I start this topic to make a brite change to this mostly debatlbe forum.

I have started this thread to post war stories of Our heroes.....Please share tales of our heroes...so taht evry one can know abt their contributions to tthis great country and they can get the respect tehy deserve from all of us...This thread will be very informative to specially teh new bies that join this site

Mods Please help me with this...if u have any war heroes story print them stories..u gys shud hav an archive.


SINCE FINDIN STORIES TAKES TIME PLEASE PIN THIS TOPIC....

Rashid Minhas (my role model)

Rashid Minhas or Rashid Minhas Shaheed (born February 17, 1951 / d. August 20, 1971) was a Pilot Officer in the Pakistan Air Force during the Bangladesh Liberation War. He was new to the Air Force having been commissioned that year. This work is copyrighted. ... February 17 is the 48th day of the year in the Gregorian calendar. ... 1951 was a common year starting on Monday; see its calendar. ... August 20 is the 232nd day of the year (233rd in leap years) in the Gregorian Calendar. ... 1971 is a common year starting on Friday (click for link to calendar). ... The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) (Pakistan Fizaya in Urdu) is the Aviation branch of the Pakistan armed forces. ... The Bangladesh Liberation War (two other names are also used occasionally) refers to an approximately nine month long armed conflict between current day Pakistan and Bangladesh. ...

On August 20, 1971 Minhas was getting ready to take-off in a T-33 trainer in Karachi when a Bengali pilot, Matiur Rahman forced his way into the back of the plane. The Pakistani account says that Rahman knocked out Minhas with some blunt object and tried to defect to India in order to join the liberation movement for Bangladesh. August 20 is the 232nd day of the year (233rd in leap years) in the Gregorian Calendar. ... 1971 is a common year starting on Friday (click for link to calendar). ... Categories: Aircraft stubs | U.S. military trainer aircraft 1940-1949 ... The Karachi Port Trust Building Karachi (کراچي) is the largest city of Pakistan and the capital of the province of Sindh. ... This is a disambiguation page — a navigational aid which lists other pages that might otherwise share the same title. ... Matiur Rahman or Shaheed M. Matiur Rahman (Born February 21, 1945 in Dhaka) was a Flight Lieutenant in the Pakistan Air Force when the Liberation War broke out. ...

Minhas came to realize that the plane was headed for India. He crashed the plane just thirty miles from the border of India. For his act he was awarded the Nishan-E-Haider, becoming the youngest man to win the award, and the only member of the Pakistan Air Force to be honoured with it . Nishan-E-Haider The Nishan-E-Haider is the highest award given by Pakistans military. ... The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) (Pakistan Fizaya in Urdu) is the Aviation branch of the Pakistan armed forces. ...

With this award he has become a national hero. The Pakistan Air Force base at Kamra has been renamed in his honor. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) (Pakistan Fizaya in Urdu) is the Aviation branch of the Pakistan armed forces. ...


source Rashid minhas

33 years ago, today, i.e. on 20 August it was a Friday like today. Something extraordinary happened at around 11:30 am that made history.
At the Masroor Base in Karachi, a young Pilot Officer of the No. 2 squadron who was scheduled to fly his only second solo flight on the advanced fighter trainer Lockheed T-33A did what no other 20 year old pilot, or fighter pilot had ever done. Rashid Minhas wrote history with his own blood in golden words. he made sure his country lived and prospered no matter he lived or not.




As he was taxiing his aircraft for takeoff one of his instructor pilots Flt. Lt. Mati-Ur-Rehman, a Bengali, who had fallen prey to the rebellious thought, waved him to halt. Rashid obeyed and Mati forced his way into the cockpit and before Rashid could realize waht was going on took off and turned towards the Indian border. Rashid Minhas upon realizing what was going on took control of the aircraft with difficulty and decided no matter what happened he wouild not let this hijack take place and would not cross the border at any cost.



Everything was happening very quick and rashid didnt have enough time left, in only a few more minutes he realized they would be crossing the border. Pilot Officer Rashid Minhas took the final decision and realizing that he wouldnt be able to take control of the aircraft to return to base he began forcing it down. His rival a more experienced pilot forced it up, but Rashid was true in his cause and managed to achieve his goal just 30 miles short of the border, where he crashed his plane into the Pakistani soil to avoid being disgraced by a hijack, to protect his country from the agony and insult of having to lose a pilot and a plane in a hijack, especially during those turbulent times. He couldn't let the glory of his country be stained by the enemy, a traitor, who had been one of them. For Pakistan this young man, a boy, a child of just 20, laid down his life! Had all his dreams, hopes, personal responsibilites left behind, abandoned, shattered because he had to answer to the call of duty towards serving his motherland. Pilot Officer Rashid Minhas Shaheed was awarded the Nishan-i-Haider, the highest possible award for any Pakistani and/or Muslim.



Nishan-i-Haider, Pakistan's highest military award awarded posthumously for acts of extreme valour. Its status is higher than that of any other civil or military award.

This Friday 20th of August 2004 lets remember that Friday from 33 years ago, let's refresh the memory of one of our country's greatest heroes, greatest sons Rashid Minhas. May Allah grant him a high position in heaven. may his glory be an inspiration for all of us and mayhe be always remembered and may we all be able to take good care of this land for which so many young warriors have sacrificed each drop of their blood.

Rashid Minhas's grave stone at his grave at the Fauji graveyard off Shara-e-Faisal in Karachi reads the following epitaph:

"Parwaaz hai ik hi fiza mein dono ki
momin ka nishaan aur hai munafiq ka nishaan aur

Hai Rashid ki shahaadat pai Iqbal ka yeh qaul
shaheen ka jahaan aur hai kyrgyz ka jahaan aur"


Translation:

"Both glide in the same air yet
the aim of a momin is another, that of a hypocrite another

On Rashid's martyrdom Iqbal's quote is
the world of a falcon is another, that of a vulture another."


Pilot Officer Rashid Minhas Shaheed, Nishan-i-Haider.
No. 2 Squadron PAF Base Mauripur (Masroor), Karachi.
Born 17 February 1951, Martyred 20th August 1971.

The Official Citation:

Pilot Officer Rashid Minhas
(Nishan-e-Haider)

On the morning of Friday, 20th August, 1971, Pilot Officer Rashid Minhas, a pilot still under training, was in the front seat of a jet trainer, taxing out for take off. An instructor pilot from the same unit forced his way into the rear cockpit, seized control of the aircraft and having taken off, headed the aircraft towards India. With just some 40 miles of Pakistan territory remaining, Minhas had only one course open to him to prevent his aircraft from entering India. Without hesitation, and living up to the highest traditions of the Pakistan Air Force, Rashid Minhas tried to regain control of his aircraft, but finding this to be impossible in the face of the superior skill and experience of his instructor, forced the aircraft to crash at a point 32 miles from the Indian border. In doing so Pilot Officer Minhas deliberately made the supreme sacrifice for the honour of Pakistan and the service to which he belonged. For this act of heroism above and beyond the call of duty, the President of Pakistan is pleased to award the Nishan-i-Haider to Pilot Officer Rashid Minhas

Source :Rashid minhas

Bengali verison....teh instructors name was mati ur rehman the traitor was awarded teh highest bengali award


Rahman, (Bir Srestha) Matiur (1941-1971) martyr in the war of liberation. Flight Lieutenant Matiur Rahman was born in dhaka on 29 November 1941. He received his primary education at Dhaka Collegiate School. Next he got himself admitted into Pakistan Air Force Public School at Sargoda in West Pakistan. After completing his twelfth class course there he entered Pakistan Air Force Academy. He was commissioned in June 1963 and was posted at Risalpur, West Pakistan. He successfully completed the Jet Conversion Course in Karachi before he was appointed a Jet Pilot in Peshawar.

Rahman made a secret plan of hijacking an aircraft. His aim was to join the liberation forces with the hijacked plane. On the morning of 20 August Pilot Officer Minhaz Rashid was scheduled to fly in a T-33 aircraft from Masrur Airbase in Karachi with Matiur Rahman as his trainer. The T-33 aircraft was code-named 'Bluebird'. During the training flight Matiur Rahman attempted to take control of the aircraft into his own hands, but failed. The plane crashed in Thatta, a place near the Indian border. Matiur's dead body was found near the crash sight, but no traces of Minhaz's dead body could be discovered. Matiur Rahman was buried at the graveyard of fourth class employees at Masrur Airbase.

Matiur Rahman was awarded the highest state title of honour 'Bir Srestha' in recognition of his patriotism and sacrifice.

Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmed Rafiqui Shaheed, Sitara-e-Jurat,Hilal-i-Jurat




On 6 September, 1965, Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmad Rafiqui led a formation of 3 F-86 aircraft on a strike against Halwara airfield. The formation was intercepted by about 10 Hunter aircraft out of which Squadron Leader Rafiqui accounted for one in the first few seconds. But then his guns jammed due to a defect and stopped firing. However, Rafiqui refused to leave the battle area which he would have been perfectly justified to do; instead he ordered his No. 2 to take over as leader and continue the engagement while he tried to give the formation as much protection as was possible with an unarmed aircraft. This called on the part of Squadron Leader Rafiqui. The end for him was never in doubt but he chose to disregard it and, in the process, his aircraft was shot down and he was killed but not before enabling his formation to shoot down 3 more Hunter aircraft. Rafiqui’s conduct was clearly beyond the call of duty and conformed to the highest traditions of leadership and bravery in battle against overwhelming odds. For this and his earlier exploits, he is awarded Hilal-i-Jurat and Sitara-i-Jurat

Source :SOURCE

M.M Alim...remember the air ace.

even sum one in teh mongolian airforce shud know abt him....ill have his story if i find it...pls post it if u find it...im also tryin to get Maj.aziz bhatti shaheed

M M Alam - Sitara e jurat

Mohammad Alam's wartime exploits gained him international acclaim, but his military career was marked by controversy.
When jets replaced propeller-driven aircraft, many of the pundits of military aviation predicted that the days of the old-fashioned dogfight were over. The Korean War and subsequent conflicts proved them wrong. Jet fighter pilots still engaged in dogfights, and they could often be as individualistic and eccentric as their prop-era predecessors.

The great ideological conflicts of the Cold War produced its share of outstanding pilots, but so did some other, lesser-known conflicts. In fact, one of the fastest aces of all time was a participant in a short-lived border war between India and Pakistan in 1965. Few fighter pilots of any nation could claim nine victories in three combats. Fewer still could claim seven in two days. And it is doubtful that anyone besides Mohammad Alam of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) can lay claim to shooting down four enemy planes in less then one minute. That fighting record should have assured an airman of Alam's proficiency a brilliant military career, but Alam would give it all up as the consequence of a spiritual rebirth that set him on a collision course with many of his senior officers.

Mohammad Mahmood Alam was born in Behar, western Bengal, on July 6, 1935. He was in his early teens when he saw India achieve independence in 1946 only to be split as a result of violent religious and political differences between Muslims and Hindus. The result was the creation in August 1947 of the Islamic State of Pakistan, whose divided territories existed both to the northeast and northwest of India. Alam's own hometown fell within Indian territory, and his family was compelled to move.

Neither India nor Pakistan was satisfied with their borders, and intermittent conflict continued between the two countries, resulting in the development of indigenous armies, navies, and air arms by both. Given the long-term colonial presence of Great Britain, both the PAF and the Indian Air Force (IAF) were profoundly influenced by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in regard to training, uniforms and military behavior. Pilots of both countries were often sent to Britain to polish their flying skills and keep up with the latest aviation developments.

In case of the Pakistanis, there was an additional social legacy left behind by the British. As their proficiency and confidence grew, PAF personnel came to affect the cocky demeanor of their British mentors, to the extent that they regarded themselves as members of a social elite, not bound by the same rules as the average citizen. The most visible manifestation of that attitude was drinking in PAF units. Ignoring the Quran's commandment against the consumption of alcohol beverages, PAF personnel enthusiastically emulated the RAF practice of having a bar in the officers' at each air base.

Upon qualifying as a PAF pilot, Alam became caught up in the social practices of his brother officers and later admitted to getting drunk on numerous occasions. Another RAF custom adapted by the PAF was the use of nicknames for various pilots, and Alam's short stature earned him the sobriquet "Peanut".

Alam embraced the RAF tradition of professionalism with equal enthusiasm. His own gunnery scores - an average of 70 percent - were the highest in PAF, and by September 1965 he had accumulated 1,400 hours in the North American F-86F Sabre alone. To this he added experience in other aircraft, both at home and abroad, among them the Hawker Hunter, a type that became the mainstay of the IAF.

The first unit to which Alam was assigned, No. 11 Squadron, had the distinction of being the first PAF unit to use jet fighters, being equipped with the Supermarine Attackers in 1951. It was also the PAF only jet fighter squadron until 1955, when United States began selling F-86F to Pakistan. In 1956 No. 11 was re-equipped with the new Sabres, and by 1965 it was part of No. 33 Wing, based at Sargodha, in West Pakistan. In February 1964, Alam took command of No. 11 Squadron, while his predecessor, Wing Commander Muhammad Anwar Shamim, was promoted to command of No. 33 Wing.

Meanwhile, war clouds were gathering over Kashmir. Far to the south, in the Rann of Kutch on the coast of the Arabian Sea, intermittent armed clashes broke out between Indian and Pakistani forces in January 1965. In the months that followed Pakistan began recrutting and arming a "Free Kashmir" guerilla army, called the Mujahiddin. Indian troops responded by occupying the strategically important region of Kargil, on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line, on August 15. Tensions escalated until finally, on September 6, open warfare broke out between India and Pakistan.

The armies of the two countries were about equal in numbers, but India enjoyed an overwhelming advantage in the air, having 476 fighters and 60 bombers at the start of the war, against 104 fighters and 26 bombers of the PAF. From the outset, the Pakistani pilots knew that only their intensive training would enable them to successfully defend their airspace. At the time hostilities commenced, No. 33 Wing at Sargodha could field a total of 30 Sabres, of which 22 supplemented their six .50-caliber machine guns with wing-mounted AIM-9 Sidewinder heat-seeking air-to-air missiles. For Squadron Leader Alam, the war began in earnest at 5:30 a.m. on September 2, when he led seven Sabres against Indian troop concentrations reported to be at Jaurian. The Pakistanis saw nothing at first, then Ala, noticed Indian troops hidden in an orchard. He and his pilots strafed the enemy with gunfire and rockets, hitting five tanks and damaging a personnel carrier. Two days later, Alam was flying a low-level reconnaissance mission near the Indian airfield at Jammu when he came under groundfire and his cockpit canopy was shattered. Temporarily blinded by debris, Alam nevertheless maintained control of his F-86 and completed his mission. Spotting Indian artillery positions, he carried out two firing passes before his overheated guns jammed.

Alam led a section of three Sabres in a low-level raid on the Indian airbase at Adampur at dusk on September 6. As they neared their target, a quartet of Hawker Hunters suddnely crossed their Sabres' path at the slightly higher altitude of 500feet. Alam later described the encounter: "I remember thinking what very pretty aircraft werebrand-new Hunters were as I ordered my section to punch tanks. The Hunters also jettisoned their drop tanks, and we turned into each other for combat. The fight didn't last long. I got my sights on the No. 4 Hunter, and after a brief burst, he flicked and went into the ground in a great ball of flame, although I am not certain whether I hit him or not. We were now evenly matched, numerically, although I never fought at such low altitudes again, nor often at such low speeds."

As the twisting dogfight continued, Alam downed another Hunter. At that point, however, the Sabres were low on fuel, and Alam ordered them to disengage. He later learned that, unknown to him at the time, the PAF command had aborted the Adampur strike. As their wingmen made their way back to base, Alam ran into two more Hunters.

"I turned into them and took a shot at the last man at long range," said Alam. "He turned into me, then took off his bank. I think I registered hits - I only saw smoke coming out, but no flames. As a wise man, I thought I should not turn back after him as I was low on fuel. So I crossed the border and climbed up to contact our CGI [ground control intercept] and check my position. I was not sure what had happened to the rest of my flight, and I was relieved to hear that they were all in the vicinity of Sargodha, where I came back and landed. This was the first time we had encountered the Hunters, and any misgivings we had in our minds were resolved that day. In maneuverability, the Sabre was undoubtedly better then the Hunter."

Squadron Leader Alauddin "Butch" Ahmed and Flt. Lt. Syed Saad Akhtar Hatmi, who had accompanied Alam, claimed a Hunter as damaged. Postwar examinations of IAF records mention that Squadron Leader Ajit Kumar Rawley of No. 7 Squadron was killed when his Hunter flew into ground, but the record is vague as to whether or not that was during combat. Other Indian aircraft might have been damaged, but there are no specific records. Discrepancies between claims made in good faith and actual enemy losses date to World War I and apply to all war air combatants. The high-speed encounters of the jet age certainly put more strain on human perception, increasing the likelihood of such discrepancies.

The following day, Alam and some his comrades were of No. 11 sat strapped in the cockpits of their Sabres, waiting to scramble, when seven French-built Dassault Mystere IV-A fighter-bombers of No.1 Squadron, IAF, suddenly came towards them out of the rising sun at tree-top level. As the Pakistani airmen looked up in disbelief, the Mysteres pulled up to about 1,000feet and sprayed the tarmac with rockets - but they only hit the empty areas. They then fired at the same areas with their twin 30mm cannons and disappeared to the southwest, after one of their Mysteres, flown by Squadron Leader A. B. Devayya, was hit by 20mm cannon fire from a Lockheed F-104A Starfighter of No. 9 Squadron, PAF. Devayya was killed, but the victorious Pakistani pilot, Flt. Lt. Amjad Hussein Khan was forced to eject when his F-104 was struck by the debris from his victim's exploding aircraft. The attack had left the vulnerable airfield unharmed.

After the Mysteres departed, Alam and his wingman, Flying Officer Mohammed Masood Akhtar, took off. Within five minutes, they were directed by ground control to intercept another incoming Indian raid. They had only flown eastwards for 10 to 15 miles when they were ordered to return, as still more Indian fighters had appeared over Sargodha.

"As we vectored back towards Sargodha," Alam recounted in a postwar interview, "Akhtar called, 'contact - four Hunters,' and I saw the IAF aircraft diving to attack our airfield. So I jettisoned my [drop tanks] to dive through our own ack-ack after them. In the meantime, I saw two more Hunters about 1,000feet to my rear, so I forgot the four in front and pulled up to go after the pair behind. The Hunters broke off their attempted attack on Sargodha, and the pair turned on me. I was flying much faster then they were at this stage - I must have been doing about 500 knots - so I pulled up to avoid overshooting them and then reversed to close in as they flew back towards India."

"I took the last man and dived behind him," Alam's report continued, "getting very low in the process. The Hunter can outrun the Sabre - it's only about 50 knots faster, but has much better acceleration, so it can pull away very rapidly. Since I was diving, I was going still faster, and as he was out of gun range, I fired the first of my two Sidewinder air-to-air missiles at him. In this case we were too low and I saw the missile hit the ground short of its target. This area east of Sargodha, however, has lots of high tension wires, some of them as high as 100-150 feet, and when I saw the two Hunters pull up to avoid one of these cables, I fired the second Sidewinder. The missile streaked in front of me, but I didn't see it strike. The next thing I remember was that I was overshooting one of the Hunters and when I looked behind, the cockpit canopy was missing and there was no pilot in the aircraft. He had obviously pulled up and ejected and then I saw him coming down by parachute."

Alam's alleged victim, Squadron Leader Onkar Nath Kacker, was the commander of No. 27 Squadron, IAF, based at Halwara. After being returned to India, he claimed that he had flown 150 kilometers east of Sargodha when his engine stopped due to a boaster pump failure. It is possible that anything from mechanical failure to fragment's from Alam's exploding Sidewinder might have been responsible for the loss of Kacker's plane, but certainly Alam's perception of his going down near Sargodha was erroneous.

At that point, Alam lost sight of the remaining five Hunters, but he had plenty of fuel left and was prepared to fly as far as 60 miles in an attempt to catch up with them. Alam and his wingman had just flown over the Chenab river when Akhtar called out, "Contact - Hunters 1 o'clock." Alam immediately spotted them - ans as he described it: "five Hunters in absolutely immaculate battle formation. They were flying at about 100-200 feet, at around 480 knots and when I was in gunfire range, they saw me. They all broke in one direction, climbing and turning steeply to the left, which put them in loose line astern. This of course was their big mistake…."

What happened next occurred very quickly. "We were all turning very tightly - in access of 5g or just about on the limits of the Sabre's very accurate A-4 radar ranging gunsight," Alam reported " And I think before we had completed more than about 270 degrees of the turn, at about 12 degrees per second, all four Hunters had been shot down. In each case, I got the piper of my sight around the canopy of the Hunter for virtually a full deflection shot. Almost all of our shooting throughout the war was at very high angles off - seldom less then 30 degrees. Unlike some of the Korean combat films I had seen, nobody in our war was shot down flying straight or level."

Alam knew that downing four enemy aircraft in less then one minute was a feat that took some explaining. "I developed a technique of firing very short bursts - around half a second or less," he said. "The first burst was almost a sighter, but with a fairly large bullet pattern from six machine guns, it almost invariably punctured the fuel tanks so that they streamed kerosene. During the battle of September 7, as we went around into a turn, I could just see, in light of the rising sun, the plumes of fuel gushing from the tanks after my hits. Another half-second burst was then sufficient to set fire to the fuel, and, as the Hunter became a ball of fire, I would quickly shift my aim forward to the next aircraft. The Sabre carried about 1,800 rounds of ammunition for its six 0.5 inch guns, which can therefore fire about 15 seconds. In air combat, this is lifetime. Every fourth or fifth round is an armor-piercing bullet, and the rest are HEI - high explosive incendiary.

"My fifth victim of this sortie started spewing smoke and then rolled on to his back at about 1,000 feet. I thought he was going to do a barrel role, which at low altitude is a very dangerous maneuver for the pursuer if the man in front knows what he is doing. I went almost on my back and then realized I might not be able to stay with him, so I took off bank and pushed the nose down. The next time I fired was at very close range - about 600 feet or so - and his aircraft virtually blew in front of me.

"Hunter pilots won't believe it," remarked Alam. "I have flown the Hunters myself in England, and they are very maneuverable aircraft , but I think the F-86 is better. Actually the Sabre has a fantastic turning performance. Although the normal stalling speed with flap is about 92 knots or less in a descending scissors maneuver, between 100 and 120 knots is quite normal speed range to rack the Sabre around in combat….

"In a turn the Hunter slows down more quickly then the F-86 for the same application of g. for one thing, it has a much higher aspect ratio - in other words, the lower the speed, the higher the induced drag. This means the Hunter losses speed faster then the Sabre in a turn because of its higher drag rise, which the extra thrust can not counter. So in the turn I steadily closed up on the Hunters, which quickly decelerated from about 450 knots to around 240 knots, and would have had to pull about 7g to get away from me. As it was they just slid back into my sight, one by one."

Later, the Pakistanis found the wreckage of two of Alam's victims a few miles from the Sangla Hill railroad station, along with the bodies of their pilots - identified as a Hindu and a Sikh but otherwise too badly burnt for individual identification. The IAF later reported the loss of Squadron Leader S. B. Bhagwat and Flying Officer J. S. Brar of No. 7 Squadron. Alam's two other claims were evidently more examples of overclaiming in the heat of combat. His remaining antagonists, Wing Commander Toric Zacharaiah (the commander of the No.7 Squadron) and Flt. Lts. Ajit S. Lamba and Manmoham S. Sinha, returned to their base safely. Lamba and Sinha later went on to become air marshals of the IAF.

Alam's third and last air-to-air clash with the IAF occurred on September 16, when he and Flying Officer Mohammed I. Shaukat entered enemy airspace and were detected by the Indians flying 10 miles from the airfields of Halwara and Adampur. Two Hunters scrambled to intercept them. Alam reported the situation to the GCI at Sakesar and was asked if he wanted to engage the Indians, since his wingman had no more than 80 hours flying time in the Sabre and 19 combat missions in his logbook. "Now we are here," Alam replied. "We've got to fight."

"They were flying very fast," Alam reported afterwards. "We were doing about Mach .8 but they must have been diving at around Mach .95 or more. They couldn't stay in our turn, so they zoomed up in a yo-yo maneuver. When I reversed back they both pulled through from there, and we dived behind them until at about 13-14,000 feet they separated in a vertical break."

Alam went after the climbing Hunter and engaged it at about 20,000 feet. His frst burst of gunfire missed, but second scored a hit. "At the third burst he became a ball of flame," Alam said, "so I turned back and looked for my wingman…. Then suddenly I lost all radio contact with him, although I could see him in the distance and I saw the Hunter break away from him."

"The Hunter saw me," Alam continued, "and although he was close to his base, he didn't accept combat. He turned away from me and accelerated rapidly in a dive, although I followed as closely as possible behind him. I knew we were approaching close to the airfield of Halwara and suspected a trap, but then he did a loose sort of a roll to clear his tail, so he had obviously lost me. I had a good 5-6,000 feet below him, at about Mach .94 - .95, and when I felt that he was slowing down, I fired a Sidewinder at him. There was something wrong with the missile, however, as it turned through 90 degrees soon after its release."

"I continued diving after him, however, and then released my second Sidewinder, which scored a hit on his right wing root. As it began to smoke, I saw that we were crossing the Halwara Canal and as I was well inside Indian territory and getting a bit short of fuel, I immediately half-rolled and dived down to tree top level. When I hit the River Ravi, which marks the border between India and Pakistan, I climbed up to conserve fuel, feeling very miserable at having lost my No.2."

Although Alam had not seen the second Hunter crash, the PAF credited him with both planes, for his eight and ninth victories of the war. As in the earlier cases, one of the Alam's victim survived to give his own description of the fight. When the PAF's F-86s were reported, Flying Officer Prakash S. Pingale and F. Dara Bunsha of No. 7 Squadron scrambled up from Halwara. Pingale reported that he got behind the first Sabre, which turned south, then spotted the second "at about 4 o'clock at a range of about 1,000 yardsand about to fire on us." He then told Bunsha to "go for Sabre No. 1," while he engaged the other.

"Sabre No.2 attempted to shake me off by pulling up into the sun," Pingale said. "He also jettisoned his external loads and pulled up steeply as a last ditch maneuver to make me overshoot him, perhaps by the use of leading edge slats…. I was able to open fire at about 350-400 yards. The aircraft literally exploded in front of me."

At that point, Pingale saw saw Bunsha engaging in scissors maneuver with Alam's F-86. He radioed a warning to Bunsha that the Sabre held the advantage in such a fight. But Bunsha was going down in flames by the time he intervened. "Seeing me coming towards him Sabre No.1 left my No. 2 and turned towards me," Pingale continued. "As we crossed head-on, he opened fire on me…. As I reversed to engage Sabre No. 1 in 1 vs. 1 combat, to my utter dismay I found that instead of fighting with me he had half-rolled and was speedily trying to get away in a vertical dive. I attempted to close in but lost contact with Sabre No. 1 because I blacked out due to excessive g (around 8-10 as recorded by my g-meter)." As he returned to Halwara, Pingale could not recall seeing his Pakistani opponent ever fire a missile at him, but he later admitted that his preceptions were somewhat impaired by the pain of a slight back injury he had sustained after being hit by ground fire and bailing out a few days earlier, aggravated by the effects of his high-g turn. Pingale was rewarded the Vir Chakra for his valor in September 16 dogfight and is currently the inspector general of the IAF.

Just before his Sabre exploded in flames, Shaukat ejected at 12,000 feet over the eastern Punjabi village of Taran Taran. He was shot by civilians, who mistook him for a paratrooper, before reaching the ground and being taken prisoner. He was then taken to a hospital, where an Indian surgeon removed a .303 caliber bullet and some shotgun pellets from his body.

After being released in a prisoner exchange in February 1966, Shaukat rejoined the No. 11 Squadron. Inspite of his misfortune on September 16, 1965, he recently stated: " I still consider…M.M. Alam as an example of professional leader and a great human being. It was through his untiring effort that I became an operational fighter pilot in the F-86F well ahead of my many course mates and took part in the 1965 war. We should appreciate that Alam took with him an inexperienced pilot like me with only 80 hours on the F-86F as his only wingman and flew deep into the Indian territory and invited the IAF to fight in their sky. He was a source of inspiration and encouragement for many professional pilots in the PAF."

Shaukat later served in the Turkish air force as part of the Exchange Posting Program between the air arms of the North Atlantic Treaty and its allies. He was a flight lieutenant and had accumulated 1,200 hours flight time in the F-86 by the time East Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh in December 1971. At that point, however, Shaukat who had been born and raised in the eastern Bengali district of Bogra, chose to become a citizen of the new nation and joined the Bangladesh Air Force as a flight commander in its only fighter squadron. He subsequently took the Junior Commander's Course in India and studied at the RAF Staff College in Britain. Mohammad Shaukat-ul Islam applied his leadership training as commander of a squadron of Mikoyan-Gruevich Mig-21s, a wing and an air base. He flew 13 different types of aircraft before retiring with the rank of group captain in 1982. After that he served nine years as managing director of Biman (Bangladesh Airlines) and as chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority of Bangladesh.

On September 23 a cease-fire brought the Kashmir War to an end. Alam received the Sitara-I-Jurat and bar - the Pakistani equivalent of the British Distinguished Flying Cross and bar - for gallantry during the short conflict.

Alam commanded the No. 11 Squadron until April 1966. In November 1967, he was promoted to wing commander, given command of the No. 5 Squadron and charged with overseeing the introduction of the newly imported Dassault Mirage IIIEP into that unit.

At about that time, however, Alam began to have problems as a result of professional jealousies and personal resentment among fellow PAF officers. For one thing, there were some accusations that while Alam was a virtuoso pilot, his leadership qualities at the senior officer level left something to be desired. As Pakistan's first ace, much was expected of him after the war, and his more limited administrative abilities may have suffered further under the pressure of such expectations.

Alam was also reappraising his lifestyle, reaching the conclusion that the abandonment of traditional Islamic values by the PAF constituted a betrayal of the people it served. The most obvious symbol of that compromise of values was the consumption of alcohol. Alam not only quit drinking but also began trying to persuade his colleagues to banish alcohol from the officers' mess. Inevitably, Alam's growing zeal rubbed many PAF officers - a good many of whom were his superiors - the wrong way.

In 1969, Alam attended the Staff College, but was removed from the course in 1970 under the absurd pretext that he could not read and write. In May, he was relieved of his command of No.5 Squadron - which was given to Wing Commander Hakimullah Khan - and played no active role in the Indo-Pakistan War of December 1971. Alam was given command of No. 26 Squadron in January 1972 but lost it just two months later. His final position was chief of flight safety, but he continued to meddle in PAF policy.

Also in 1971, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came to power as the Prime Minister of Pakistan and commenced a series of social reforms. Among other things, Bhutto championed an end of elitism of the military and a return of consistent Islamic values. As one consequence of his efforts, by 1976 the PAF had gone officially "dry."

Alam took a leave of absence and slipped over the border into Afghanistan in 1979. It is believed that Alam advised the Mujahiddin guerrilas in their operations against the Soviet-backed Afghan government. After his return to Pakistan, he would say nothing about his activities, save that they had been inspired by his lone decision to aid the Afghans in a jihad (holy war) against the Soviet atheists.

When Alam retired on May 12, 1982, he had attained the rank of air commodore - the PAF equivalent of a brigadier general. When General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq took power, promising a return of traditional values, Alam welcomed the change. But he soon became disillusioned with Zia's regime, as well.

After that, Alam took up a life of austerity, living in a sparsely furnished apartment in Karachi with little more then a pile of books. As for the once-dashing ace of 1965, while Alam did appear with his fellow war veterans on Pakistani television as late as 1994, his comments on his war time service were disappointingly sparse. That had been another, earlier Mohammad Alam, he said - the new Alam was a different man, more concerned with spiritual integrity than with reliving old dogfights.

At a time when most military heroes are the subject of unqualified adulation, Pakistanis are not entirely sure what to make of Mohammad Alam. Although still looked upon askance by most senior officials of his old service, he continues to command the admiration of most junior officers and men of the PAF. Even those who did not share his religious views respect his integrity, as an "Islamic man for all seasons." It may be noted, too, that in recent years most of his older critics have retired and his younger admirers have become the PAF senior officers of today.

As for the question of separating the man from the myth, even his former Indian adversaries have acknowledged that when their actual losses are separated from the more nebulous claims, Alam's aerial achievements hold up on their own merits. In the final analysis then - and contrary, perhaps, to his own wishes - Alam's record assures his place as one of the great aces of the jet age.

taken from http://babriet.tripod.com/articles/art_mmalam.htm

withe all due respect this is teh angrez version of MM alam who is portrayed a rigid n very cockyperson..please getr the paksiatni verrsion thank You


It was becuase of MM alam that squadron 11 was codnamed tail choppers by thge indains......The name is still famous in evry airfield to date

Few fighter pilots of any nation could claim nine victories in three combats.
Fewer still could claim seven in two days.
Barely anyone could claim to have at least three jets destroyed within the space of 30-40 seconds.
But Mohammad Mahmood Alam of Pakistan Air Force did it all in 1965 war


Re-birth of Pakistan's Record-holder Air Fighter as a Changed Man: Mohmammad M. Alam

The middle of the year 1965 was unquestionably the peak point of the Pakistan Air Force's 40-year history. It brought into focus the fundamental character of this relentless air force when faced, for the first time, with a full scale confrontation with its number one enemy, the Indian Air Force.

Mohammad Mahmood Alam, who was born in 1935 in the state of Bihar, Western Bengal, is so far the top scorer fighter pilot of PAF. In the war of 1965, he shot down 9 Indian planes (5 in one sortie) and damaged another 2. On 6th September, 1965, during an aerial combat over enemy territory, Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam in an F-86 Sabre Jet, shot down two enemy Hunter aircraft and damaged three others. For the exceptional flying skill and valor displayed by Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam, he was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat [The Star of Courage]. On 7th September, 1965, Squadron Leader Alam is said to have destroyed five more enemy Hunter aircrafts in less than a minute , which remains a record till today. Overall he had nine kills and two damages to his credit


Eye-witness to M. M. Alam's Encounter with the IAF


"History has never been a particularly interesting subject for me, but on 7th September, 1965, I had the unique opportunity of seeing history being made. I shall not hesitate to accept that, ever since, my prejudices against history have weakened quite a bit..." narrates the Retired Wing Commander, M. Arif Iqbal (PAF). Read more about M. M. Alam's courageous encounter with the Indian army's fighter jets in 1965 war.

Eye-witness to M.M. Alam's encounter with the IAF
By Wing Commander (Retd.) M. Arif Iqbal (PAF)
History has never been a particularly interesting subject for me, but on 7th September, 1965, I had the unique opportunity of seeing history being made. I shall not hesitate to accept that, ever since, my prejudices against history have weakened quite a bit.

The tension of the post Rann-of-Kutch period had increased progressively culminating in the outbreak of the Indo-Pak War. The PAF was in a high state of alert. I was then at Sargodha - the focal point of interest for the Indian Air Force. It did not take a psychologist to analyse the state of mind of the PAF pilots. Calm and resolute, quite yet zealous, they were all too keen to their teach adversaries a lesson.

Seated in the cockpit of an F-104 aircraft, I was awaiting my turn to the launched into the air. On a warning of an approaching low-level raid, some of my colleagues had already got airborne. For a short span of about half a minute we were anxious, but it was not long before we realised that the enemy had failed to deliver a proper attack and had caused no damage except to chip off a corner of a transistor-radio. They had to pay a rather heavy toll for the damage they had caused on the personal property of an officer - 4 out of the 6 raiding aircraft were shot down.

When a second in-coming raid was detected, four of my colleagues flying the F-80s and I in my F-104 were ordered to the air. In minutes we were airborne and were waiting to "great-our friends." Squadron Leader M. M. Alam with his wingman was orbiting south-east of the airfield; the other pair of F-86s led by Flight Lieutenant Bhatti was further east of Squadron Leader M. M. Alam's section and I was circling the airfield at a height of about 15,000 feet. While heading north, I spotted four enemy aircraft exiting in a south-easterly direction. I called out on the radio that I had visual contact with them and started turning in the direction of the enemy's exist. By the time I had come behind the enemy aircraft, I saw that four F-86s - two of Alam's formation and two of Bhatti's - were already chasing the Indian Hunter aircraft.

The Hunter is a faster aircraft than the Sabre: In order to close in to a firing range the Sabres had to jettison their external fuel tanks and dive down from height. Bhatti tried to get rid of his external tanks but unfortunately one of his tanks failed to jettison. It was now practically impossible for him to close the gap between himself and his prey. So, he wisely decided to let the other pair of F-86s, led by Alam, tackle the Indian aircraft. Alam and his wingman started gradually to close in on the enemy. Thought I, in the F-104, would have had no problem getting into the firing range, I thought it appropriate and fair to let Alam try his hand first. I decided to keep the Hunters in sight and trail Alam, firstly to allow him more manoeuvring area and, secondly, to be ready for any one of them who might decide to run away faster. In the heart of my heart, I feared that Alam, with his complete mastery of the F-86 and his determination to punish each one of the Indians for the liberty they had taken, would give me no opportunity. In a short while I realised that my fears were turning into facts.

Like me, Alam had also spotted only four Hunters. He decided to engage the one on the extreme right first. It was then that he spotted a fifth Hunter further to the right. He changed his mind and switched his attack to this new find. Barely a couple of seconds must have lapsed before Alam six guns were spitting fire and fury at this Hunter and I saw a ball of fire hit the ground. Alam pulled his guns on to the next Hunter. A few seconds later, another ball of fire hit the ground. Then the Indians tried a half-hearted defensive manoeuvre. Alam was almost overshooting an enemy aircraft but by then he had destroyed it - a third ball of fire and the pilot of this Hunter managed to eject from his aircraft before it crashed. Alam was once again in a better position to tackle the two remaining Hunters. It was only a matter of moments before these two also turned into balls of fire and crashed into the ground. I felt a pang of disappointment - Alam had been unfair to me. He had himself tackled them all, giving me no chance to bear my guns on to any one of them. The Indians disappointed me too. Had they just decided to run away from Alam, I would have possibly had a chance.

I checked my distance from Sargodha; it was 37 miles. This was the first time that a fighter pilot had attacked and destroyed five enemy fighters at almost tree-top level in a short span of a minute or so. A new chapter was added not only to the history of the PAF, but also to that of military aviation.

It was a great privilege to have been a witness to this encounter. The bit "Fox Hunt" started by the Indian Hunters had ended up in the "Fox" killing all the hounds but one. This one hound, I do not know how, managed to detach himself from the rest of the 'hounds' and ran back with his tail between his legs. I believe that on his return he was awarded a "Veer Chakra" for his demonstration of great courage and valour in the face of the enemy!

Indian version of MM alam............tehy just love to WHine




However before we move any further, we first have to hear S/L Alam's side of the story, which was published in Battle for Pakistan, a book written by John Fricker - an aviation journalist and an old & trustworthy friend of the PAF. He was appointed by the PAF to write their version of what happened in the skies in 1965 and he wrote what they had expected - a flattering account of the air war, in which the PAF won flaps down. Thus, here is S/L Alam's version, taken from Battle for Pakistan, of what happened on that fateful day:

"As we were vectored back towards Sargodha, Akthar [his wingman] called, "Contact - four Hunters" and I saw the IAF aircraft diving to attack our airfield. I jettisoned my drops to dive through our own ack-ack after them. But in the meantime I saw two more Hunters about 1000 ft. to my rear, so I forgot the four in front and pulled up to go after the pair behind. The Hunters broke off their attempted attack on Sargodha, and the rear pair turned into me. I was flying much faster than they were at this stage - I must have been doing about 500 kts - so I pulled up to avoid overshooting them and then reversed to close in as they flew back towards India. I took the last man and dived behind him, getting very low in the process.

The Hunter can out-run the Sabre, it's only about 50 knots faster, but has a much better acceleration, so it can pull away very rapidly. Since I was diving, I was going still faster, and as he was out of my gun range, I fired the first of my two GAR-8 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles at him. In this case, we were too low and I saw the missile hit the ground short of its target. This area east of Sargodha, however, has lots of high tension wires, some of them as high as 100-150 ft., and when I saw the two Hunters pull up to avoid one of these cables, I fired my second Sidewinder. The missile streaked ahead of me, but I didn't see it strike.

The next thing I remember was that I was overshooting one of the Hunters and when I looked behind, the cockpit canopy was missing and there was no pilot in the aircraft. He had obviously pulled up and ejected and then I saw him coming down by parachute. This pilot [Sqn. Ldr. Onkar Nath Kakar, commander of an IAF squadron] was later taken prisoner. I lost sight of the other five Hunters, but I pressed on thinking maybe they would slow down. I had lots of fuel so I was prepared to fly 50 to 60 miles to catch up with them. We had just crossed the Chenab river when my wing man called out "Contact - Hunters 1 o'clock," and I picked them up at the same time - five Hunters in absolutely immaculate battle formation.

They were flying at about 100 - 200 ft, at around 480 knots and when I was in gunfire range they saw me. They all broke in one direction, climbing and turning steeply to the left, which put them in loose line astern. This, of course, was their big mistake. If you are bounced, which means a close range approach by an enemy fighter to within less than about 3000 ft., the drill is to call a break. This is a panic maneuver to the limits of the aircraft's performance, which splits the formation and both gets you out of the way of an attack and frees you to position yourself behind your opponent. But in the absence of one of the IAF sections initiating a break in the other direction to sandwich our attack, they all simply stayed in front of us.

It all happened very fast. We were all turning very tightly - in excess of 5g or just about on the limits of the Sabre's very accurate A-4 radar ranging gun-sight. And I think before we had completed more than about 270º of the turn, at around 12º per second, all four Hunters had been shot down. In each case, I got the pipper of my sight around the canopy of the Hunter for virtually a full deflection shot. Almost all our shooting throughout the war was at very high angles off - seldom less than about 30º. Unlike some of the Korean combat films I had seen, nobody in our war was shot down flying straight and level.

My fifth victim of this sortie started spewing smoke and then rolled on to his back at about 1000 feet. I though he was going to do a barrel roll, which at low altitude is a very dangerous maneuver for the opponent if the man in front knows what he is doing. I went almost on my back and then I realised I might not be able to stay with him so I took off bank and pushed the nose down. The next time I fired was at very close range - about 600 ft. or so - and his aircraft virtually blew up in front of me. None of these four pilots ejected, and all of them were killed."

According to Pushpinder Singh Chopra, Ravi Rikhye and Peter Steinemann in their book, Pakistan Fiza'ya: Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force, the PAF had released the names of the five pilots shot down by S/L Alam --> as S/L Kacker, S/L Devayya, S/L Bhagwat, F/L Guha and F/O Brar. But these names do not coincide with the names from Strike No.4, which PAF officials assume as Strike No.3, in which the PAF states that Alam shot down the five IAF Hunters. S/L Devayya was from Strike No.1, S/L Kacker from Strike No.3 and F/L Guha from Strike No.6. Only S/L Bhagwat and F/O Brar were from Strike No.4 - the sortie in which S/L Alam was flying CAP over Sargodha. Then how is it possible that S/L Alam shot down five Hunters down in a matter of minutes when the IAF pilots, the PAF had stated, were all from different strikes at different times of the day?

S/L Kacker, one of the five pilots claimed by the PAF to be supposedly shot down by S/L Alam, was from Strike No.3 and not Strike No.4. Then how can S/L Kacker be added to S/L Alam's score of five IAF Hunters, since the difference in time between the two strikes is 18 minutes! The authors of Fiza'ya describe what actually happened to S/L Kacker and S/L Alam's first clash with the two Hunters:

When Alam first went up, he encountered 2 Hunters. He specifically says he could not use his guns and so fired his Sidewinders. The first missed; the second he did not actually see striking, but on overshooting the victim saw a Hunter without canopy and pilot, and a pilot later identified as Kacker coming down by parachute. Kacker ejected near the border, which was 100km east of the main battle area, itself 50km east of Sargodha. So there is simply no manner in which Alam could have seen Kacker coming down. The first clash and its results are the product of Alam's imagination.

Insofar as the two Hunters Alam first encountered were part of the five-plane third strike with whom Kacker was flying, Alam could have fired a missile at Kacker. But he did not strike him down, or anyone else on that first encounter. There is always the possibility that someone, say ground fire knicked Kacker causing him to eject many minutes later under the impression he had suffered a pure mechanical failure. Pilots usually have little idea of the damage they suffered and the hits they took till they return to base. Whatever maybe the reason, Kacker lost his Hunter, Alam had no part in it.

S/L Alam himself was not sure whether he shot down S/L Kacker, because the first Sidewinder he had fired missed the Hunter, while the second Sidewinder he fired did not see it strike. As Pushpinder Singh Chopra says, "The first clash and its results are a product of Alam's imagination." After ejecting over Pakistan, S/L Kacker was subsequently captured and returned to India after the war. The four IAF pilots who flew with S/L Kacker also stated that he had ejected, due to a mechanical failure in his Hunter. In his book, My Years with the IAF, Air Chief Marshal (retd.) P.C. Lal interviewed these IAF pilots, who said:

"Homeward bound, Rathore fought a defensive battle. Suddenly he noticed Kacker in front losing speed. Jog reduced speed for the formation to stay together. But Kacker had a fuel problem. His Bingo Lights, the fuel warning lights, came on and finally the engine flamed out. He had to eject."

Though the cause of S/L Kacker's ejection may disputed, his wingmen testify to the absence of Sabres or Starfighters when he ejected.

S/L Devayya was one of the other pilots supposedly shot down by S/L Alam. However S/L Devayya was from Strike No.1 and flew a Mystere. The PAF again later corrected itself in saying that S/L Devayya was shot down by F/L Amjad Hussein, a F-104 pilot, just after the first strike had occurred. The claim of F/L Hussein itself is quite confusing as illustrated by the his report that he encountered a formation of two Mysteres, shot down one of them with cannon, shot down another but flew into the debris of the destroyed aircraft and had to eject.

To add to the confusion , Fricker has a different version to give. He said that F/L Hussein shot down one Mystere and was downed by another Mystere in air combat. Accordingly the PAF scaled down the claim to one Mystere downed by AA fire and another lost to the Starfighter. Fricker makes the claim of two Mysteres shot down again, and throws up more names to justify the claim. His account, after explaining how one Mystere was downed by AA fire and another shot down by F/L Hussein, goes on to say:

"...The PAF later obtained the personal details of at least three IAF Mystere pilots who were killed in air combat over Pakistan on 7 September. From their ranks – two were Squadron Leaders (Jasbeer Singh and A.B. Devayya) and one a Flight Lieutenant (B Guha) – all were evidently officers of considerable experience….even if they had been junior personnel, a 50% mission loss rate could not be long endured by the IAF, or any other airforce for that matter."

Either Fricker was trying to mislead the reader, or he was misled by the PAF himself. Fricker mentions S/L Jasbeer Singh, who was lost in an entirely unrelated raid on Rahwali, and F/L Guha, who was shot down later in the day to imply that the IAF lost more than 50% of the aircraft from the first raid over Sargodha. The composition of the pilots of the first raid was well discussed in the previous chapters with S/L Jasbeer Singh not belonging to any unit remotely associated with the Sargodha raids.

F/L Guha, piloted a Mystere and was from Strike No.6. He was shot down by F/L A.H. Malik who flew a F-86. The PAF later corrected its claim and now states that F/L Guha was indeed shot down by F/L Malik and not by S/L Alam.

The last two pilots - S/L Bhagwat and F/O Brar - were from Strike No.4. They acted as Hunter escorts, for the three-ship Hunter formation they were accompanying. The strike was led by W/C Zachariah with S/L Lamba and S/L Sinha. Strike No.4 was at 0605 hrs, the same time S/L Alam was flying CAP over Sargodha. However Sargodha's defences were alerted from the previous strike and the Hunters from Strike No.4, laden with bombs and rockets, were sitting ducks for the PAF interceptors. Pushpinder Singh Chopra gives a more clearer picture of what happened to the second Hunter formation. The following is from his article in Vayu Aerospace Review, titled 'Laying the Sargodha Ghost to Rest':

Meanwhile, the second formation of Hunters, led by Wg. Cdr. Toric Zachariah, C.O. No.7 Squadron and comprising Sqn. Ldr. S.B. Bhagwat and Flg. Officer J.S. Brar as escorts, were heading towards Sargodha when they crossed the six Sabres, with two F-104s over-head, following the returning Hunters. According to strict operational instructions, which were to avoid air combat when weighed down by extra fuel tanks and rockets, the Hunters turned hard port to climb towards the Sabres which were some 3000 feet higher. Stores were jettisoned as the Sabres, diverted from the Hunters of No.27 Squadron, turned into the No.7 Squadron formation.

With the element of surprise lost and the PAF operating Sidewinder-equipped Sabres and F-104s ranged against them, the formation leader instructed the Hunters to return to base. The aircraft exited individually at low level but the escort section consisting of Bhagwat and Brar got into a scrap and was overwhelmed by superior numbers and Sidewinders and from which they did not return. The remaining three Hunters; flown by Zachariah, Lamba and Sinha saw a number of other patrolling Sabres, particularly in the vicinity of Chak Jhumra airfield, but returned safely to Halwara.

It is not known as to which PAF pilot actually shot down S/L Bhagwat and F/O Brar, but in the face of evidence S/L Alam is given the credit, since he was flying CAP over Sargodha at that time and he reached the area first . The latter was stated by Fricker himself in his book, Battle for Pakistan. Also no other PAF Sabre pilot claimed to have encountered air combat with Hunters that morning.

S/L Alam's eyewitnesses have proved to be quite damaging, rather than helpful. Their version of the events, from how they saw it, were different from S/L Alam's version. Take the example of W/C (retd.) M. Arif Iqbal - a F-104 pilot - who was providing CAP (Combat Air Patrol) on September 7th. In an article titled, "Eye-witness to M.M. Alam's encounter with the IAF" he states:

"Like me, Alam had also spotted only four Hunters. He decided to engage the one on the extreme right first. It was then that he spotted a fifth Hunter further to the right. He changed his mind and switched his attack to this new find. Barely a couple of seconds must have lapsed before Alam six guns were spitting fire and fury at this Hunter and I saw a ball of fire hit the ground. Alam pulled his guns on to the next Hunter. A few seconds later, another ball of fire hit the ground. Then the Indians tried a half-hearted defensive manoeuvre. Alam was almost overshooting an enemy aircraft but by then he had destroyed it - a third ball of fire and the pilot of this Hunter managed to eject from his aircraft before it crashed. Alam was once again in a better position to tackle the two remaining Hunters. It was only a matter of moments before these two also turned into balls of fire and crashed into the ground."

S/L Alam clearly states that he saw four Hunters attacking the airfield and another two 1000 feet to his rear. He then claims that he forgot about the other four and engaged the pair behind him. However Iqbal states that S/L Alam spotted only a fifth Hunter in addition to the earlier four. Or did Iqbal mistake two Hunters for one? In fact, Iqbal goes a step further and states the fifth Hunter S/L Alam spotted was to the right of the four-ship Hunter formation. Quite a contrast to S/L Alam's claim of seeing two Hunters a 1000 ft. to his rear!

S/L Alam also states that he used GAR-8 Sidewinders instead of his guns, when he attacked the two aircraft. According to Iqbal however, S/L Alam used only his guns and does not mention Alam using his Sidewinders. If Iqbal is referring to the second encounter, again discrepancies arise from his story. S/L Alam claims to have seen five IAF Hunters in immaculate battle formation and once he entered gunfire range, the IAF Hunters called a break. Iqbal however states that only after two Hunters were destroyed, did the remaining Hunters in the formation call the break. Obviously both versions are contradictory to each other, because it is very easy to determine three aircraft from five - especially when they are in the air.

The third Hunter in the formation, according to Iqbal, also became a victim of S/L Alam's guns but the pilot managed to eject before the aircraft crashed. S/L Alam states exactly the opposite of Iqbal and says, "None of these four pilots ejected, and all of them were killed." S/L Alam had in fact claimed the pilot who ejected as his first kill. Iqbal concludes the air battle by saying that S/L Alam destroyed the remaining two Hunters in the formation, thus bringing his total kill rate in that sortie to five aircraft. S/L Alam also concurs with that figure. It appears that that is the only thing S/L Alam and Iqbal agree on, because everything else in Iqbal's story is remarkably different from S/L Alam's version. Iqbal proudly claims to have been an eyewitness to the S/L Alam encounter. The impression left is that of a deliberate attempt by Iqbal to support S/L Alam's tally.

There are a few contradicting claims originating from Battle for Pakistan - a book which praised the PAF's role in 1965 and put S/L Alam on a pedestal - in which Fricker states the following:

Many pilots have scored several air victories in one sortie, and have equalled or exceeded Alam's claims of shooting down up to five enemy aircraft of superior performance within a few minutes. But few are likely to be able to match his record of destroying at least 3 opponents - Hawker Hunters of the Indian Air Force - within the space of somewhere around 30 seconds. Admittedly, confirmation of Alam's claims has been difficult to obtain, despite close-range observation of his encounter by several PAF pilots, and some gun camera evidence. Nearest of these observers was his wingman, Fg. Off. Masood Akhtar, who, protecting his leader's tail, clung like a leech throughout the action.

Another section of PAF Sabres, led by Flt. Lt. Bhatti, was attempting to engage the Hunters but Alam (at that time a Squadron Leader) got there first. Flying top cover in an F-104A Starfighter was Sqn. Ldr. Arif Iqbal who, with intense frustration, watched the brief combat with admiration. On this basis, Alam was originally credited with five IAF Hunters destroyed, although the wreckage of only two could be found in Pakistani territory, within 2 or 3 miles of Sangla Hill railway station. The bodies of the pilots - one Hindu and one Sikh - was burnt beyond recognition. The area of the main engagement, however, some 30 miles east of Sargodha airfield, was only about 55nm inside the Pakistani border - some seven or eight minutes at jet speed.

What is unusual about Fricker's story is that he states "at least three Hunters in 30 seconds" when S/L Alam clearly stated in his account above, which is also from the same book, that he shot down four Hunters in that same time period. This clearly illustrates the fact that even Fricker found the PAF's claims difficult to digest. Fricker also believes that evidence for Alam's claim was "difficult to obtain", even when eye witnesses and gun camera evidence were present. However the disparity in the story of M. Arif Iqbal and S/L Alam is very difficult to explain.

Arriving at the gun camera evidence, which is displayed every September 7th in Pakistan to commemorate PAF Day, it appears that a crucial factor is overlooked. Did the gun camera pictures come from that particular battle? There is enough evidence to suggest that all is not what it seems to be. As Pushpindar Singh Chopra in his Vayu Aerospace Review article, 'Laying the Sargodha Ghost to Rest' says:

Amongst earlier examples of clumsy propaganda was a photograph purporting to depict an Indian Hunter on fire but later identified as cut from a training film showing a Pakistani Sabre firing rockets against practice ground targets.

This indicates, that the gun camera evidence must have been most likely tampered with, to prove that S/L Alam had indeed shot down five Hunters! After all, gun camera evidence along with the names, would have sealed any doubts about the validity of S/L Alam's claim. The PAF indeed go to great lengths to back their claims! Moreover, the legitimacy of gun camera shots becomes questionable when it is considered that it depends on the word of the claimant that the evidence was from that particular circumstance. There is no way to check the date, time or particulars of where those particular pictures were taken. One of the camera gunshots of a Hunter was captured at an almost impossible angle, something only achieved if the Sabre was flying sideways and downwards. Gun camera pictures become important in the absence of any other form of evidence, like wrecks and/or captured aircrew. As these kills were near Sargodha, the PAF should not have had any problem in producing evidence in terms of wreckage/pilots. But Pakistan had problems providing evidence in terms of wreckage and pilots recovered too.

Fricker also states "...only two could be found in Pakistani territory..." and if S/L Alam shot down five Hunters, then why is it that only two wreckages were found? Fricker said that the engagement took place "...only 55nm inside the Pakistani border..." and by that he suggested that the other aircraft might have crashed in Indian territory. However this is contradicted by S/L Alam's version: "These aircraft virtually blew up in front of me. None of these four pilots ejected, and all of them were killed." This meant that all aircraft either blew up or crashed in front of his eyes and therefore in Pakistani territory, for nowhere did Alam claim that the battle took him into India. How and when this version transformed into a story about the Hunters crashing in Indian territory is not known.

There is an amusing story, in Air Chief Marshal (retd.) P.C. Lal's book, My Years with the IAF, in which he states:

The personal account of M.M. Sinha who took part in the 1965 War shows how misleading some of these claims and counterclaims can be. In 1969, both India And Pakistan had sent officers to the Joint Services Staff College at Latimer in England. One evening at the bar, a Pakistani officer attending the course was speaking to another Pakistani officer visiting him. Talking of old times with great satisfaction, he was recounting what happened at Sargodha in Pakistan on 7 September. He was talking of the raid, by Hunters and five of them were shot down by Sqn. Ldr. Alam alone as recounted in John Fricker's book. The Indian Officer on the course, M.M. Sinha, happened to overhear the statement. "It was as not so," he said "you got only two."

"Nonsense", retorted the Pakistani Officer, "How do you know exactly what happened?"

"I should know" said Sinha, "I took part in that raid. We lost only two - Fg. Off. Brar and Sqn. Ldr. Bhagwat. Sqn. Ldr. Kacker had to eject because his engine developed some trouble and it flamed out due to fuel starvation. He became a POW." There was an awkward silence. "The other members of that raid, or rather two raids, are all still alive. I can give you their addresses if you want to check. One of them Wg. Cdr. A.T.R.H. Zachariah, the former CO of No.7 Sqn has an English Wife and is right here in England."

Lately, it seems that the list of the five pilots have been mysteriously changed from S/L Devayya to S/L Rawlley - popularly also known as Peter. S/L Devayya was a Mystere pilot, while S/L Rawlley was a Hunter pilot and it is understandable why the PAF changed the names to keep with the story of only Hunters being shot down by Alam on September 7th. However, in an attempt to keep this absurd claim alive, the PAF missed a very big point. Although S/L Rawlley did get into an air battle with S/L Alam, it occurred on September 6th, a day earlier, in Halwara - 200 miles away from Sargodha! Even Air Chief Marshal (retd.) P.C. Lal in his book - My Years in the IAF stated that S/L Rawlley was killed on September 6th. The most interesting source, however, comes from Pakistan itself. In a September 1998 issue of Defence Journal - a Pakistani defence magazine - an article titled, Sqn. Ldr. Sarfaraz Ahmed Rafiqui, stated the following:

On the evening of 6th September 1965, an ill-fated formation of three aircraft took off from Sargodha for a raid on Halwara airfield, one of the three, that had been singled out for a pre-emptive strike. Led by Sqn. Ldr. Rafiqui, with Flt. Lt. Cecil Chaudhry as No.2 and Flt. Lt. Yunus Hussain as No.3, the formation hurtled across into enemy territory in fast fading light. Sqn. Ldr. M.M. Alam's formation, also of three aircraft, which had taken-off ten minutes earlier, was returning after an abortive raid on Adampur. They had been bounced by four Hunters, themselves proceeding on a mission against Pak Army formations. Rafiqui was warned by Alam's section to watch out for Hunters in the area. At Halwara, IAF's No.7 Squadron equipped with Hunters had flown four strikes during the day. These were armed reconnaissance missions, which had had little success in finding worthwhile targets. The fourth and last strike for the day was on its way to the precincts of Lahore, when it had encountered Alam's formation near Taran Taran. In that engagement Sqn. Ldr. Peter Rawlley's Hunter impacted the ground as he did a defensive break at very low level, with Alam firing at him from stern.

The authors of Fiza'ya further explain the September 6th incident:

Very oddly, though Alam is credited with two Hunters in the Adampur attack on September 6th, the previous day, he himself is exceptionally circumspect about the incident. He fired on one Hunter and saw him go into the ground in flames but says "...I am not certain whether I hit him or not," indicating that one of his other pilots might be responsible. While exiting he took a long shot at a Hunter. "...I think I registered hits - I only saw smoke coming out, but no flames." Here he is not even claiming certain damage, leave alone the aircraft.

While, the first Hunter, S/L Alam can claim to have destroyed, the second Hunter he assumes that he had shot it down. It is quite a mystery as to how the second kill on September 6th, could be added to S/L Alam's score.

S/L Alam's last battle, according to the PAF, occurred on September 16th near Halwara AFB. In this air battle, S/L Alam claims to have shot down two Hunters and describes what happened. However, one of S/L Alam's claimed victims - then F/L P.S. Pingale - narrates his side of the story as well. Jon Guttman, in a 1998 Aviation History article titled, 'Pakistan's Sabre Ace' gives S/L Alam's and F/L Pingale's version of the events:

"They were flying very fast," Alam reported afterward. "We were doing about Mach .8, but they must have been diving at around Mach .95 or more. They couldn't stay in our turn, so they zoomed up in a yo-yo manoeuvre. When I reversed back they both pulled through from there, and we dived behind them until at 13-14,000 feet they separated in a vertical break." Alam went after the climbing Hunter and engaged it at about 20,000 feet. His first burst of gunfire missed, but his second scored a hit. "At the third burst, he became a ball of flame," Alam said, "so I turned back and looked for my wingman....Then suddenly I lost all radio contact with him, although I could see him in the distance and I saw the Hunter break away from him. "The Hunter saw me," Alam continued, "and although he was close to his base, he didn't want to accept combat. He turned away from me and rapidly accelerated rapidly in a dive, although I followed as closely as possible behind him. I knew we were approaching close to the airfield of Halwara and suspected a trap, but then he did a loose sort of a roll to clear his tail, so he had obviously lost me. I had dived a good 5-6000 feet below him, at about Mach .94-.95, and when I felt that he was slowing down, I fired a Sidewinder at him. There was something wrong with this missile, however as it turned, through about 90 degrees soon after its release."

"I continued diving after him, however, and then released my second Sidewinder which scored a hit on his right wing root. As it began to smoke, I saw that we were just crossing the Halwara Canal and as I was well inside Indian territory and getting a bit short of fuel, I immediately half-rolled and dived down to treetop level. When I hit the border between India and Pakistan, I climbed up to conserve fuel, feeling very miserable at having lost my No.2."

Although Alam had not seen the second Hunter crash, the PAF credited him with both planes, for his eighth and ninth victories of the war. As in the earlier cases, one of Alam's victims survived to give his own description of the fight. When the PAF F-86s were reported, Flying Officers Prakash S. Pingale and F. Dara Bunsha of No.7 Squadron scrambled up from Halwara. Pingale reported that he got behind the first Sabre, which turned south, then spotted the second, "at about 4 o'clock at a range of 1,000 yards and about to fire on us." He then told Bunsha to "go for Sabre No.1," while he engaged the other. "Sabre No.2 attempted to shake me off by pulling up into the sun," Pingale said. "He also jettisoned his external loads and pulled up steeply as a last-ditch maneuver to make me overshoot him, perhaps by the use of leading edge slats....I was able to open fire at about 3000-4000 yards. The aircraft literally exploded in front of me." At that point, Pingale saw Bunsha engaging in scissors manoeuvres with Alam's F-86. He radioed a warning to Bunsha that the Sabre held the advantage in such a fight. But Bunsha was going down in flames by the time he intervened.

"Seeing my coming towards him, Sabre No.1 left my No.2 and turned towards me," Pingale continued. "As we crossed head-in, he opened fire on me," Pingale continued. "As we crossed head-on, he opened fire on me....As I reversed to engage Sabre No.1 in 1-vs-1 combat, to my utter dismay I found that instead of fighting with me he had half-rolled and was speedily trying to get away in a vertical dive. I attempted to close in but lost contact with Sabre No.1 because I blacked out due to excessive g (around 8-10 as recorded by my g-meter)." As he returned to Halwara, Pingale could not recall seeing his Pakistani opponent ever fire a missile at him, but he later admitted that his perceptions were somewhat impaired by the pain of a slight back injury he had sustained after being hit by ground fire and bailing out a few days earlier, aggravated by the effects of his high-g turn.

Entirely two different stories arise from both men - S/L Alam and F/L Pingale. There is no doubt that F/O Farokh Dara Bunsha became a victim of S/L Alam's guns, But whether F/L Pingale himself became a victim of S/L Alam's guns is certainly debatable. S/L Alam claims that the first Sidewinder he fired malfunctioned, and the second hit F/L Pingale's Hunter on the wing root. S/L Alam however did not stay for long to confirm his second kill, as he realised he was deep in Indian territory. F/L Pingale on the other hand, had returned safely to Halwara which might suggest that he landed back at base. What is of greater significance is that the PAF adds F/L Pingale's kill to S/L Alam's list, when no evidence of any kind - eyewitness, gun camera, etc. - was ever present.

The PAF claimed a total of nine confirmed kills for S/L Alam in the 1965 air war. They were respectively, according to the PAF, two on September 6th, five on September 7th and two more on September 16th. However with the damning evidence presented above, his claims stand no ground. Given the modesty of his claims for September 6th and the extravagance of his claims for September 7th, S/L Alam is certainly a complex personality. Surprisingly, the most contradicting claim comes from the PAF. The authors in Fiza'ya say, "Alam's citation for the Sitara-e-Jurat and Bar, cites him as shooting down four Hunters on September 7th and two on September 6th." Thus, even the PAF in 1965, did not claim five Hunters over Sargodha on September 7th! When and why the number changed to five, is not known. Also there is no mention of the September 16th incident in the citation! This it appears, was added later on.

Jon Guttman, in an Aviation History article titled, 'Pakistan's Sabre Ace' states that Sqn. Ldr. Alam's professional relationship with the Pakistan Air Force suffered after the 1965 war due to certain reasons. The following are excerpts from that article;

Alam commanded No.11 Squadron until April 1966. In November 1967, he was promoted to Wing Commander, given the command of No.5 Squadron and charged with overseeing the introduction of the newly imported Dassault Mirage IIIEP into that unit. At about that time, however, Alam began to have problems as a result of professional jealousies and personal resentments among fellow PAF officers. For one thing, there were some accusations that while Alam was a virtuoso pilot, his leadership qualities at the senior officer level left something much to be desired. As Pakistan's first ace, much was expected of him after the war, and his more limited administrative abilities may have suffered further under the pressure of such expectations.

Alam was also reappraising his lifestyle, reaching the conclusion that the abandonment of traditional Islamic values by the PAF constituted a betrayal of the people it served. The most obvious symbol of that compromise of values was the consumption of alcohol. Alam not only quit drinking but also began trying to persuade his colleagues to banish alcohol from the officers' mess. Inevitably, Alam's growing zeal rubbed many PAF officers - a good many of whim were his superiors - the wrong way.

In 1969, Alam attended the staff college, but he was removed from the course in 1970 under the absurd pretext that he could not read and write. In May, he was relieved of command of No.5 Squadron - which was given to Wing Commander Hakimullah Khan - and played no active role in the Indo-Pak War of December 1971. Alam was given command of No.26 Squadron in January 1972 but lost it just two months later.

It must have been surely insulting for S/L Alam to have been removed from staff college in 1970 on the basis that he could not read or write! Even more damaging was his non-active role in 1971, when just six years earlier in 1965, he was on the top of the PAF. To be then removed from command of No.26 Squadron just two months after he got it in 1972, must have surely hurt his ego deeply. Alam retired as an Air Commodore in March 1982 and lives a secluded lifestyle in Karachi. He has become a devout Muslim, being often described as a mullah who spends his time praying and forecasting condemnation to hell for the PAF Officers who are less devout!

To read complete article go to their web site

SOME ONE PLS GET ME THE STORY OF MAJ AZIZ BHATTI SHAHEED ND SHER KHAN SHAHEED...ITS HARD TO FIND

O.K. Your wish is my command. I'll do as you say sir!

Our historic heroes were

Ghauri

Ghaznavi

Abdali

Aurangzeb

Bal thakeray , modi, advani , lalu persad yadav , tendulker

PTV used to air a show/story on major Raja Aziz Bhatti shaheed a while ago on every sept 6.I used to watch it wach yr but now i have forgotten most of the story.It would be good to read it as well.

I have watched other three, Raja Sarwar,Rashid Minhaas and major Tufail.Dont know of the stores are made on other 6 heros as well especially kargil ones.

...hmmm i remember teh story very well....but by far the best drama on war heroes was directed by shohaib mansooor..on rashid minhaas

Maj. Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed

Born: 1928, Hong Kong
Commissioned: 1950, Punjab Regiment



On 6th September 1965, as Company Commander in the Burki Area of the Lahore Sector, Major Bhatti chose to move with his forward platoon under incessant artillery and tank attacks for five days and nights in Defence of the strategically vital BRB Canal. Throughout, undaunghted by constant fire from enemy small arms, tanks and artillery, he organized the Defence of the canal, directing his men to answer the fire until he was hit by an enemy tank shell which killed him on 10th September 1965.


Source

[SIZE=7]STORY oF MAJ. AZIZ BHATTI SHAHEED


In spite of massive numerical superiority in men and weapons, and advantage of surprise and pre-emption during the 1965 war, Indian Army, Air Force and Navy failed in their missions. This failures was because the Pakistani nation i.e. the people and the military were fully united and determined to resist and defeat the Indian aggression. Within the armed forces, professionalism, motivation, boldness in battles, and loyalty contributed to the success of the Pakistan armed forces in the most tiring circumstances. The spirit of 6th September needs to be rekindled, because continued Bharti infernal inimical attitude and prejudice against Pakistan is not abating. False propaganda about sponsoring and supporting the freedom movement in Occupied Kashmir is continuing.

Over six million troops of Indian Army and paramilitary forces are engaged in inhuman bestiality and, since 1989, have killed and maimed by torture thousands of Kashmiris. Their actions are seriously threatening Pakistan's national security and sovereignty. Bharti political and military leaders are hurling threats and ultimatums of war.

By April 21, 1965, Indian provocative intrusions in the Rann of Kutch were effectively crushed by 8 divisions of Pakistan Army. On April 28, Prime Minister Shastri gave a warning that, "If Pakistan did not listen to reason... Indian Army will decide its own strategy in the manner it deems fit!" This ineffect was an ultimatum that Indian Army was free to choose the place and time for full-scale aggression against Pakistan. General Mohammad Musa Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army at the time, in his book 'My Version' states that, "We had clearly appreciated that Indian would retaliate violently against Azad Kashmir...... To face the very likely contingency of a general war, we kept the whole army in its forward concentration areas throughout the country, even though the Kutch emergency was over".

But the Army was withdrawn from the forward areas by July 65. Major General Shaukat Riza in his book on 1965 war states that, "In early July our troops had been deployed on the border.


The defensive positions were strengthened with barbed wire and mines. In the last week of July, the troops were ordered to completely dismantle the defenses, and return to barracks. All signs of warlike activity were to be ceased. When the Indians attacked on the night of 5/6th Sept, there were no mines, no barbed wire". Intelligence agencies did not confirm assembly of Indian forces for the impending invasion, India had the full advantage of surprise, but Indian pre-emption failed. The epic unity of Pakistani nation, and the girt, courage, boldness in battle and patriotism of Pakistan armed forces, and the exemplary cooperation and coordination between the infantry, armour, artillery and air force, stunned the enemy into a paralysis and defeat.

Indian H-hour was 0330 hours, but Indian troops had infiltrated at many places before the H-hour. On Sept 05, 1965, G-II Intelligence of 10 division, in his briefing to the GOC (Major General Mohammad Sarfraz Khan) and his Brigade Commanders, and Commander Artillery stated that 37 Indian tanks were off-load from a train at Raja-Jhansi Cantt railway station near Amritsar on the morning of Sept 4th. He commented that Indian armour was being assembled in Amritsar for a possible offensive in the future. But he significantly added that villagers, rangers, army posts and patrols had reported heavy noise and rumble of armour and vehicles along the border. But according to him, it was from tapes being played by Indian intelligence agents to create panic and could be a deception - diversion gimmick. The GOC did not bite the intelligence crop, and in my presence (I was Base Commander PAF Lahore) ordered that the troops are to be in their defensive positions by mid-night. The tense faces of the GOC and his Brigade Commanders proved that they knew that the enemy was all set for the attack. Indian offensive had fully developed by the H-Hour at 0330 hours. While most of the formations were in position by mid-night, the marching columns of 10 Division i.e. 103 and 114 Brigades arrived in their semi-prepared battle locations by 0030 hours. Major General Shaukat Riza states that; "It was by merest chance that General Sarfraz had ordered occupation of defensive positions on mid-night 5th/6th September." The sixth sense of Major General Sarfraz, GOC 10 Division perhaps saved Lahore. That Indian attack on Lahore was broken in spite of the shock of surprise does lot of credit to the officers and men of 10 Division.

Lahore being a prize target, Indian Army plan was to capture it by a blitzkrieg offensive. At 0330 hours, Indian attack on Lahore was launched by two Indian divisions - i.e. 7 and 15, three artillery brigades and two armour regiments on two axis. Facing this invasion force was Pakistan Army's 10 division consisting of three brigades (22, 103 and 114). These three brigades comprised seven battalion, one patched-up Recce and Support battalion and to armoured regiments.

10 Division had to defend a front of 60,000 yard i.e. 34 miles from Ravi Syphon in the north to Bedian in the south, 22 Brigade under Brigadier Qayyum Sher was the division striking force. 103 Brigade under Brigadier Asghar was responsible for the defence from exclusive Wagah road to Bedian; and 114 Brigade under Brigadier Aftab Ahmed was responsible for the defence of Ravi Syphon, through Beni bridge to inclusive main Wagah road. Its three battalions fought a bloody battle and stopped the enemy short of BRB. From Bedian to Hussainiwala was the responsibility of 11 Division. There was no corps headquarter for co-ordinating the operations of 10 and 11 Divisions which was a big disadvantage.

Opposing 10 and 11 Division was Indian Army's 11 Corps comprising 7 and 15 Infantry Divisions, 4 Mountain Division, an armoured brigade. 15 Division attacked Wagah road. 7 Indian Division attacked Barki - Harike - Lahore road, in a co-ordinated pincer. 4 Mountain Division had planned to capture Kasur by the afternoon of September 6th. The Armoured Brigade was split-up. Indian amour started crossing Wagah into Pakistan by 0330 hours of September 6th. After heavy shelling and over-running several Ranger posts (Wagah, Giwindi, Ichogil), 114 Brigade, Recce and Support Company Headquarter and a platoon at Dial; by 0430 1/9 Jat Indian Army contacted Bravo Company 11 Baluch at Bheni bridge. The attack was broken-up. Another attack on Bheni bridge at 1030 met similar fate. Soon enemy tanks advanced within 1000 yards, and troops were 2000 yards from Batapur bridge. The bridge had not been prepared for demolition. Indian tanks started firing across Batapur bridge about the time the Brigade Commander and the Battalion Commander reached the bridge. A single recoilless rifle responded to the firing by Indian tanks. Exactly at this time, six PAF F-86 Sabres started rocketing the Indian tanks, which ran for cover. PAF air support at this crucial juncture, enabled time to bring down concentrated divisional artillery fire, when the Indian infantry was only four hundred yards from Batapur bridge, and enemy tanks had regrouped for hostile action. The PAF and Artillery broke the India offensive. At 1000 hours Brigadier Aftab telephoned General Sarfraz, "We have stopped the attack. The troops are digging". It was at this time that BBC and All India radio had announced that, "Lahore had fallen, and Indian troops were parading through Anarkali Bazar triumphantly." It was a close call. The order for the demolition of 20 bridges given to 4 Engineer Battalion on mid night 4th/5th September could not be accomplished before 6th September.

On September 6, Allah, Artiller and Air Force came to the rescue of 114 Brigade. The war diary of 114 Brigade had the following to say for the events of September 6, 1965:



"a. The enemy had achieved a complete surprise on us. Our troops were hardly in