brightly, helped the B-57s to fix their position for final approach at Jamnagar, now some four minutes away. A mile short of the target the aircraft pulled up and each was able to deliver its load of 4,000 lbs of bombs on to the target. All aircraft were carrying a full load of rockets as well, and for this reason only internal bombs had been taken. The last minute orders for the mission had not allowed time for the rocket to be replaced by external bombs. The leader, however, discharged his rockets at a hangar and set it ablaze. No fighter interceptors and anti-aircraft fire were encountered.

Thereafter a Ôshuttle serviceÕ to Jamnagar was kept up all night with single aircraft sorties. During these operations, one PAF aircraft was lost which was attributed towards fatigue and bad weather. A photo intelligence report of Jamnagar after the war confirmed that a total of about fifteen bombs landed inside the airfield complex destroying two Indian Air Force Vampires on the technical area.

In another operation, four of B-57s aircraft from Mauripur were ordered to report at Peshawar. On landing at Peshawar, the leader of the formation was informed about his mission to strike Adampur at 5:30 p.m.. The aircraft had left Mauripur with internal bombs only and were to have the external stations loaded at Peshawar. However, Peshawar that evening was crowded with aircraft and arrangements had not yet been made to meet the unforeseen commitments that had suddenly arisen for the base. While the maintenance staff struggled to refuel the aircraft, time was slipping by and in order not to delay their mission further, their leader decided to drop his demand for the external bombs.

It was already dusk before they took off and pitch dark when the B-57 crossed into India flying at low level. The Initial Point, ten minutes from their target, was the bridge over the river Beas Ñ a darker streak on an already dark canvas; but they made no mistake about the attack. The anti-aircraft swung in action but the bombers repeated the attacks regardless of its hazard. Except for one aircraft, that had its left wing pierced by a 40 mm shell, no other damage was sustained. The formation landed back at Peshawar at 9:00 p.m. and was tasked for another mission against a bridge at 4:00 a.m. The formation, encouraged the success of the first mission, accept the task willingly and destroyed the target as required.

The non-stop nature of PAFÕs airfield offensive was indicated by the fact that, as the Adampur strike force was landing back at Peshawar, the other five B-57s were taking off for a follow up strike against Pathankot. The operational signal indicated four aircraft, but as five were available, so all took off. The discussed airfield at Pasrur was the IP (Initial Point) for run-in for the target. The new moon was giving a faint light and the visibility was fairly good. The Indian black out was quite good even in small villages.

There was no sign of any fire etc. of the previous F-86s attack. In fact there was a probability of missing the target. Thanks to an Indian who was kind enough to forget putting the airfield beacon off. It provided accurate pinpoint direction for the destruction of Pathankot. The enemy heard the attack and opened up with everything he had. It further assisted our pilots to see the airfield clearly. A large concentration of ground defences was reported at Pathankot. The PAF pilots were clear in their minds that once they were in an attack, they had to accomplish the mission. The enemy suffered a heavy loss. Next morning our troops intercepted an enemy radio message which said, ÒPathankot burning, immediate help neededÓ.

To conduct counter air offensive mission against enemy airfield, and to remain out of reach of their fighter aircraft, the PAF bomber wing remained elusive throughout the war. The pattern repeated was to take off from home base, strike inside Indian territory and recover at another airfield. The B-57 operations called for great skill, concentration, stamina and dedication. These qualities were found in abundance in the ever-eager crew of the wing and no task seemed impossible for them.

Operation Gibraltar
Role of SSG Para Commandos

Col SG MEHDI, MC who commanded the SSG till just before the 1965 war, gives a fascinating account of SSG operations during the conflict

Mian Arshad Hussain, a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan had demanded a judicial probe in the events leading to the 1965 war. On Oct. 23, 1977, Mian Sahib addressed the nation through a statement released to the Pakistan Times, Lahore. I quote;
Following Col. Mehdi's articles on the 1965 war, there has been an expression of interest in this momentous event as can be seen from the letters which appeared in this columns. In my opinion, the 1965 war bred the 1971 war and is thus an important contributory cause of the latter and the tragic events that have followed the conflict. Is it not time that a full-fledged inquiry was held into the causes, the conduct and the consequences of 1965 war?

Mian Arshad Hussain had excellent reasons to demand a probe into the concept, conduct and consequences of 1965 war' as he was Pakistan's High Commissioner at Delhi during that fateful period. He sent a warning on 4th September 1965 to the foreign office of Pakistan through Turkish Embassy that the Indians were planning to attack Pakistan, on 6th September. Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary through a press statement acknowledged that such a warning was indeed received by the Foreign Office. But the debate on this warning issue' remained inconclusive, in that Aziz Ahmed maintained that the warning was received two days after war had already started! Only probe by a high powered judicial commission can separate shadows from the substance.

1965 war
'Without deliberate intent'

In 1965, the Pakistan Army found itself at war with India without deliberate intent which achieved a measure of surprise....'This is the opening sentence of the foreword by General Zia-ul-Haq, written for The Pakistan Army, War 1965' compiled by Major General Shauket Riza from hundreds of interviews and documents.

General Mohammed Musa who commanded the Army in the 65 War, gives a graphic account of how the Indians surprised the GHQ, the C-in-C and the Supreme Commander Field Marshal Ayub Khan on September 6, 1965. Narrates Musa Khan on page 48 of his book My Version'.

India launched her ignominious, undeclared and blatant aggression on our homeland at about 0330 hours on 6 September. The Supreme Commander was informed about the invasion by Air Commander Akhtar of the Pakistan Air Force, who was on duty at the Air Defence Headquarters at Rawalpindi on night of 5/6 September. Indian troop movements across the frontier had been reported to him by the border posts of the PAF Wireless Observer wing. The President then rang me up to ascertain whether or not GHQ had received any information about the Indian attack and the whereabouts of the field army that morning'.

How did the GHQ
allow Indians to Achieve Surprise?

Let General Musa describe the genesis of the surprise' Indian attack on 6th September in his own words.

The then Foreign Minister Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and the Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed spurred on by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, who was commander of our troops in Azad Kashmir, pressed the Government to take advantage of the disturbed situation in the valley and direct the Army to send raiders into Indian held Kashmir for conducting guerrilla activities there and to help, on a long term basis, the locals in organising a movement with a view to eventually starting an uprising against the occupying power.

Continues the former C-in-C on page 6 of his book, the sponsors and supporters of the raids had at last succeeded in persuading the President to take the plunge that led to an all-out armed conflict with India' ....... To the extent that the concept of sending infiltrators in the Indian held Kashmir, code named Gibraltar' was the brain-child of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the simple truth and nothing but the truth. But General Musa, the C-in-C, assumed full responsibility for the development of the concept, its planning and coordination of the entire operation. This is graphically stated by him on page 35 of his book: After the Government finally decided that deep raids should be launched in Indian-held Kashmir, I directed Commander 12 Division, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, to prepare a draft plan for the operation, code-named Gibraltar' in consultation with GHQ and within the broad concept we had specified. GHQ approved it after making certain changes in it. With the help of sand model, he went over the final plan in Murree before it was put into effect on 7 August, 1965 under our overall control. The Supreme Commander and his Military Secretary were present. He also agreed with it. I was accompanied by the CGS (Major General Sher Bahadur) and the Directors of Military Operations and Intelligence (Brigadiers Gul Hasan and Irshad Ahmed Khan respectively). No civil official attended this briefing.

Broadly the plan envisaged, on a short-term basis, sabotage of military targets, disruptions of communications, etc. and, as a long-term measure, distribution of arms to the people of occupied Kashmir and initiation of a guerrilla movement there with a view to starting an uprising in the valley eventually. The push towards Akhnur was not part of it. However, it was considered as one of the likely operations that we might have to undertake, as we felt our activities would have an escalating effect.

When Akhtar Malik was pointing out on the sand model the various targets of the raiding parties of Gibraltar, the President did say why don't you go for Akhnur also? Akhtar Malik replied that, too, could be considered, but it was not raided because no Gibraltar force had been organised for that purpose.


Nevertheless, when the Indians started attacking and capturing Azad Kashmir territory in Tithwal and Haji Pir Pass areas, we decided to hold them in these places and retaliate by threatening Akhnur through the Chamb valley in order to release the pressure in the north.

The simple truth emerging from the preceeding statement of General Musa is clear cut, in that, while the concept of Gibraltar' did originate from the ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Musa, whatever he might say after the event, went along with it in a half heartedly and non serious manner.

Operation Gibraltar and the SSG Involvement

This writer is a personal witness to the unfolding of this tragedy as I had the honour to command our Army's Corps de elite, the Special Service Group (SSG) at this critical juncture.

In late May 1965, I was directed by the Vice Chief of General Staff, (late Major General Abid Bilgrami) to go to Murree and see GOC 12 Division, Akhtar Hussian Malik. The GOC's briefing of the outline plan of Gibraltar operation left me stunned. The plan was so childish, so bizarre as to be unacceptable to logical, competent, professionally sound military persons anywhere in the world.

I frankly told General Akhtar Malik that the Operation was a non starter and that I would render the same advice to the Chief and Vice Chief of General Staff. At GHQ, the same day I briefed the CGS and VCGS, who listened to me patiently. The result of my presentation however was barren of the result. Major General Malik Sher Bahadur (The CGS), posed only one question. You (Mehdi) say that operation Gibraltar as planned stands no chance of succeeding, but Akhtar Malik (COG 12 Division) feels confident of its success. My reply to the Chief of the General Staff was that, the conflicting view point of Mehdi and Akhtar Malik not withstanding, as Chief of General Staff of Pakistan Army, he should also have an opinion on this important matter as we were not playing a peace time war game, but with the destiny of Pakistan itself. To this date I remember the reaction of the CGS. He went red right up to his ears, and after a painful pause got up, extended his hand to shake and brought the interview to an end with the remarks that it is always interesting to listen to you!!

Undaunted by the rebuff at Murree and later at the GHQ, I decided to reduce my arguments in writing, as to the reasons why Gibraltar shall fail. These, in brief, were:

1. No ground had been prepared before launching of the operation, in concert with people of the valley.

2. The raids were to be launched in total logistical vacuum relying exclusively of what the troops would carry in their packs or living off the countryside. Without any covert support across the Ceasefire Line, this living off the land proved fatal to the security of the guerrillas. Most of them were betrayed.

3. GHQ had mixed up classic guerrilla operations with Commandos raids.

4. All SSG and other officers, responsible for training and later leading groups across the ceasefire line were critical of the soundness of the plan, unsure of the means and uncertain of the end.

SSG records at Cherat shall substantiate the points made above

The simple truth emerging from the narrative is, that neither the C-in-C Army nor General Staff had the guts to stand up to the President, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, and tell him that his advisers in the ministry of Foreign Affairs supported by GOC 12 Division, Akhtar Malik were taking him on a long ride commencing with Gibraltar, leading to his downfall via Tashkent, as it eventually proved! The loser in the final analysis was Pakistan, described so feelingly by General K.M. Arif in an analysis carried by daily Dawn', 6th September 1990. How and why Pakistan blundered into war .......... At that time, the policy making in the country was highly personalised. The institutions were weak and by-passed. Pakistan's Foreign Office with Mr. Aziz Ahmed as the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto as the Foreign Minister called the martial tunes. It had miscalculated that despite operation Gibraltar, the fighting was likely to remain confined inside the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Foreign Office is on record to have assessed that India was not in a position to risk a general war with Pakistan......for inexplicable reasons the General Headquarters based its operational plan in Kashmir on a wishful logic. The misplaced ego, the high ambition and the naive approach of a selected few plunged the country into an armed conflict. The outcome of the war, or the lack of it, eclipsed Ayub's position.

S.S.G. COMMANDO PARA DROPS

The 1965 War cannot be worthy of study unless the story of Pakistani commando drops on Adampur, Helwara and Pathankot air bases are briefly recounted. John Fricker calls this operation as an unmitigated disaster'. This operation conceived initially by PAF Chief who obtained the nod' of Ayub Khan in May/June 1965 while planning for operational contingencies in the event of an Indian aggression. Such advance operational planning is normal to all service HQ in peace time. GHQ passed the buck on to the commander of SSG- this writer. On being told by Vice Chief of General Staff Brigadier Bilgrami who had these instructions conveyed to him from Musa and Sher Bahadur the Chief of General Staff, I emphatically pointed out that the concept of operation was faulty as no raids of this nature, after the breakout of war, could have even a remote chance of success against fully alerted targets.

On my persistent refusal, GHQ told me that I should give my reasons for not undertaking the envisaged operation direct to the HQ, PAF. At a briefing arranged at SSG Parachute Training School at Peshawar in the presence of two senior officers of my command, Lt. Col. Abdul Matin, the Commander of No. 1 Commando Battalion, now retired and the brilliant Operations Staff Officer Maj. E. H. Dar, (Late Major General E. H. Dar) Air Force Chief were told that only a pre-emptive operation like the Israeli crippling raids against the front line Arab State's air bases as in 1956 Arab Israel War, could have probability of success. To this, the Air Chief observed that a decision to carry out pre-emptive operation as suggested could only be taken by the Government-meaning the President. Technically the observation made was correct but in that case the operation should have been based on the hypothesis of pre-emptive' alone. I had also objected to the para-commandos after being dropped, just left there in the void, in the heart of 100% hostile population with no equivalent of French Maquis to hide, feed and organise the escape of commandos.

That this was an unmitigated disaster from beginning to end is correct but for no fault of the brave band of commandos or their officers. I have already rendered a full account of this in my testimony to Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission, besides submission of a report to the Chief of General Staff and C-in-C in 1967.

Tribute

No objective study of this war would be complete without paying tribute to the great fighting spirit and unparalleled heroism of all ranks of the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force and notably of the SSG. The war of 1965 into which the country stumbled, with GHQ Surprised' and the army, its 25% of its strength still on leave, thus became a series of stray and isolated battles without any strategic concept and perspective. The Ghazis of the army, janbaz of the SSG, Shaheens of our Air force and Barbaroosas' of Pak Navy fought against the betrayal within and India's regimented hordes to an honourable draw. They also fought against international conspiracy of Anglo Saxon powers.

Conclusion

Had our Government initiated a probe into concept, conduct and consequences of 1965 War', and raised the curtain from the acts of gross omission or that of the criminal commission, the ignominy of 1971 could have been avoided.

BATTLE OF BUTTAR DOGRANDI
(16 - 17 Sep 1965)

SEPT 16
Deployment of Troops

After having spent a night in the area of Chawinda Railway Station, where BHQ 3 FF was also located in a Bunker, two troops of C squadron moved out to occupy the battle locations. Khaliq's troop took up position in area 15R on the northern outskirts of Chawinda while my troops went accross the Railway line. Lance Dafadar Ghazanfar's tank was positioned at the northern outskirts of Buttar Dograndi. It had under observation area up to track chawinda - Jassoran in the north and area from Jassoran up to Mundeki Barian in the west. Lance Dafadar Mohammad Khan's tank was deployed in the western part of the village which effectively covered area from Jassoran to Mundeki Barian and Khurpa. Other two tanks were deployed in the area of hut about 100 yards from the Railway Station building in the west. The hut also had few trees around it. Aslam's tank was placed under the umbrella tree facing north . My tank was placed south of hut under another tree facing towards west. The hut was located between the two tanks and there was no visual contact between us although we were few yards apart. Between four of us only myself and Ghazanfar were in visual contact. All my tanks were so placed that our line of sight was clear up to 2000 yards and more in the north and west where from the enemy could approach. I may mention here that we seldom cared for camouflage and concealment. We normally positioned our tanks where we could have maximum field of fire without realizing that we were providing opportunity to the enemy to locate us through binocular much before they reached our killing range.

Activity

As the sun came up I saw the movement of enemy tanks at a distance of 3000 yards in the north in the direction of Kot-Izzat. The armour column was moving from east to west. I could count each tank when it negotiated a gap between two clumps. I counted two squadrons of tanks and reported to my Squadron Commander accordingly. The same tanks were also reported by Khaliq. My Squadron Commander Major Raza Khan asked me to direct artillery fire on tank column. I showed my inability to do that. I thought that it would be waste of ammunition because I could not have directed the fire accurately. if it was so easy to direct artillery fire there was no need to attach artillery officers as observer and earmark a tank for them in each squadron. I requested to send Major Chaudhry forward, who was the Battery Commander to engage the target. Eventually Major Raza Khan ordered Khaliq to direct artillery fire on enemy tanks. He did that to no avail. The shells were falling short of the target and he could not correct the fire. In fact these shells created a screen between myself and the enemy. The enemy tanks moved behind that screen. At about 0800 hours elements of 3 FF passed my tank. They were moving cross country towards Pasrur. They were shaken and demoralized. They told me that the whole company had been run over by enemy tanks. I must mention here that I had no knowledge of the extent up to which 3 FF was deployed.

At this time I also observed movement of tanks in Jassoran. I then observed that four tanks appeared from a clump located on the eastern side of Jassoran and started movement in extended line formation parallel to the track towards my position. I ordered my troop to engage the enemy tanks. Four tanks of my troop simultaneously fired at them. Smoke was produced from the enemy tanks and they stopped. My gunner Gulzar was too happy thinking that he had hit the target. In fact he said so on Intercom. When the smoke disappeared I could not see enemy tanks. They had gone back to the clump and behind cover. It was on 17th when we captured colonel Tarapur's tank that I came to know about centurions having smoke dischargers fitted on top of the turret. Range was too great to be accurate, more than 2000 yds and thus we missed the target. The enemy was too quick to notice our fire and immediately released smoke bombs to withdraw behind smoke screen. We should have allowed them to come closer. But there was every possibility of their locating and engaging us before we could do that because we had positioned. There after, one squadron took up position on the outskirts of Jassoran on either side of village mosque and fire fight ensued between opposing forces. The enemy called for Artillery and Air support. Enemy aircraft could not locate my tanks as they were parked under trees. All enemy tank gunners proved as inaccurate as my gunner. My tank fired 16 rounds from one location. I could not observe the fall of shot because no dust was raised due to ploughed field. Same was the case with enemy shots which were falling all around my tank. This battle continued up to 1200 hours without any significant losses on either Side.

I may mention here that in 90 percent cases of direct hit the tank does not catch fire. Driver mostly remains safe because normally upper portion of the tank is hit and turret gets damaged, crew in the fighting compartment gets injured and even killed. But the driver, if he is safe, should try to take disabled tank to safety. This had happened in our squadron several times. the only loss up to 1200 hours in my troop was that the turret of Mohammad Khan Ôs tank got locked due to direct hit. The shot hit the tank at turret ring and recochetted. He wanted to go back but I did not allow and ordered him to remain in position and fire when ever the enemy tank come in his line of fire. It was an unwise decision on my part and the squadron commander had picked up my transmission. He ordered me to move Mohammad Khan backwards and gave me two other tanks in return. One tank was commanded by LD Flaksher while other was commanded by LD Kamal Khan (Turnet No. 1 CO's tank). At one time Ghazanfar reported that he could see some enemy tanks but was not in a favourable position to engage them. I ordered him to leave the village and advance 200 yrds take up position under a tree and fire at the enemy. He did that, I saw him reaching under the tree I had indicated. As he took up position he was fired upon be a troop of tank from Jassoran. He flashed back the message that shots were being recochetted from his tank. I immediately realized that by sending Gazanfar 200 yrd up I had placed him within the effective range of enemy tank guns. He was lucky that Indians were no good and they missed the target. I ordered him to reverse and take up old position. Had Gazanfar been killed I would have repented all my life. L.D. Ghazanfar and Mohammad Khan occasionally reported to me that enemy tank had been hit. After some time they would again report that the damaged tank had been pulled back by another enemy tank in spite of heavy fire from their side.

Ghazanfar was deployed north of Buttar Dugrandi to cover the area in the North up to track, and area east of Jassoran. This area was also being covered by my tank alongwith Aslam's tank. I, therefore, moved these tanks to take up position on the western edge of the village and cover area east of Jassoran including MundekiBairan - Khurpa.

At this point of time the RHQ and my Squadron Commander were located at Nogaza. After 1200 hours the enemy tanks moved to southern outskirts of Jassoran and established an base of fire with a squadron of tanks, and started shooting at my troop. I returned the fire. After some time another enemy squadron started moving towards south of Jassoran. every thing was happening under my nose. I passed frantic messages that my position was being out-flamed by enemy tanks. Our Artillery fired to stop that move but only with approximation because there was no artillery FOO with us to correct the fire. The fire fell short and provided cover to enemy tanks. I was also told by my Squadron Commander that our friends would look after the enemy's move and I need not worry. The enemy did not use Artille ry during this manoeuvre.

At about 1400 hours I received a massage from Major Raza Khan that situation in Buttar Dugandi was not favourable. He was located at Nogaza. I looked left towards Buttar Dudgadi and saw that my tanks were moving back wards. I called my tank commanders on wireless but received no reply. At this time I received a message from Khaliq that he could see heavy concentration of tanks in Jassoran and south of it. He also said that I need not worry as he was coming to my help. Since the situation was obscure, three to four tanks were burning between Buttar Dugrandi and Railway line. I decided to reach that village. My tank was facing Jassoran. I ordered the driver to reverse and then face Buttar Dugrandi. As my tank started moving towards the village, I saw that a centurian appeared from behind the village and took up position under the sole kikar tree north of village. I order the driver to halt and Gulzar laid his gun on that tank. But the enemy gunner was faster, he fired first. I saw the flash with open eye. The shot hit the gun tube of my tank and then the gun shield. It did not pierce through the tank armour. Before I could react my gunner pushed me from underneath. I looked down in the turret, it was full of smoke. The operator had already abandoned the tank. I got out of the tank followed by the gunner. I straight went in front of the tank and found the driver bleeding form his face. Splinters had injured him. I encouraged Sawar Fazal Hussain and told him to reverse the tank and take it behind the hut which was only 10 yards away. The enemy again fired at the moving tank but missed the target. I then told Fazal Hussain to cross the railway line, reach the main track and head for workshop at Pasroor . I then turned to Dafadar Aslam's tank who was unaware of what had happened. He was concentrating towards Jassoran and Kot Izzat. I told him that enemy had reached our rear in Buttar Dugrandi and he should engage them. His tank was placed in such a position that on his left was a hut, on the right was a tree. To locate and fire at the enemy which had reached his rear he had to change his position. As he reversed and came in view of enemy tank in Buttar Dugrandi, he was fired upon and hit. Sawar Anwar turned the tank towards Railway line, enemy tank fired again on the moving tank. Three to four shots struck the tank but none of them was fatal. The tank crossed the railway line and went away. Half an hour later I saw that tank standing near MS 5 badly damaged and with one track duty.

DEFENCE NOTES
Aslam's tank was crossing the railway from line west to east while Khaliq's tank was crossing the line from east to west. True to his words he was coming to my help but it was too late. He was advancing towards me standing in Cupola. He had covered only few yards when the same centurian fired a shot which was fatal and Khaliq's tank went into flames instantly. There was no time for the crew to bail out. All four of them were burnt to ashes. All this happened in few minutes. I looked around, there were no own troops except myself, my gunner and operator. There were no enemy troops either to be seen except that one deadly tank which had destroyed our three tanks within five minutes. The remaining tanks of Khaliq's troop did not cross the railway line. In fact he alone had come for my help while remaining tanks of his troop stuck to their position area 15 R. I decided to go back and report the situation to my Squadron Commander. We crossed the railway line and walked over the platform. At this time enemy was subjecting the railway station to tremendous Artillery fire. Through that fire we were able to reach the main track Chaiwanda-Pasrur. There was panic in Chaiwanda, HQ 24 Brigade had moved out but HQ 3FF remained steadfast in the area of tall trees. Our troops were moving on the track towards Pasroor in a disorganized manner. RR Jeeps were loaded with men. This was the second most depressing situation, the first being on the 11th. Since my aim was to reach the RHQ quickest, I suggested to my crew to jump in one of the jeeps and reach Nogaza as soon as possible. My gunner Gulzar disagreed with me with the reason If we go back in Infantry Jeep these people after the war would say that armour people used our jeep for running backward. I considered his argument valid and started running. As we reached short of milestone 5, I saw Captain Raheem Shah of 3 FF (later colonel) dug in with his company in reserve. I told him what had happened to my troop. He looked confident. He had been teaching us CBR warfare in School of Infantry and Tactics, Quetta. I reached Nogaza and contacted my Squadron Commander Maj Raza Khan and Col. Nisar. The two of them were sitting between Railway line and Nogaza facing Buttar Dugrandi. I could see five of our tanks destroyed, few of them were burning, between Railway line and the village. Two of my troop belonging to Ghazanfar and Flak Sher and the other three belonged to 33 TDU. I could see that Indian tanks were milling around in Buttar Dugrandi. Few RRs and tanks were deployed on Railway line facing Butter Dugrandi to stop the enemy advance. Situation was extremely grave and as I reported the death of Khaliq, Col. Nisar started weeping. I caught hold of his shoulder and said please do not weep, what will happen to us if you start weeping. Call some tanks from B Squadron and we shall attack Butter Dugrandi,. Major Raza interrupted and asked me to go away and rest. If at this point of time, the enemy had subjected Nogaza to heavy Artillery fire and at the same time pushed a troop of tank to the Railway line, they could have won the battle of Chawinda.
But the enemy was no good, or in other words the enemy Squadron Commander felt contended after capturing Buttar Dagrandi without any losses and destroying eight of our tanks in the process. Alternatively, if, after the destruction of my troop and capture of Buttar Dugrandi, the Squadron which had established the base of fire at Jassoran had moved on to the Railway Station, there was no one to stop them. The enemy would have carried the day but to our good luck this was not to happen. There was a lull in the battle for about an hour. At about 1500 hour four Centurians appeared from Buttar Dugrandi and advanced eastward in the direction of Sarang Pur (8699 old map) . I was lying under big Banian tree when some one came running to me and indicated the tanks. Dafadar Awal Sher's tank was in hull down position behind the track. It was ordered to open fire. Apart from Awal Sher's tank there were few other tanks and Rrs in the area. Two Centurians were knocked out and the other two swiftly reversed and went into the village. I felt that our performance was no good. If the fire was coordinated and controlled we could have destroyed all the four tanks. The range was 1000 yrds, the tanks were presenting broad side and their guns were not pointing towards us. However we were satisfied because we had stopped advance of the enemy any further.

At about 1630 hours I was called by Major Raza. He told me that we had to attack Buttar Dugrandi. He gave me four tanks, one of them was turret No. 1 CO's tank commanded by Lance Dafader Kamal Khan. My other two tanks commanders were LD Amin and Dafader Ismail. He gave me the following plan verbally.

I was to form up left on Nogaza along the Railway line. Will cross the line and attack Buttar Dugrandi on order which were to be passed after our Artillery had stopped bombardment on the village. I was to charge (southern) left side of the village and take up position west of it. A troop was called from B Squadron which was commanded by N/Risaldar Akbar, the same Akbar who according to Col. Nisar had chased the Indian tanks up to Mehrajke on the morning of 8th. This troop was to form up right of Nogaza along the Railway line and was to charge the northern side of the village. The Squadron Commander was to charge in the centre. I called my tank commanders and briefed them verbally on the ground. I decided to advance in Box formation. I placed my tank on the right. On my left was LD Amin's tank . The other two tanks were to follow. I instructed my tank commander to fire continuously at short halts on the village, after crossing the railway line. Artillery fire started at about 1700 hours. Major Rasheed of I SP was in the area to control the fire. The fire was accurate and tremendous. No house was visible, it was all dust and smoke in the area. As soon as the fire stopped I heard the message from Major Raza, Charly - charly - 60 Advance Out, I may mention here that Major Raza had a peculiar way of making wireless transmissions which I admired and enjoyed during my 3 year service with him. I ordered my driver to move and simultaneously hand signalled LD Amin to advance. There was no need for me to make a collective call to the troop because each one of us heard the Squadron Commander. After crossing the railway line I did not look left or right my eyes were fixed on the village which was nothing but dust and smoke. I peared through the smoke in search of enemy while crew was acting automatically i.e. halting for a short while and letting off a shot or two on the village. Before the dust raised by Artillary fire and our shots could settle down we had reached the village. I crossed the line of two centurians which Awal Sher had destroyed from railway line an hour ago south of village and advanced further to the west. Area of Butter Dugrandi was plain, flat and not even a tree in sight upto 1000 yard in the direction of jassoran and Mandiki Barian. I knew that Jassoran and south of it was infested with enemy tanks and expected my tank to be shot up any movement. I was standing in Capula ever since we crossed the railway line. As my tank reached in the effective range o enemy tank in Jassoran and south, It was fire at and I noticed three to four shots whizz passed my tank one after the other. I could not locate the enemy yet I ordered the gunner to fire and the driver to halt and reverse. At the same point of time LD Amin yelled that few shots had rechocheted off his tank. I looked left for the first time after crossing the railway line and found Amin's tank on my left, other two tanks were behind us. I ordered him to reverse and get behind a clump next to the village. I ordered my driver to get behind the houses. After reaching to safety I looked around. All my four tanks were in the village. The tool box of turnet No. 1 was on fire. I informed the tank commander accordingly on wireless. Ghazanfar's tank which was destroyed at noon was burning on my right. Several bodies of soldiers (enemy and own) were lying dead. At this time intense Artillary fire also started on the village. The fire must have been from enemy side because Major Rasheed of 1 SP would not have engaged us. I was standing in the Copola with empty mind and not knowing what to do when heard a massage from my Squadron Commander.

Hello three for one one, Shamshad has not crossed the railway line.. ask him to advance .. I am under heavy fire,

Before one could reply I went up on the air Hello, 61, I have crossed the Railway line.. went ahead of the village..was fired at from Jassoran and now in Dograndi.. out , In return I received a dressing down for not reporting the situation earlier. I must mention here that leading troop leader must report the situation but he can not always do that when suddenly confronted by the enemy. Instinctively he will act to save himself first and then do anything else. It is for the Squadron Commander to keep himself up to such an extent from where he can observe his leading troop which is going in attack or advancing to contact. In these two operations of war the leading troop leader will seldom get a chance to report the situation because there are vast chances of his tank getting knocked out and will need immediate help. A Squadron Commander who remains in the rear or keeps his cupola closed will not only deprive the leading troop leader of the help he would need so badly and immediately but will also remain blind to the situation on battle field.

As I finished my transmission a platoon of Infantry appeared from behind the houses. They were advancing in extended line towards my tank with rifles on guard. I waved at them to find out who they were. Since the surrounding was hazy due to dust and smoke I could not make out whether they were friends or foes. I just could not visualise that enemy infantry could advance on my tank. I thought they were own troops. I tried to stop them at a distance with hand signal but they continued advancing. Artillery fire was still falling. I was double minded and confused. I ordered the gunner to fire machine gun on their feet and not kill them. They could be own troop. By that time they had reach as close as 20 yards from my tank, I suddenly noticed a turban and olive green uniform which looked khaki from a distance due to smoke and dust. I ordered the troop to open MG fire on the enemy. My machine gun developed fault at that crucial moment. I do not know whether my other tanks opened fire or not but I saw some soldiers taking position on the ground and others still advancing. More and more Infantry was coming from behind the houses Time was very short. I spotted a rocket launcher, ordered the gunner to fully depress the main gun and fire few HE round on the Infantry. The gunner fired three or four rounds rapidly. When the dust settled, I saw several soldiers laying dead, no living soul was visible. Meanwhile my squadron commander had ordered my troop to withdraw to railway line. I looked back, my three tanks were already moving backwards.

I ordered the driver to reverse. The tank reversed a distance of 1000 yards and reached behind the railway line from where we had started 20 minutes back.

What happened to the squadron commander and the other troop? After issuing orders to attack, Major Raza crossed the railway line and took up position under a lone tree about 20 yards away from railway line. He had closed down his cupola and therefore could not track my movement. He remained in this position and did not attack the centre of the village. N/R Akbar did not leave FUP ( railway line) at all. After few minutes I saw that enemy Infantry appeared from the village and started advancing towards railway line. We fired all weapons, artillery fire was called. The advance was halted. We remained pitched against the enemy till late at night when we were ordered to move back and leaguer in Matteke. As far as I know there was nothing between Buttar Dugrandi and Nogaza once we left that place for leaguer. I wonder if H Q 3 FF remained deployed on Railway station during night 16/17 September. I also do not know where Capt Rahim Shah was deployed during night 16/17 September. However, we met again at Nogaza on 17th September to Attack Jassoran that morning the details of which will appear in D.J. of May 98.

IN THE DESERT

Brig (Retd) MUHAMMAD TAJ, SJ & BAR, one of the authentic heroes of our time, recounts a small unit action in the Thar Desert during the 1965 war

In a recent issue of the 'Defence Journal', I briefly covered the battles of Shakarbu,
Kharin and Dali fought gallantly by 18 Punjab (Desert Hawks). In this article the battle of Kalraon-ka-Talao shall be described. In this battle the enemy was so badly defeated that he had to re-group the battalions and never dared to face Pakistani troops again during 1965 war.

During Dali Operation, 18 Punjab had captured three Indian tanks in serviceable condition and probably is the only proud battalion that had used these very tanks against the Indians.

Indian commanders in desert after suffering a humiliating defeat at Dali Area tried to capture isolated Rangers Posts to save their face. One of their targets was Kalraon - Talao occupied by our Rangers. Brigade commander, having obtained the information that Indians are concentrating some infantry and artillery against this Ranger's Post, ordered the Desert Hawks to reinforce Kalraon - ka -Talao. 18 Punjab had hardly reached this area when at dawn the Indians attacked the post with 4 Marhattas supported by artillery. As the flanking company Commander, having concentrated at night. I heard the artillery and small arms fire and moved to the forward sections to observe the direction of fire and the enemy's intention. The forward elements were under enemy's machinegun fire. I tried to see through the binoculars the direction of fire, when the intensity of fire increased and the Section Commander insisted that I must get into the trench. I hesitated and continued observing the movement of the enemy. The Section Commander came out of his trench saying that if you do not take shelter we have no right to be in the trenches. So I jumped into the trench and ordered the platoon to occupy the feature on the left which was overlooking the direction of enemy assaulting elements. I along with the platoon and machine guns, reached this position and found at least two companies advancing towards the Ranger's post. I immediately ordered the machine gunners to open fire. 4 Marhattas got totally surprised on being fired upon from the flank.

This flanking fire and fire by the captured tanks slowed down the momentum of the attack.

The enemy's battalion suffered heavy casualties and the attack failed. 18 Punjab and captured tanks played their role so effectively that 4 Marhattas ran back in all directions leaving behind their dead and wounded. It was later reported by intelligence agencies that 4 Marhattas was so badly mauled that it had to be regrouped and was no more an effective unit during the '65 war.


Next day the Indians again tried to reinforce this failure and this time used 3 Garhwals to assault the post. This unit also received the same treatment from the gallant Pakistani troops and the attack failed. 3 Garhwals suffered heavy casualties and were withdrawn. After this, the Indian forces never tried to face Pakistani troops anywhere in this desert and 18 Punjab in recognition of its achievements was permitted to use 'Desert Hawks' with it's name. This action further confirms the fundamentals of War i.e. a well thought- out maneuver by a small force can always defeat a major force.

The loyal, well trained and highly motivated troops, without caring for their lives, can endure and show outstanding courage in times of danger despite fatigue. The Section Commander's reaction to come out of his trench seeing his senior outside the trench is a typical example of well trained, dedicated and loyal soldiers that make a proud unit.

It is said that ten good soldiers wisely led will beat a hundred without head. Here the Indians launched both the attacks (one after the other) without proper analysis and intelligence and got badly defeated.

Lastly, one must not forget that the war makes extremely heavy demands on the soldiers strength, therefore train your men during the peace time under adverse conditions so that their mind is in peace in the battle.

At the end we must not forget the brave, gallant and dedicated soldiers who had laid down their lives during the '65 war. Let us hope that their sacrifices shall not go waste and the cause for which they made supreme sacrifice of their lives shall be honoured. They had proved their worth in 1965 and we must strive harder to be worthy of them.

DEFENCE OF CHAWINDA

Maj (Retd) SHAMSHAD ALI KHAN gives an authentic first person account of the defence of the pivotal town of CHAWINDA in the SIALKOT SECTOR in the 1965 war


On 12th morning C Squadron was left with two troops due to loss of Sultan Bahadur on 11th at Phillorah. My squadron had lost only one tank so far as battle casualty, others were mechanical breakdowns and therefore only two troops were available to defend Chawinda. Khaliq’s troop was sent to Area 15 R on the northern outskirts of the village where Col. Shanwari’s Infantry had taken up position in the evening of 11 Sept. My troop was deployed along the railway line facing Jassoran with a task to stop enemy advance on Chawinda from that direction. Major Affendi’s Squadron was deployed on right of Chawinda. The exact location and extent is not known to me. Raccee troop with six recoilless rifles and six .30 brownings was also deployed independently, of which I have no knowledge. However, throughout the war, this troop did not suffer any casualty.
12th September was a peaceful day for my troop but not for Khaliq. The enemy did make probing attacks which Khaliq handled successfully. I heard unpleasant transmissions when a driver on one of his tank was killed through direct fire.

Somehow our deployment of tanks differed from Indians. They used tanks only for offensive action. Always concealed and camouflaged when deployed in static roll. They made good use of foot soldiers. Tanks seldom moved without infantry as per dictates of ground. In our case we did otherwise. Although our infantry was always around but we, as tank commanders, did not know their location nor did we know the forward and flanking extents of our defences. We also did not care much about concealment and positioned tanks which could be picked up by the enemy from long distance.


On the morning of 13th Major Raza Khan came back from rear and assumed command of the squadron. Khaliq was again deployed in area 15R and my troop along the railway line facing Jassoran. My tank was located behind high ground Nogaza grave, Grid reference 881012 (as per old maps). Regimental HQ was also located in the same area. At about 1200 hours I heard rifle bursts being fired at short intervals. I saw that an Indian soldier was firing at my tank from the direction of Dograndi. He was about 500 yards away. I called ‘Wurdee’ Major N/R Akhtar Hussain Shah and showed him the enemy soldier. His green uniform was clearly visible. We decided to catch him alive. A party of the men was formed including myself and N/R Akhtar Hussain Shah. We advanced in the direction of enemy infantry man with our stens on guard. We reached the point from where the enemy rifleman was firing, searched the entire field but there was no trace of enemy soldier, neither our infantry was deployed there. We came back disappointed. I can therefore conclude that enemy did send out patrol in order to probe our defences. I wonder if our infantry did the same. Khaliq’s troop remained under pressure on 13th September also but he remained steadfast.

On the morning of 14th we went into our positions as on 13th. At about 1600 hours I received orders to move and take up position in Mundeke Berian. I was told that enemy was advancing to that village from Jassoran.

I crossed the railway line and moved toward Mundeke Barian. When I reached near Butter Dugrandi I saw that a Shernam II was approaching from track Chanda-Jassoran. The tank Commander stopped me with hand signal. He was an elderly JCO with big mustaches from 33 TDU. He told me that he had gone across track Chawinda-Badiana, of which I had no knowledge. In fact I did not know that TDU was also operating with us. He further told me that his two tanks had been hit by enemy tanks short of Janewali. He requested me to accompany him and destroy the enemy tanks across the railways line. He further told me that there was good hull down position for me on the home side of railway line.

I asked for the permission to go with the JCO. The permission was not granted. I felt sorry for the JCO who had approached me with all the hope but I could not help him. I feel even today that I should have been allowed to go with the JCO who had seen the enemy tanks and could have directed me to a position from where I could destroy them.

From Buttar Dugrandi I was called back to Nogaza and was told that I was going to a wrong place. From the high ground I was shown a village on ground as Mundeke Barian and was ordered to reach there urgently. I reached that village and deployed my tank under a prominent tree. The troop was deployed in front of the village facing Jassoran and reported to the Squadron Commander. My Squadron Commander in turn reported to the Commanding Officer that his troop had reached the right destination. After some time I observed a civilian moving around in the area and inquired from him the name of the village. It was village Khurpa where I had taken up position. I wonder even today as to whether I had to defend Khurpa or Mundeke Barian. In any case map reading in the plains of Punjab is quite difficult specially in green season. In fact initially I was moving in right direction. After sometime I saw a troop of tanks coming out of Jassoran and moving parallel to the track facing Chawinda. I looked through my binoculars. Only the turret and gun was visible due to crop. To me they appeared to be M-48s. I passed the message accordingly to my squadron commander. I received the reply from Major Sikander that anything in front is enemy and I must open fire immediately. I ordered my tanks to open fire. The range was too great (3000 yards) to be accurate. The tanks in front did not return fire, instead they went north of track and disappeared. I remained deployed there for rest of the day with no activity.

Night fell and I was ordered to form a troop leaguer and stay there. I did not welcome this order and disliked to be left alone in the wilderness. I requested my squadron commander not to abandon me in the darkness of night. My request was not accepted and thereafter I collected my four tanks to form troop leaguer. No replenishment was to come.


Late at night I received orders to reach the high ground and join regimental leaguer there. It was a problem to reach the high ground because map reading was not possible at night. I requested Maj Raza Khan to show me a torch light signal from the high ground so that I could take direction. He did show the light which I could not locate. I then requested him to fire a very light to show me the direction which he refused to do and asked me not to bother him anymore and find my own way. I may mention here that north of my location very lights were being fired extensively.

I felt that enemy troops faced the same problems as myself, the direction problem. As I tried to line up one of my tanks failed to start. I ordered my other tank to toe the non starter. When the tank commander displayed reluctance, I decided to toe the non starter behind my tank. Keeping a safety margin I started moving towards east followed by other tanks. I hit Mattock instead of high ground where I happened to find Risaldar Riazul Hassan who was escorting few tanks, which were released from workshop, to regiment leaguer. I followed him and reached the leaguer at a time when Capt Rashid our quarter master, was leaving after replenishing the regiment. On the morning of 15th Khaliq was sent to 15R as usual and I was ordered to deploy along the railway line facing Jassoran.

At about 1200 hours pressure developed on Khaliq’s troop, thereafter I was ordered to move up for his support and stop enemy penetration between Jassoran and Chawinda. This was to prevent out flanking move from that direction by the enemy. I was also told to coordinate with the Battalion HQ of 3FF which was positioned in the area of tall trees little ahead of railway station in the north.

I ordered two tanks, Ghazanfar and Mohammed Khan, to take position in Butter Dugrandi. I along with Dafadar Aslam moved along the railway line keeping my tank west of the line and that of Aslam on the east. There was no visual contact between myself and Aslam due to intervening Railway station building. As I reached near the hut about 100 yards west of Railway station I spotted a centurion firing from area in the direction of rest house on Railway station. At the sametime I received uneasy messages from Dafadar Aslam. Gulzar, my gunner immediately engaged the enemy tank but he missed the target. The tank quickly reversed and went into the grove. I called for Aslam but there was no reply from his side. I could feel that something had gone wrong. I left my tank in position and ran towards rest house. There I saw that Aslam’s tank was standing rammed into a railway quarter Railway Station was under heavy artillery fire. The engine was under the debris which the crew was busy removing.

What happened was that as Aslam advanced ahead of rest house he came in the open and was engaged by the enemy tank which was already in position. The shot hit the rear left tool box and ricocheted. The driver reversed in hurry and hit the quarter in the rear. The tank stopped, meanwhile I engaged the enemy tank and Aslam’s tank was saved.

I helped them in clearing up the debris and started the tank. After placing Aslam in a suitable position I contacted CO 3FF in his bunker who was in good mood and high spirits. I briefed him about the location of my tanks which would remain in his support.

I may mention here that I did not ask him about the forward and flanking extents of his battalion nor did he brief me about that very important point of coordination for which we had to pay heavily the next day. Throughout the day my two tanks in Butter Dugrandi did not fire. However myself and Aslam did fire shots whenever the enemy tanks showed up in front of us. By now I had reached the conclusion that it was waste of ammunition to fire when the enemy tank is far too away. Mostly we kept them under observation and they were also doing the same. On this day the enemy also used air force in support of ground troops. My tank was rocketed several times but each time the rocket hit the ground few yards away from my tank. For rest of the day my troop remained in position with out any serious fighting, the enemy appeared occasionally in front of us. We fired at him and he disappeared every time in the grove.

At night we were told to leaguer close to front line and deploy next morning in the same position myself and Khaliq got together in the area of railway station close to 3FF battalion HQ who provided protection to our tanks. That night we spent together under one shelter and compared notes. Khaliq was quite bitter about the way his troops were being employed since last four days. He was being battered since last four days at the same location. He expected relief.

He was being used in anti tank role in static position while 106 recoilless rifles were available in plenty for that role. After few hours rest we were back again in our position at the first light 16th September.

For four days i.e. 12-15 September the enemy did not launch a determined attack on Chawinda which is evident form the casualties sustained by both sides, wich was almost nil.

However, the enemy did launch limited amend probing offensives frontly on Khaliq troop and also trying to fines flanks towards west of Chawinda. They did not attempt to prove the eastern side of Chawinda.

'TAIL CHOPPERS' - BIRTH OF A LEGEND

When War broke out in 1965, East Pakistan had only a solitary squadron of 12 F-86F aircraft at Dhaka to meet its air defence requirements. Since offensive operations were not contemplated from the East, it was expected that No 14 Squadron alone would be sufficient to counter the limited threat envisaged.

No 14 Squadron based at Tezgaon on the outskirts of Dhaka, had maintained a constant vigil of air defence alert right since the Rann of Kutch crisis in April, 1965. The limited effort available and long spells of watchfulness had taken their toll in fatigue and exhaustion. The prevailing unsafe conditions further aggravated the situation. The single airfield had inadequate dispersal. Absence of proper aircraft protective pens, sand bags, camouflage nets and operational readiness platforms, non-existence of airfield fencing and ground defence arrangements must have given the Station Commander Group Captain Ghulam Haider, nightmares. The 14 Squadron aircraft remained in the open while the pilots had to be accommodated in tents. Yet the Station Commander set about making preparations. A few aircraft decoys were placed at strategic locations. Hessain cloth was acquired and utilizing the natural camouflage of East Pakistan, some degree of concealment and deception was achieved.

Tezgaon airfield was defended by only one battery of ack ack. Little or no early warning of incoming raids was possible. There was a solitary and out-dated Marconi radar at Kurmitola 20 kilometers north of Dhaka. It was virtually useless as enemy aircraft could approach from any direction and not be detected at low level. There was no other reporting organization against low level raids.

It was in this scenario that No 14 Squadron took up its vigil to guard the aerial frontiers of East Pakistan. Prior to 1 September, there had been no formal indication of the impending operations. On 2 September, Air Headquarters ordered a special alert and issued instructions for dispersal and camouflage. From this date, two aircraft were flown twice daily on Combat Air Patrol (CAP) missions. On 4 September an aircraft was lost due to a bird hit. The pilot ejected safely but the squadron strength was reduced to 11 aircraft.

When War ultimately broke out on 6 September, No 14 Squadron was ordered to be ready for immediate strikes. CAP missions were flown over Dhaka all day. When PAF launched its airfield strike plan at dusk on 6 September, No 14 Squadron was asked to hold back because of the difficulty in synchronizing the strike timings owing to the one hour difference in local times between East and West Pakistan. Moreover, the Government wanted to wait and see. In case the situation remained quiet overnight in East Pakistan, it might prove possible to avoid an escalation of hostilities. This hope was short lived. IAF Canberras from Kalaikunda penetrated into East Pakistan-s airspace as deep as Dhaka during the night of 6/7 September, and dropped bombs at random without much effect in the way of damage of casualties.

IAF also launched a pre-dawn offensive on 7 September. Various targets in East Pakistan comprising the airfields at Chittagong, Jessore, Lalmunirhat, Shibgang, Thakurgaon and Kurmitola were attacked. Low clouds and the natural camouflage of East Pakistan caused the Indian aircraft to miss Tezgaon air field at Dhaka altogether. Instead they attacked Kurmitola, an airfield in the vicinity of Dhaka. Here, a barrack was hit with rockets resulting in two casualties-one Sergeant AR Choudhry, and a child.

Two Sabres were scrambled to intercept the enemy. They failed to catch up with them but Flight Lieutenant ATM Aziz did not return from the mission. Later the wreckage of his Sabre was discovered 25 kilometers north of Dhaka. It indicated no damage from enemy action but the cause of the accident was never established. No 14 Squadron was now down to 10 aircraft.

Strike at Kalaikunda

The night and pre-dawn raids of IAF allowed the PAF C-in-C to retaliate. PAF-s strike against Kalaikunda was a totally different story. After the mission order had been received at about 6 a.m. on 7 September, five pilots (Flight Lieutenants Haleem, Baseer, Tariq Habib Khan and Flying Officer Afzal Khan) led by their Squadron Commander, Squadron Leader Shabbir Hussain Syed were briefed for a low level mission involving a distance of nearly 300 kilometers from Dhaka. Because of the necessity to fly low all the way, the Sabres were required to carry their full load of external fuel in two 120 and two 200- gallon drop tanks per aircraft, leaving only their 0.5 inch machine-guns available for the attack.

Despite poor visibility the Sabre formation reached its target and as the No 14 Squadron pilots pulled up to commence their attack, it was obvious that complete surprise had been achieved. There was no anti-aircraft fire and no fewer than 14 Canberras were lined up wing-tip to wing-tip on the tarmac as though for peacetime review. The Indians had probably never imagined that such a small force could react with such speed and audacity against odds so heavily weighted against it, and that, too, at the very limits of its reach into Indian territory.

Each Sabre put in two passes over the airfield and by the time they exited, Kalaikunda was engulfed in smoke and flames. The mission landed back safely at 0744 a.m., claiming 10 Canberras destroyed and five damaged along with two Hunters damaged. A remarkable achievement by only five aircraft.

While the strike had been airborne, large numbers of IAF aircraft had been plotted over Jessore, heading towards Dhaka. Several of the six remaining Sabres on the airfield were scrambled for interception. No contact, however, was made with the IAF aircraft, which headed back across the Indian border. The degree of the air defence effort at Dhaka can be illustrated by the fact that one pilot alone-Flight Lieutenant Farooq F Khan- was scrambled five times in his Sabre in the first two hours after daybreak on 7 September. At no time, however, did he see an enemy aircraft.

A Second Attack on Kalaikunda

To complete the destruction of Kalaikunda, a second raid was ordered at 10:30 a.m. This time Flight Lieutenant Haleem led a formation of four Sabres. Visibility was still very bad when they reached the target but now the enemy was prepared. A barrage of anti-aircraft fire greeted them and nine Hunters pounced on them. The Sabres split in two pairs. One continued the attack while the others turned to engage the Hunters. Flight Lieutenant Tariq Habib, leading the second pair asked his No 2 Flying Officer Afzal Khan to jettison his fuel tanks to prepare for battle but he was shot down before he could do so. Flight Lieutenant Tariq Habib in the meantime jettisoned three of his tanks, but the fourth hung up and with this handicap he was cornered by 3 Hunters for a good ten minutes. With remarkable coolness and presence of mind, he twisted and turned at low level and though his aircraft got badly damaged, he managed to shake them off and returned safely to Dhaka. For his courage and skill in fighting his way clear of the larger and better equipped enemy force, Tariq Habib was awarded a well-deserved Sitara-e-Jurat. His Squadron Commander, Squadron Leader Shabbir Hussain Syed was also decorated with Sitara-e-Jurat for his outstanding leadership. No 14 Squadron earned the nickname of Tail Choppers, alluding to the swath of bullets they used at Kalaikunda to cut through the tails of IAF-s neatly lined up Canberras. In West Pakistan, PAF had cut off the head of the Indian Air Force, and in their two sorties on 7 September, the pilots of No 14 Squadron did an equally good job with the tail.

In its second raid, No 14 Squadron claimed 4 to 6 Canberras destroyed but lost one pilot and one Sabre. Flight Lieutenant Tariq Habib-s aircraft also could not be recovered for want of spares. The squadron strength was now reduced to 8 but not their zeal to attack the enemy. It was only bad weather and some political considerations that brought a lull in their operations.

Other Raids

On 10 September, No 14 Squadron struck IAF Base Baghdogra with 4 Sabres. On 14 September it attacked Barrackpore and Agartala. Due to enemy-s retreat to deeper bases, the squadron-s score in these strikes was limited to 5 transport aircraft, 2 fighters, 1 Canberra and a helicopter.

These were its last strike missions as it was considered prudent to conserve the depleted strength of No 14 Squadron specially since the enemy never showed its face again on the eastern front for the rest of the war.

Cumulative Effect

No 14 Squadron-s offensive on 7 September was a crucial blow to IAF morale. The fearless and timely action of this plucky squadron caused the enemy to withdraw the bulk of its aircraft to bases in the rear, thus ensuring by default, the comparative security of East Pakistan. This stirring tale of valour and stoic defiance by 14 Squadron was to have a second, even more glorious chapter- to be written by the blood and grit of its men, in another far grimmer war-in December, 1971.

'A Flying Start'
PAF Opens Its Account in September 1965

Columnist Gp Capt SM HALI gives a fascinating account of PAF's initiatives at the start of the 1965 war

Operation Grand Slam was launched across the CFL in the Chamb sector of Kashmir, towards Jaurian and Akhnur, at first light on 01 September, 1965 by Pak Army's 12 Division under its GOC Major General Akhtar Malik. By early afternoon, they had advanced more than 10-15 miles.
PAF maintained continuous Combat Air Patrols (Caps) comprising pairs of F-86s supported by single F-104A Starfighters, keeping about 10 miles away from the border to avoid provocation, but ready to deal immediately with any attempt at IAF intervention in the land battle. The plan was to withdraw the CAP by 1700 hours if the IAF had not reacted by then. The IAF however, remained conspicuously absent till afternoon which was enigmatic and added to the tension. That's when Nur Khan, the PAF C-in-C decided to obtain assessments of the battle area from personal observation. He took off in an Army L-19 aircraft from Gujrat. On landing back from the reconnaissance flight, the Air Marshal decided to extend the CAP beyond 1700 hours. His observation was that Pakistani troops, tanks, guns and vehicles were too temptingly exposed for the IAF to ignore for long.

At 1720 hours, Army reported that IAF was indeed attacking the advancing Pakistani forces in the Chamb sector. Within minutes, Squadron Leader Sarfraz Rafiqui, Officer Commanding No 5 Squadron and Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Bhatti, Flight Commander No 15 Squadron were scrambled and their F-86 Sabres were directed towards the enemy. The rest is narrated by Bhatti:

... Rafiqui and I were told to proceed to Chamb area where the enemy aircraft were attacking our advancing troops. Rafiqui's radio had packed up for a while on the way up. Over the area we descended fast, looking all round and below us for the enemy aircraft. At about this time we also learnt that the C-in-C was flying around the area in an L-19. We did not see him but later on discovered that he had left the area a little while earlier.

Our search succeeded and I spotted two enemy aircraft. They were crossing underneath us and I informed Rafiqui about it. He immediately acknowledged ... 'contact'! Rafiqui said he was going for them. While covering his tail, I spotted two Canberra's 9 O'clock from me at 5-6,000 feet. Then I spotted another two Vampires trying to get behind Rafiqui. I instinctively broke off and positioned myself behind these two. In the meantime Rafiqui had knocked down one of his two targets and was chasing the other. About now I had my sights on one of my own and was holding my fire. I was anxiously waiting for my leader to bring down his second and clear out of my way. When the Vampire I had targeted, closed in on Rafiqui too dangerously, I called out to him to break left. Within the next moment, Rafiqui shot down his second, reacting to my call and broke left. Simultaneously, I pressed my trigger and hit one of them. Having disposed of one I shifted my sight on the other and fired at him. In the chase I had gone as low as 200 feet off the ground when I shot my second prey, he ducked and went into the trees. We had bagged four in our first engagement with the Indians....'

More than thirty years after the 1965 War, the Indian version of the engagement is available in an article 'Four-Nil at Chamb' on the Internet in the programme Bharat-Rakshak-Vayu Sena. Whereas the account admits the loss of four IAF Vampires over Chamb on 1st September, some interesting revelations are made. Portions of which are quoted here:-

'On September 01, the Pakistani artillery started shelling the Indian forward positions, starting 0330 hours, the shelling was exceptionally heavy and continued till 0630 hours. At which time a Pakistani Army force of two Infantry Brigades and two Armoured regiments started their attack on the Indian positions. 3rd Mahar was the forward most battalion and it bore the brunt of the attack along with a solitary squadron of AMX-13 tanks of 20th Lancers. Inspite of their heroic defence the sheer strength of the enemy made its presence felt. No artillery support was given as the Pak shelling had put the guns out of action.

Faced with this critical situation, Commander, 191 Infantry Brigade asked for air support at 1100 hours ... by the time the Defence Minister okayed the request, five hours had elapsed.'

(This explains the absence of IAF from the battle area till late afternoon)

'Pathankot was the nearest airbase available to the zone of conflict. Situated near the border between Jammu and Punjab, Pathankot was a mere 30 seconds flying time from the border ... It had two Mystere Squadrons No 3 and 31 and No 45 Squadron flying Vampire fighters ... The Vampires had been ready and armed sitting on the tarmac and on receipt of the CAS's orders, the first wave of four Vampires took off at 1719 hours ... Three missions were to be flown. The second one at 1730 and the third at 1740 hours ... The arrival of the Vampires over the battlefield was greeted with relief. But relief turned to horror as the aircraft made a strafing run on the 3 Mahar positions ... they then turned their attention towards the Pakistani tanks ... Ground fire hit one of the Vampires flown by Flying Officer SV Pathak ... The PAF was called up and soon a pair of Sidewinder - armed F-86s were over the area....'

The article then recounts Bhatti's account verbatim and then comments on some aspects ... 'However, Bhatti is inaccurate in identifying Canberras in the vicinity, as no Canberra's were flying that day. He had also missed another fact, that one Vampire escaped the wrath of the Sabres. Flight Lieutenant Sondhi managed to escape. Of the four Vampires claimed by the Pakistanis, Rafiqui was credited with two of the kills, with Bhatti getting the credit for the Sabres. There was only one survivor, Flying Officer SV Pathak from the first formation who managed to bale out (after his Vampire was hit by ground fire). Flight Lieutenants A K Bhagwagar, V M Joshi and S Bharadwaj, all from the second formation were killed. The solitary Vampire that escaped was from the second formation. A very shaken Flight Lieutenant Sondhi explained how the Sabres made mince meat of his formation..... All in all the Vampires had received a bad mauling from the Pakistan Air Defences.'

Air Marshal Nur Khan, returning from his visit to the battle front, landed at Sargodha where he received the news of the PAF opening its account and the decisive initial victory achieved over the IAF. He was able to congratulate in person the two PAF officers responsible for drawing first blood. This overwhelming victory had several profound effects on the military situation. One of them, unknown then to PAF, after losing an entire formation of four Vampires in the opening round, IAF ordered the immediate withdrawal of its entire fleet of 132 Vampires and 56 Dassault Ouragons (Toofani) from its operational inventory. This single engagement resulted in the effective reduction of IAF Combat Strength by about 35%.

The entire air battle had taken place in broad view of the Pakistan Army whose morale was raised pitch high at the prompt dispatch of its tormentors. Brigadier Amjad Chaudhry, the Artillery Commander of No 4 Corps wrote in a letter to the C-in-C, 'Your very first action in Chamb left no doubt in our minds that we did not have to worry much about the enemy air. The pattern was set there and then. We will never forget that spectacle - it lifted our spirits and gave us a flying start.'

Devastation of Pathankot

Columnist Gp Capt SULTAN M HALI writes about the PAF’s air strike on PATHANKOT in 1965.

PAF’s air strike on 6th September, 1965 on the Indian Air Force base of Pathankot has been rated by historians and defence analysts of both Indian and Pakistan as one of the most successful air raids of contemporary history. Not only did the PAF pilots achieve complete surprise but they also executed the attack with text-book precision. Its details make fascinating reading.

PAF’s airfield strike plan for the dusk of day one of the war in 1965 comprised the following:-

STATION OF ORIGIN
SORTIES & AIRCRAFT TARGET
Sargodha
8 F-86 Sabres Adampur
Sargodha
8 F-86 Sabres Halwara
Peshawar
8 F-86 Sabres Pathankot
Mauripur
8 F-86 Sabres Jamnagar
Source: Story of PAF


The Time Over Target (TOT) for the strike was set at 1705 hours. This was to be followed by night bombing raids by B-57 bombers.

No 19 Squadron which was based at Peshawar, had been given the Indian airfield at Pathankot as its first target. This target had been allotted in mid-1965 when the Rann of Katch crisis was at its peak. Pathankot was the only large Indian Air Force (IAF) airfield within fighter reach of Peshawar, and even this distance of 200 miles or so was marginal for the Sabre, with two 200-gallon drop tanks in addition to full internal fuel, if sufficient reserve was to be kept in hand for a fighting exit. This would limit the weapons to only the 1800 rounds of the six. 50 Browning guns of the Sabres.

Squadron Leader Sajad Haider, affectionately known as ‘Nosey Haider’, the Squadron Commander of No 19 Squadron had prepared his squadron pilots well and planned the strikes very thoroughly using a High-lo-High profile. This involved getting airborne from Peshawar and climbing high in the opposite direction then dipping to tree-top level below radar cover, turning simultaneously towards the target. The Squadron had in fact carried out identical and simulated strikes to practice for attacks on its primary and alternate targets.

Dawn of 6th September, 1965 saw a formation of 6 F-86s of No 19 Squadron fully loaded with 5 inch rockets (a last minute premonition the night before, by Air Marshal Nur Khan the C-in-C, which paid rich dividends) flying on “Hot Patrol’. The moment the Air Defence Commander learnt of Indian Army’s advance towards Lahore, the 19 Squadron formation was diverted to stop the advancing Indian armour columns at Wagah. In twenty minutes of action, the Grand Trunk Road was littered with scores of burning tanks, armoured and soft vehicles. The 5 inch rockets had a devastating effect on the enemy armour. The formation led by Squadron Leader Sajad Haider with Flight Lieutenants M Akbar, Dilawar Hussain, Ghani Akbar and Flying Officers Khalid Latif, and Arshad Chaudhry brought the Indian attack to a dead halt.

After landing at Sargodha for re-fuelling, the formation rushed back to Peshawar to prepare for the strike on Pathankot.

Having rested a while the pilots were assembled for a final briefing at 1600 hrs. The formation comprised:-

After a thorough briefing and going over the already well rehearsed strike plan, Squadron Leader Sajad Haider surprised his pilots by asking for a fire bucket filled with fresh water. He pulled out a bottle of No 4711 Eau-de-Cologne from his coverall pocket and emptied it in the bucket. He took small white towellettes, dipped them in the water and after wringing them out, handed over one each to his pilots. “This could be a one-way mission and if we meet our Maker, we should be smelling nice”, Sajad Haider wryly remarked.1 Every pilot complied, his resolve emboldened and his faith reinvigorated.

Everything proceeded according to the plan and the formation got airborne at 1630 hours, climbed in battle formation up to about 11,000 metres and then dived down to tree top level and set course for the I P (initial point) for the target.

The planning staff was not certain whether Pathankot would still be occupied by IAF aircraft after the outbreak of hostilities. But the formation of eight Sabres, escorted by two more sidewinders equipped

F-86s acting as top cover at 6,000 metres were fortunate.

A glimpse of the other side of the story is also presented from website Bharat Rakhshak:

“Meanwhile, at the IAF Air Base at Pathankot, the Station Commander, Group Captain Roshan Suri had just returned from a meeting of Station Commanders from Western Air Command. Suri briefed his Squadron Commanders of the impending Army move to cross the international border....

As evening approached, Pathankot Airbase received an urgent phone call from Squadron Leader Dandapani at Amritsar Air Defence Centre. He spoke to Wing Commander Kuriyan and informed him that several Sabres had been observed taking off and then go ‘Off the Scope’ as they all went below the radar horizon. This had all the tell-tale signs of an incoming raid. Kuriyan informed Suri about the suspicions of a raid and asked for permission to scramble the CAP (Combat Air Patrol). (This is where the Pathankot Base Commander made a vital mistake for which IAF paid dearly) Suri refused to order the CAP to go off and ordered Kuriyan to go off the shift.”2

The PAF aircraft reached Pathankot precisely on time at 1705 hours and discovered a large number of IAF aircraft parked around in protected dispersal pens. With no enemy fighters in the vicinity and fairly thin ground fire, ‘Nosey’ set the ball rolling with four carefully-positioned dives from about 500 metres, systematically selecting individual aircraft in protected pens on the airfield for his fixed-gun attacks. He was gratified to recognize the distinctive delta-winged MiG-21s- India’s latest fighter - among the aircraft on the ground, and singled them out for special attention.

The rest of the pilots followed suit. Each pilot had been briefed to make only two passes but the lucrative targets and limited opposition enabled them to make multiple passes. Wing Commander Tawab, flying top cover, counted at least 14 fires burning on the airfield.

“Wing Commander Kuriyan was just then driving into his garage at his house, when he heard the ack ack guns booming. He looked towards the airfield to see four F-86 Sabres bore down the airfield at low level firing their machine guns, while two ‘F-104 Starfighters’ kept high altitude cover. As the four Sabres pulled out, another four bore in. The Sabres strafed buildings, installations and aircraft on the ground....

......The Sabres attacked the row of MiGs and Mysteres along the blast pens in the airfield. The CAP was not scrambled. Two of the MiGs, which were being refuelled after returning from an earlier flight, went up in flames.

.......Some Mysteres on the ground bore the brunt of the raid and were damaged as were the two MiG-21s. Only the fact that the Sabre’s 0.50 inch machine guns could fire ball ammunition instead of exploding cannon shells prevented further damage. The Sabres slipped off unscathed as even the airfield defences were caught napping. For the PAF this raid was a cakewalk. All in all one C-119, four Mysteres, two Gnats and two MiG-21s were destroyed in this highly successful raid by the Pakistan Air Force.” 3

After de-briefing and interrogation, this text book operation against Pathankot was credited with seven MiG-21s, five Mysteres and one Fairchild C-119 destroyed on the ground, plus damage to the Air Traffic Control building - IAF admits to the loss of only two MiG-21s but it goes to the credit of PAF that after the fateful strike on Pathankot, Indian MiG-21s were not seen in the air for the remaining duration of the 1965 War.

Epilogue:

Where are they now?

Six of the pilots on the devastating raid on Pathankot including both pilots flying Top Cover, Squadron Leader Sajad Haider, Flight Lieutenants M Akbar, Dilawar Hussain, Ghani Akbar and Arshad Sami and Wing Commander M G Tawab were decorated with the Sitara-e-Jurat.

Squadron Leader Sajad Haider later commanded the Flying wing at Sargodha during the 1971 War. He served as Air Attache at Washington D.C. and retired as Air Commodore in 1983.

Flight Lieutenant M Akbar rose to the rank of Air Commodore, commanded the Pakistan Armed Forces Mission at Riyadh and retired in September, 1991.

Flight Lieutenant Dilawar saw action during the 1971 War and shot down an IAF Hunter over Dhaka on 04 December, 1971. He went on to become an Air Marshal and retired from the post of Director General Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kamra.

Flying Officer Abbas Khattak also saw action in the 1971 War. He rose to the rank of Air Chief Marshal and commanded Pakistan Air Force from 1994-97. He is now leading a retired life.

Flying Officer Arshad Chaudhry rose to the rank of Air Marshal and retired from the post of Vice Chief of the Air Staff in 1997.

Flight Lieutenant Mazhar Abbas retired in the rank of Air Commodore.

Flying Officer Khalid Latif retired in the rank of Group Captain.

Flight Lieutenant Ghani Akbar left the airforce as a Squadron Leader and started flying for PIA. He is now retired.

Flight Lieutenant Arshad Sami Khan left the Air Force in the rank of Squadron Leader and joined Foreign Service. Currently he is an Ambassador.

Wing Commander M G Tawab left Pakistan Air Force in the rank of Group Captain. He later became an Air Vice Marshal and commanded the fledgling Bangladesh Air Force. After his retirement, he settled in Germany, where he breathed his last in 1998 after a brief illness. His demise was mourned by friends and admirers all over.

Bibliography

1. Narrated from Air Cdre Sajad Haider’s TV programme telecast on Defence of Pakistan Day 1997.

2. Down loaded from the Internet “Air Attack — Outbreak of the War (September-1965)” website Bharat Rakhshak.

3. Ibid.

4. Fricker, John, Battle for Pakistan: The Air War of 1965, published by Ian Allan Ltd, Surrey, 1979.

5. The Story of the Pakistan Air Force, published by the Shaheen Foundation, Islamabad, 1988.

Higly Recommended...

Grand Slam—

A Battle of Lost Opportunities


Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN from WASHINGTON DC does a detailed analysis of Pakistan Army’s attempt to capture AKHNUR in 1965.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to discuss “Operation Grand Slam” in the overall context of the 1965 War, assessing its strategic significance, and the various controversies surrounding it.

The Kashmir problem shaped the future of Indo-Pak Sub-Continental politics from 1947 onwards and led to the militarisation of India and Pakistan. The Poonch Valley link road connecting Jammu with Poonch Valley, the second largest valley of Kashmir, was a hot favourite military objective of military planners in Pakistan, right from 1947-48. One of the major military objectives of the 1947-48 War was to harass Indian communications around Jammu in areas Akhnur and Kathua.1 Beri Pattan Bridge over River Tawi a few miles south-east of Nowshera on this road was the main objective of a planned Pakistani armoured brigade and infantry brigade attack code named “Operation Venus” in December 1948.2 As a matter of fact one of the reasons which motivated the Indian Government, in 1948, into requesting for a complete ceasefire may have been its anxiety to avoid a major battle, opposite its communications to the Poonch Valley.3 The Pakistani governments, calling off the projected “Operation Venus”, and acceptance of this ceasefire offer and final ceasefire with effect from night 31 December 1948 and 1st January 1949, was later much criticised in Pakistan. Claims were made that the Pakistani Government agreed to a ceasefire “to the army’s horror” at a time when military victory was within Pakistan’s grasp!4 A Pakistani officer who was then commanding the infantry brigade strike force tasked to execute “Operation Venus”, much later in 1976 claimed that, had the operation been launched, he could have been in Jammu within 24 hours and into Pathankot and Gurdaspur in the next 24 hours! 5

Thus when “Operation Grand Slam” was conceived and launched in 1965 history was repeating itself and as later events turned out, ironically history repeated itself, in terms of irresolution and indecisiveness on part of Pakistan’s highest military and political leadership. The bluff self-promoted Field Marshal from a so-called martial area proved himself as indecisive as the Hindustani Muslim Prime Minister of 1948 who was much criticised by many intellectuals in Pakistan6 for indecisiveness and timidity in the 1947-48 War. History repeated itself for the second time in 1999 when a smaller scale military operation was called off in Kargil. The man accused of timidity on this occasion was a Punjabi (Kashmiri) Prime Minister! The 35th anniversary of the 1965 War demands that we in the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent must re-assess the validity of the historical life scripts into which past experiences have programmed us! It is a vain hope since most human beings despite all advancement in civilisation are dominated by absurd urges!

OPERATION GRAND SLAM

Background

1965 was an eventful year in Indo-Pak history. The Pakistani military ruler Ayub emerged victorious in the Presidential elections held in January 1965 amidst allegations of rigging. This factor created a desire in Ayub to improve his political image by a limited gain in the realm of foreign relations. He got an opportunity to do so in April 1965 over a minor border dispute with India in the Rann of Kutch area. The Pakistan Army dominated the skirmishes in the Rann area as a result of which a climate of overconfidence was created in the Pakistani military and political establishment.7

In May 1965 following the jubilation in Pakistan because of the Rann affair Ayub became keen to launch the proposed “Operation Gibraltar”: a proposed plan to launch guerrillas into Indian held Kashmir with the objective of creating a popular uprising, finally forcing India to, abandon Kashmir. Ayub went to Murree on 13 May 1965 to attend a briefing on the conduct of Operation Gibraltar.8 We will not go into the controversy surrounding this plan, which is basically an exercise in futility, and mud slinging initiated by some self-styled experts, motivated largely by personal rivalry and ulterior biases, since the prime aim of this article is to discuss the military significance of Operation Grand Slam and its connection with “Operation Gibraltar”. In this briefing Ayub “examined” the “Operation Gibraltar” plan prepared by Major General Akhtar Malik, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 12 Division. The 12 Division was responsible for the defence of the entire border of Pakistan occupied Kashmir from Ladakh in the north till Chamb near the internationally recognised border to the south. It was during this briefing that Ayub suggested that the 12 Division should also capture Akhnur.9 This attack was codenamed “Operation Grand Slam”. General Musa, the then C in C Army and Altaf Gauhar the then Information Secretary and Ayub’s close confidant, the two principal defenders of Ayub have not given any explanation about what exactly was the strategic rationale of “Grand Slam” and what was its proposed timing in relation to “Operation Gibraltar”. We will discuss this aspect in detail in the last portion of this article.

OPERATION “GIBRALTAR”

The confusion in history writing in Pakistan may be gauged from the fact that Shaukat Riza’s book on 1965 War, despite being Pakistan Army’s official account does not contain the two words “Operation Gibraltar”! It appears that the idea of launching a guerrilla war in Indian held Kashmir was in vogue since the 1950s. Major General Mitha confirms in his GHQ inspired book, written soon after publication of Gul Hassan Khan’s memoirs10 that had outraged the Pakistani GHQ that he heard ideas that such an operation should be launched since 1958.11 Mitha claims that from 1958 to 1961 he had advised that “such operations had no chance of success and each time F.M Ayub Khan had agreed with me and vetoed the suggestions”.12 General Gul Hassan states that the secret “Kashmir Cell” formed by the Foreign Office on Ayub’s orders consisting of various key officials including the DMO i.e Gul Hassan was informed by the Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad that the President had ordered GHQ to prepare two plans to encourage/provide all out support sabotage/guerrilla operations in Indian Held Kashmir. Gul states that the decision to mount guerrilla operations with active Pakistan Army involvement was taken after the Rann of Katch skirmish. Altaf Gauhar who was the Information Secretary at that time claims that the Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad had “convinced himself that Pakistan was in a position to dislodge the Indians from Kashmir” and that “Once trained Pakistani soldiers went inside Kashmir the people of the Valley would spontaneously rise in revolt” and that “fear of China would prevent the Indians from provoking an all out war that would give Pakistan army the opportunity to drive the Indians out of Kashmir just as it had done in the Rann of Kutch”. Gauhar further claimed that the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and the Foreign Office drew up the plan for Operation Gibraltar.13

Pakistani expectations, and this does not include Bhutto alone, as many self-styled experts based on personal rivalry would much later claim; were raised to unrealistic heights after the Rann affair and Ayub was convinced that Gibraltar would succeed! In a written communication before the war Ayub asserted that “As a general rule Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of blows delivered at the right time and place. Such opportunities should, therefore, be sought and exploited”.14

Gauhar states that Mr Z.A Bhutto the Foreign Minister was so convincingly persuasive in his advocacy of Operation Gibraltar that he convinced many Pakistan Army officers serving in the GHQ, who in turn urged the Pakistani C in C Musa to “bite the bullet”.15 Further Musa, the C in C much later in 1983 claimed that Bhutto had “Brainwashed” his officers.16 These two assertions if true means that either Bhutto was a military genius or those army officers who he convinced had no grey matter and that the Pakistani C in C was a glorified headclerk whose function was that of a rubber stamp rather than anything to do with higher military strategy or operational planning.

This article is not about “Operation Gibraltar” but “Grand Slam”, however, no discussion or analysis of Grand Slam is possible if Gibraltar is not discussed, although in brief. Operation Gibraltar envisaged guerrilla operations inside Indian Occupied Kashmir by a number of guerrilla groups of roughly a battalion strength comprising of Kashmiri Volunteers trained by Pakistan Army, Pakistan Army Special Services Group (SSG) Commando personnel and some regular infantry troops.17 The total strength of the “Gibraltar Force” was not more than 5,000 to 7,000 men subdivided into five forces i.e (1) “Salahuddin Force” operating in Srinagar Valley, (2) “Ghaznavi Force “ in Mendhar-Rajauri area, (3) “Tariq Force” in Dras-Kargil area, (4) “Babar Force “in Nowshera-Sundarbani area, (5) “Qasim Force” in Bandipura-Sonarwain area, (6) “Khalid Force” in Qazinag-Naugam area, (7) “Nusrat Force” in Tithwal-Tangdhar area, (8) “Sikandar Force” in Gurais area and (9) “Khilji Force” in Kel-Minimarg area.18 The mission assigned to the various Gibraltar forces was warfare in the enemy’s rear including harassing enemy communications, destruction of bridges, logistic installations, headquarters with a view to create conditions of an “armed insurrection” in Kashmir finally leading to a national uprising against Indian rule leading to liberation of Kashmir or at least parts of it.19

The infiltration operation of the Gibraltar Force commenced from first week of August 1965.20 General Harbaksh Singh the C in C Indian Western Command described the infiltration operation as “brilliant in conception”.21 The Gibraltar Forces mission was too ambitious and its achievement was beyond its means, however, in words of Indian military writer Major K.C Praval “Although the Gibraltar Force failed to raise a revolt, they did succeed in creating a great deal of confusion and disorder by acts of sabotage, violence and murder”.22 Praval praised “Nusrat Force” which was operating in Tithwal area which in his words “caused a great deal of damage before it could be pushed back over the ceasefire line”.23 Indian General Harbaksh Singh in the typical Indo-Pak style of not being intellectually honest once dealing with assessment of enemy actions, inadvertently admitted the mental dislocation that the Gibraltar Force had caused in the headquarters of Indian 15 Corps. Harbaksh thus stated “General Officer Commanding 15 Corps gave the following assessment of the prevailing situation: — The maximum success gained by the infiltrators was in the Mandi area where they had secured local support”24 .......... “General Officer Commanding 15 Corps in a personal signal to me recommended the abandonment of the Hajipir offensive .....on account of the serious tactical situation in that sector”. 25 This happened on 15th August! On 17th August 1965 General Harbaksh Singh noted that the 15 Indian Corps Commander’s assessment of operational situation in Kashmir was “rather too grim and gloomy”.26 Even Joginder Singh who later wrote a book to refute most of Harbaksh’s assertions admitted in his book that “GOC XV Corps Lt Gen Katoch appeared to be overwhelmed by the scale of infiltration”.27 The reader may note that all this was happening despite an overwhelming Indian numerical superiority in troops. A small example being the 25 Indian Division area where the Indians had some 20 infantry battalions 28 at a time when the total strength of the 12 Pakistani Division responsible for all 400 miles of Kashmir was not more than 15 infantry battalions! 29

The local population of Indian Held Kashmir did not co-operate with the Gibraltar Force and by 18th August the operations of the Gibraltar Force were considerably reduced. The Indians brought in additional troops and the infiltration operation was checked by 20th August. As discussed earlier the Indian 15 Corps Commander was unnerved, however, the C in C Western Command Harbaksh Singh exhibited greater resolution and spurred the 15 Indian Corps into launching two major counter infiltration attacks inside Pakistan Held Kashmir to destroy the logistic bases in Hajipir Bulge and Neelam Valley areas. Both these attacks succeeded since the 12 Division was already over stretched with single infantry battalions holding frontages varying from 10 to 20 miles. 30 There is absolutely no doubt that Gibraltar was an undoubted failure! The loss of Hajipir Pass, the principal logistic base of the infiltrators on 28th August and Indian successes in the Neelam Valley and opposite Uri on 29-31st August 1965 unnerved the Pakistani GHQ who assumed that Muzaffarabad was about to be attacked!31 The supposed liberators of Indian Held Kashmir were more worried now about what they had held before commencement of hostilities! It was under these circumstances that the Pakistani GHQ ordered execution of Grand Slam with the aim of relieving Indian pressure against Muzaffarabad! Shaukat Riza the official historian of the 1965 War admitted that by 31 August the Indians had ruptured 12 Division’s defences and this was the main reason why the GHQ decided to attack Chamb “to ease pressure on 12 Division”. Shaukat also quoted Musa and the Chief of General Staff Sher Bahadur in stating that the main reason why Grand Slam was launched was that “there was danger of Indians capturing Muzaffarabad”.32 Musa in his roundabout way of saying things did not mention Muzaffarabad but merely stated that the main object of launching “Grand Slam” was “reducing pressure in the north by capturing Chamb and threatening Akhnur”.33

THE BATTLE OF CHAMB-JAURIAN-AKHNUR

Significance of Akhnur

Akhnur Class 18 bridge 34 on the fast flowing Chenab River was the key to Indian communications from Jammu and mainland India a group of valleys lying south south of the Pir Panjal Range and West of Chenab River, most prominent of which was the Poonch River Valley. The bridge was the sole all weather lifeline of one oversized Indian infantry division, with at least twenty infantry battalions, defending Poonch, Rajauri, Jhangar and Nauhshera and one Independent Infantry Brigade defending Chamb-Dewa Sector. Possession of Akhnur could enable an attacker to threaten Jammu the key to all Indian communications from Pathankot to Srinagar/lLadakh etc.

Orientation with the area

Chamb-Jaurian Sector is bounded by the ceasefire line from Dewa till Burjeal in the west, the international border from Burjeal till River Chenab in the south, various branches of River Chenab from Phulkean Salient till Akhnur in the south and Southwest, and a range of hills between the height of 1000 to 3000 feet running in a roughly east-west direction in the north. Some ridges run from this range of hills downwards in a north-south direction, most prominent of which are Phagla-Sakrana Ridge located about between a mile and two miles, eastwards from the border, followed by Tam Ka Tilla, east of Pallanwalla and the Fatwal Ridge four miles west of Akhnur. Average relative height of each ridge varied from 40 to 80 feet. These ridges on the face value were minor features, however, in terms of fields of fire and observation; their value was immense for a defender engaged in opposing tanks. The gradient rose from north to south as well as from west to east, and the area to the north restricted tank movement, while the area in the south with minor boggy patches afforded excellent manoeuvrability for tanks. Two small ridges known as Mandiala North and South dominated Chamb village itself. The Munawar Wali Tawi running from north to south into the Chenab River divided the sector into two halves, was located about 7 to 8 Kilometres from the border. The Nala had a wide bed varying from 100 yards in the north to 300 yards in the south and steep banks, which made it a partial tank obstacle. There were various crossing places on the Nala notably at Chamb, Mandiala, Darh and Channi from north to south respectively. The Nala had a lot of water in summers but maximum water depth in September was not more than four feet, thus making it negotiable for all types of tanks. Only one partially constructed bridge spanned the Nala near Chamb in 1965. Road Akhnur-Jaurian Chamb to the south and Road Akhnur-Kalit-Mandiala, both running in a east-west general alignment were two metalled roads running almost parallel to each other connected Chamb with Akhnur. The area of manoeuvre for tanks from the west was restricted to a 12 Kilometre gap between Burjeal and Dewa Hills and a 7 to 8 kilometre tract from Burjeal to the Chenab River which became relatively more boggy as one went closer to Chenab River. Both the roads leading from Chamb to Akhnur were intersected by Nalas running from north to south at a distance of two to four kilometres with small ridges in between, thus reducing tank speed, but were no obstacle for tanks. The ground all along was thus broken as well as interspersed with dry Nalas. These Nalas restricted the cross-country mobility of wheeled vehicles once off road. There were mango groves and wild orchards at places, which provided adequate cover. The area was well cultivated and in September 1965 the fields had four feet high standing crops of millet and maize. River Chenab running from north-east to south west in the south and the line of hills running in an east-west direction provided natural built-in flank protection against any tank threat, for any tank force advancing from west to east but also restricted the movement of a tank force. In terms of tank manoeuvrability and space for manoeuvre the area from the border in the west till Akhnur may be described as a cylinder which is about 12 kilometres wide on the extreme western side at its western entrance and gets progressively narrower as one advances from west of east by virtue of a line of hills in the north and Chenab River in the south both of which successively get progressively closer narrowing the north-south space reducing the north south open space gap from 12 kilometre in the west to about 3 to 4 kilometre at Akhnur. Thus in terms of tank warfare, the defenders task became easier, as the attacker advanced from west to east since space for manoeuvre was reduced by some one fourth.35

Indian and Pakistani Force Composition and Plans

Indian Force Composition and Plans. Till August 1965 the Indian force defending Chamb Jaurian consisted of the 191 Independent Infantry Brigade Group consisting of four infantry battalions and no armour.36 In addition the border posts were manned by two irregular battalions of Punjab Armed Police and Jammu and Kashmir Militia Battalion. These two battalions, however, had nominal military value like the Pakistani Rangers, by virtue of being poorly trained/equipped. In May 1965 as part of “Operation Ablaze” (Indian plan of mobilisation/shifting forward of forces in Punjab in May 1965) the Indians placed a tank squadron of AMX-13 Light tanks under command 191 Brigade.37 Activities of the Gibraltar Force Infiltrators in Chamb-Jaurian forced the Indians to bring in two additional infantry battalions by end of August 1965, 38 however, both infantry battalions reverted to their parent formations after successfully dealing with the Gibraltar Force infiltrators by end of August.39 In 1956, 80 Indian Infantry Brigade responsible for defence of area Naushahra-Rajauri-Jhangar had pointed out that 191 Brigade defending Chamb-Jaurian Sector to his left constituted a vulnerable left flank.40 The same officer as Brigadier General Staff 15 Indian Corps Kashmir had concluded that Pakistani troops attacking from opposite Chamb could capture Chamb and had recommended stationing of a tank regiment in the sector, upgrading 191 Infantry Brigade to a division and construction of an alternate bridge over the Chenab at Riasi.41 None of these recommendations except upgradation of Akhnur Bridge to carry AMX-13 tanks were accepted by the Indian higher headquarters! The Indian military planners till 1965 had firmly believed that Pakistan would not cross the international border between Chenab and Burjeal and thus regarded the southern half of Chamb Salient as “sacrosanct”.42 The Indian planners had hypothesised that the most likely area of Pakistani attack in South Kashmir was the Jhangar-Nowshera Sector.43 The Indian defences in Chamb-Jaurian were thus not as extensive as in other sectors of Kashmir. The Indian artillery consisted of just one field regiment and a troop of medium guns.44 In August 1965 in the wake of Operation Gibraltar the Indian High Command finally decided to upgrade Chamb-Jaurian Sector to a divisional command, however, till 1st September 196545 the area was defended by 191 Independent Infantry Brigade directly under command 15 Indian Corps. The 10 Division headquarters staff designated to take over the area was at this time being organised at Bangalore in the Indian south.46 The 10 Division headquarters was assigned a time frame of three weeks in August 1965 and ordered to take over the command of 80 Brigade and 191 Brigade by 15 September 1965 and had reached Akhnur by 28th August 1965. The headquarters had no communication equipment and nominal staff on 1st September 1965.47 The Indian armour consisting of a squadron of AMX-13 Light tanks which was assigned the responsibility of anti tank defence of the main tank approach west of Chamb. It was deployed in an extended form two troops on a ridge between Daur and Palla responsible for the defence of the area from Paur in the north till a little east of Burjeal in the south, one troop in the south in Munawar area and one troop in reserve at Barsala. On 1st September, however, three tanks were under repair in the rear. All Indian infantry battalion anti-tank recoilless guns were grouped under 15 Kumaon and tasked with the anti-tank defence of the Mandiala crossing. The border was manned by the border force irregular battalions and 3 Mahar and 6 Sikh Light Infantry as shown on the map with 15 Kumaon and 6/5 Gurkha in depth. 15 Kumaon was deployed on the pivotal Mandiala Heights and 6/5 Gurkha was deployed till 1st September on the Kalidhar Ridge east of River Tawi. This Ridge it may be noted was an