Are the Pakistani Nukes in safe hands?

Are the Pakistani Nukes being properly safeguarded?

Does the US have access to Pakistani Nukes?

Is US targeting Pakistani Nukes?

Please watch the following PTV Video for answers to the questions above and some others regarding our Nuclear Weapons:

PTV Video: Is US targeting Pakistani nukes?

Islamabad, Sunday, January 13, 2008: Last November, The New York Times published what many analysts in Islamabad described as a planted story, claiming that the United States had spent up to $ 100 million over the past five years to help Pakistan secure its nuclear weapons.

The story coincided with reports alleging that elite U S troops already had access to Pakistan’s vast arsenal of nuclear and other strategic weapons.

Pakistani officials preferred to ignore these reports, confident about their capabilities and a little curious about where these bogus stories were coming from. These Pakistani officials were also content with assurances from the Bush administration it had nothing to do with these reports.

But over the following weeks, Pakistani analysts carefully watched how the U S media campaign portraying Pakistan as a nuclear power incapable of securing its weapons grew bigger and was joined by prominent American academics and politicians.

The quality of the ‘media reports’ about Pakistani nukes also changed. Now the American media was talking about actual ‘war games’ conducted by American military institutions and think tanks as a prelude to sending in elite troops to ‘grab’ Pakistani nuclear weapons in case of instability in Pakistan on the pattern of typical Hollywood movie scripts.

The propaganda reached its zenith in January when Mrs. Hillary Clinton, the U S presidential hopeful, proposed joint American and British ‘supervision’ of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

But there is a reason why Pakistani responses to these reports remained mostly calm and calculated. It is because the women and men in charge of the Pakistani strategic arsenal were quietly making fun of the American allegations and at first did not even take them seriously.

“It’s laughable,” said Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, a director at the Strategic Plans Division, or the S P D, which is the Secretariat of the National Command Authority that controls the Pakistani strategic assets. “We did make the bomb, didn’t we? The world thought we couldn’t do it.”

Nevertheless, one of the founding members of the team that created Pakistan’s National Command Authority, retired Brigadier Naeem Salik, who is currently teaching at Washington’s Johns Hopkins University as a visiting scholar, is advising caution while dismissing the American reports.

“We can’t dismiss it as a media campaign. There is a background to it,” he told me last week during a visit to Islamabad.

I have argued that this U S media trial of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities is not natural. It’s not like a few American journalists suddenly found themselves out of stories and thought, “what the heck, let’s talk about Pakistani nukes.”

This campaign must be seen in the context of a deliberate U S strategy to destabilize Pakistan. This strategy includes the war on terror, the American exploitation of late Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, and the situation in Afghanistan.

By early December, 2007, Pakistani officials started watching this American campaign closely.

On 11 December, the chairman of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Tariq Majid, blasted reports by “vested and hostile elements in the international media” about the security of its nuclear weapons, an army statement said.

"Suggestions have been made that our assets could either be neutralized or taken away towards safer places to prevent them from falling into wrong hands," the statement quoted Majid as saying after witnessing the launch of the Pakistani-developed Babur-Hatf-7 cruise missile.

"Though no responsible state in the world can contemplate such an impossible operation, yet if someone did create such a scenario, Pakistan would meet the challenge strongly," the statement said.

"Pakistan's nuclear assets are very safe and secure, and the nation needs not to worry on that account. There is a very strong security system in place, which can ward off all threats, internal as well as external."

Back at the S P D, I interviewed Air Commodore Banuri, on camera, and asked him about all the possibilities, including what Pakistan would do if its strategic installations came under attack.

His answer was simple: “My message is: Don’t mess with us.”

Here are excerpts from the interview. The entire television version is posted on the homepage of this website. A link is also provided below.





Ahmed Quraishi: Do we have a logistical problem in handling or managing our strategic assets?

A C Khalid Banuri: It is laughable. We did make the bomb, didn’t we? The world thought we couldn’t do it. We, too, were always concerned about how to protect it. Since 1998, when South Asia went overtly nuclear … this is 2007, we have consistently augmented our systems, a point that many people forget or overlook.

Ahmed Quraishi: Who holds the authority to push the nuclear button in Pakistan?

A C Khalid Banuri: The short answer is very easy: Not an individual but the National Command Authority, comprised of all the senior decision makers of the country, (they) would look at all the issues including the deployment, if it ever comes to that.

Ahmed Quraishi: Is it possible there could be a scientist on the inside, an extremists with links to terrorists, maybe Osama bin Laden, who could steal a Pakistani weapon …

A C Khalid Banuri: In a Tom Clancy fiction that could be a possibility. We are very sure of what our systems are.

Ahmed Quraishi: What about the reports before 9/11 that mentioned the links between some of the scientists in our strategic programs, names, who met terrorists in Afghanistan?

A C Khalid Banuri: Those names, when you actually go into the details, had nothing to do with the classified side of our programs, (they might have been) some people from the system who perhaps were power plant engineers who had some sympathies and were doing some charity work.

The key thing here is that Pakistan investigated those situations and now we have a system that takes care of all aspects, even for our very respected scientists who retire. There is a system where they will be occupied in various ways and we will know what they are doing.

Ahmed Quraishi: Let’s say there is a violent change of government in Islamabad. Someone hiding in the foothills of Islamabad breaks into one of your facilities, kills 5 or 6 guards, goes inside, picks up one of those nuclear weapons held in a very elaborate security parameter, takes it out, comes out of the building, puts it in the back of a truck or van and speeds away. How possible is this scenario?

A C Khalid Banuri: Absolutely not possible. But it is a fair question. We have several layers — a multitude of systems of security and technical solutions for security, some of which are non-intrusive and invisible. There are no exceptions for anyone from the outside going into a facility. There are various levels of access. Then there is the issue of insider threat. Not possible. We look at each individual who works within the system very closely. We look at them from various angles, something that the West knows at ‘persona reliability’, the human factor. We look into everything, background checks, medical records, police records, any history of possible impulsive behavior. And if there is anyone who doesn’t have a smooth graph of behavior, they are not put into any sensitive jobs. Even if there is someone in personal distress, for example because of a death in the family, there is a way for relieving them for a few days from sensitive responsibility.

Ahmed Quraishi: So the cinematic perception of a Pakistani equivalent of a suitcase carried at all times by the President or the Prime Minister, containing the button for a nuclear missile or something, is not correct?

A C Khalid Banuri: The decision making about nuclear assets is very carefully thought out. It’s not a hair trigger situation. We all have seen many Cold War movies and many of these idea come from them.

Ahmed Quraishi: Well said. Where are we keeping our nuclear bombs?

A C Khalid Banuri: The response to this question is in two words: Strategic Ambiguity. If anyone even claims he knows where our weapons are, they are wrong. And if they think they do, they are in for a rude shock. Even within the system, if someone doesn’t need to know about sensitive sites, they don’t have that information. So very few in Pakistan would know where they are. And I’m not going to tell you .

Ahmed Quraishi: Really, I was kind of hoping for a hint. Okay, are the safeguards in the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, Israel and India any better than the Pakistani nuclear safeguards?

A C Khalid Banuri: Even if I sound arrogant, ours are better. We have the advantage of hindsight. We have worked hard, we have trained hard, and we are very sure of what we have. We have learned from the best international practices. We don’t have aircrafts flying around with unauthorized nuclear missiles and we have a short nuclear history compared to some of the countries you mentioned.

Ahmed Quraishi: Media reports have suggested that the Americans have helped Pakistan secure its nuclear assets, which implies that the Americans have access to Pakistani nukes?

A C Khalid Banuri: Ensuring nuclear security is our own interest. We made the bomb, we have the means to protect it, and we’re confident of that security. But we do not mind exposure to education and awareness, but in a completely non-intrusive way.

Ahmed Quraishi: So you’re saying you have exchanged ideas with the Americans but not given them any access?

A C Khalid Banuri: Absolutely. That’s out of the question. That’s the red line that was defined even before we got into this exchange of ideas. We do have some rudimentary equipment and some training (from the U S). And the kinds of figures you have seen in the media (about U S financial aid to secure Pakistani nuclear assets] are highly exaggerated.

Ahmed Quraishi: The figure quoted was in the tens of millions …

A C Khalid Banuri: A $100 million was quoted in one report (New York Times, Nov. 2007). Nowhere in that range.

Ahmed Quraishi: Really?

A C Khalid Banuri: Nowhere.

Ahmed Quraishi: Some Pakistanis are concerned and are asking what if the rudimentary equipment handed over to you contained a transmitter that could send out signals to a satellite or something exposing where our installations are?

A C Khalid Banuri: You have responded to the question yourself. Anyone concerned in Pakistan would have thought about this. The Pakistani nuclear establishment is always concerned about even the remotest of possibilities. We have this responsibility on behalf of this whole nation. It’s a sacred responsibility.

Ahmed Quraishi: So let me put this to rest once and for all: You have not given access to the Americans as part of accepting their ‘help’?

A C Khalid Banuri: No access whatsoever. There are no foreigners who have any access to any Pakistani assets and they will never have. There are very few Pakistanis, even within our policy circle, who have all the information.

Ahmed Quraishi: Does everyone concerned inside and outside the region understand there will be consequences if Pakistan’s strategic assets are attacked?

A C Khalid Banuri: Let me say it in plain words: Those who have hostile intent would know that any endeavor to attack Pakistan in any way will not be successful and it will be disastrous. Our weapons are meant for deterrence and not for (aggression). But we have the capability to deal with any threat.

Ahmed Quraishi: So we will respond if we are attacked?

A C Khalid Banuri: My message is:Don’t mess with us.

Ahmed Quraishi: Late Mrs. Benazir Bhutto had publicly warned a few weeks before her tragic death that extremists could descend on the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, and take control of the nearby nuclear installations at Kahuta. Is this true?

A C Khalid Banuri: I don’t want to get into the politics of this statement. But I’d like to make two points. One, Pakistan’s nuclear assets are safe and secure. I say this with a lot of confidence. And, Two, I’d request all Pakistanis, wherever they are, that they should not mix politics with nuclear security.

[End of Interview]

The television version of this interview is available at this link: PTV World News - World View Exclusive

Mr. Quraishi is a foreign policy commentator for PTV Network.

IAN

Saturday, January 19, 2008: The tragic assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, capped a year of great institutional turmoil in Pakistani politics. It also complicated President Musharraf`s hopes for an undisturbed validation of his own reelection as president. And, it undermined the (US) administration's efforts to broker a marriage of convenience between Musharraf and Bhutto that would produce a governing dispensation that is civilian in appearance; accept Musharraf`s continuance in office because of his importance to US interests; and strengthen the elements of moderation in Pakistan.

The critical question now is whether the forthcoming elections to the National Assembly in Pakistan scheduled for February 18 will be free and fair. This is an issue of some importance because, after eight years of military rule, the political "market" in Pakistan has been sufficiently distorted to the point where it is simply not evident what the authentic preferences of the nation actually are. If nothing else, therefore, a free and fair election in Pakistan is finally necessary so that both Pakistanis and the outside world can assess the yearnings of the electorate.

Musharraf cannot afford to find himself in a situation where the new National Assembly begins to reconsider or amend the constitutional distortions that he has ordained during his past tenure in office, particularly insofar as these affect the prospect of his continued rule. He also cannot countenance any elected government that would attempt to remedy his dismissal of the former Chief Justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, and his associates or resuscitate an independent Supreme Court. In practice, this means that Musharraf`s first preference would be that the PML- Q dominate the new government.

Given the PML-Q's rather narrow electoral base, however, it is unlikely that the party would secure an absolute majority without large-scale rigging that would discredit the election entirely. Musharraf`s next most favourable outcome, therefore, would be a coalition of friendly parties, similar to the kind of arrangement seen in the outgoing National Assembly. In this context, it is possible to imagine a post-electoral outcome that involves Musharraf striking a bargain with Asif Zardari and the PPP, so long as it does not direct or support any fundamental challenge to Musharraf`s continuation in office. The worst outcome from Musharraf`s perspective would be a strong electoral performance by Nawaz Sharif's PML-N: the bitterness between these two leaders would inevitably produce a political collision that would undermine the president's interests and possibly threaten his hope for an unchallenged tenure. Given these realities, it is unlikely that the forthcoming elections in Pakistan will be truly "free and fair".

Given the failure of the political "market" in Pakistan referred to earlier, it is possible perhaps even likely that any election result, even if fair, will be challenged vociferously by the losers. And the lack of reasonable prior information about the preferences of Pakistan's electorate makes it difficult to judge whether such complaints are in fact justified or whether they simply understandable but nonetheless illegitimate protests provoked by political defeat. In any event, if such dissatisfaction results in violence that leads to a breakdown in law and order requiring the Pakistan Army to be deployed for policing operations, this diversion to internal security duties would not only distract from the counterterrorism operations currently underway in FATA but also would strain the comity currently existing between President Musharraf and the Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Kayani. The potential for civil unrest and instability emerging from a flawed election in Pakistan, therefore, ought to remain the most problematic contingency from the viewpoint of the Bush administration.

Attempting to avert just this prospect and to further the cause of a genuinely free election in Pakistan, many critics of the Bush administration have argued the US needs to "abandon Musharraf today". While that sentiment is understandable, the prescription is premature. What is important from the US viewpoint is that no premature decision with respect to supporting or abandoning Musharraf be made right away. Rather, US policymakers and Congress ought to focus on prevailing upon Musharraf to oversee a fair election that reflects certain standards of legitimacy.

If this cannot be achieved at the end of the day, the administration will be confronted with difficult choices. Irrespective of how it is inclined to respond to such a contingency, three considerations ought to be borne in mind. First, the Pakistani people today are tired of both President Musharraf and continued military rule and, given the political crisis that has been underway in Pakistan almost uninterruptedly since March 2007, are unlikely to give him the benefit of the doubt if the election is marked by gross irregularities. Second, the administration would be unwise to put itself in a position of diametric opposition to the will of the Pakistani people, whose inclinations will become more and more evident through both the character of the electoral process and if fair its result. Third, the ongoing political transition in Pakistan including the growing national clamour for a return to democracy centered on an abiding rule of law can no longer remain isolated from the larger war on terrorism. A continuing constriction of democracy could, if it leads to social disorder, distract the Pakistan Army even as it widens the opportunity for the more radical elements in Pakistani society to dominate their nation's political space.

What should Congress do at this juncture then? First, since counterterrorism operations will continue to be important to American security for the foreseeable future, cutting back on CSF (Coalition Support Funds) will be difficult, if not impossible. Because these funds have been very shoddily dispersed since 2001, however, reforming the disbursal system by amending the authorizing legislation if necessary is critical. An alternative modality of disbursing coalition support funds to Pakistan, where reimbursements are tied either to specific tasks and linked to the performance of specific objectives or allocated for specific purposes, is long overdue. Such reform would, not only better align US financial burdens with the true services rendered by Pakistan but also ensure that US military assistance would actually be used for counterterrorism efforts rather than diverted toward other programmes, while simultaneously serving as a subtle reminder to Islamabad that US generosity cannot be taken for granted in the face of continuing prevarication.

While the level and desirability of economic support funds to Pakistan should, therefore, be reviewed by Congress sooner rather than later, Congress also ought to refrain from blocking the transfer of high-end weapons that Pakistan has already purchased. While there is a compelling case to be made that the administration ought to be more restrained in its willingness to transfer certain high-leverage weapons such as advanced air-to-air missiles and airborne warning and control systems, Congress should not today interrupt the transfer of certain high-profile systems, such as F- 16 aircraft, already committed to Pakistan.

As for the country's nuclear arsenal, it is my judgment that Pakistan's strategic assets to include its nuclear devices, its delivery systems, and its stockpile of fissile materials are fundamentally safe today. The director-general of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Lieutenant-General (retd.) Khalid Kidwai deserves singular credit for remedying the security vulnerabilities that traditionally plagued the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

However, the following exceptions apply to this general conclusion. The most potent threat to the security of Pakistan`s nuclear estate currently arises primarily from contingencies involving a fissure in the Pakistani military and a breakdown in the system of authority and command. I do not believe this to be a realistic threat in the present circumstances. Even if some Islamist parties were to come to power through the ballot in Pakistan, they would enjoy no operational control over its nuclear assets. Unless one posits, therefore, a truly extreme scenario where the chief of army staff himself turns out to be secretly a political extremist, the security of Islamabad's nuclear capabilities ought not to become a matter of more than prudential concern. The real threats to the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal are likely to arise mostly over the longer term: if the rising tide of Islamization in Pakistani society seeps into its armed forces or into its scientific establishments as many fear it already has, especially in the lower ranks and the SPD's internal security mechanisms fail to detect the threat either because they are themselves compromised or because of oversight errors and deficiencies, the security of Pakistan`s nuclear weapons and materials may once again be at risk. Obviously, this is a contingency that the current military leadership in Pakistan is especially sensitive to, but it remains a good reason for the United States to stay engaged with the Pakistani military to help mitigate this threat should it arise.

TN

Islamabad, Saturday, January 26th, 2008: Lieutenant General (retd) Khalid Kidwai, director-general of Pakistan’s Strategic Planning Division, gave a presentation to foreign media in Islamabad on Saturday to allay fears that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists. “We have instituted command and control structures and security measures in a manner so as to make these foolproof,” said Kidwai, adding that “we are capable of thwarting all types of threats whether these be insider, outsider, or a combination.”

General Kidwai said 10,000 troops were deployed around Pakistan's nuclear facilities. He said security was heightened after militants began more actively targeting the military in a wave of suicide attacks during the past year. “The state of alertness has gone up,” he said, but emphasized that no conspiracy or plot related to nuclear facilities had ever been uncovered.

Kidwai, who has headed the SPD since its inception in 1999, has given three similar presentations to foreign diplomats and Pakistani media during the past few months. He said there was an exhaustive vetting process, involving political, moral and financial checks and psychological testing for staff working in nuclear facilities, and security monitors kept especially close tabs on some 2,000 scientists working in ultra-sensitive areas.

He said the nuclear proliferation scandal that broke in 2003, revolving around Abdul Qadeer Khan, was a closed chapter and there was no evidence to suggest any members of the military establishment had been involved. He said Dr. Khan's activities largely pre-dated the establishment of the SPD, and subsequent breaches of security by people involved in the nuclear programme had been minor, citing the case of a scientist who made an anti-Musharraf speech in a mosque and was removed the next day.

D

I watched that show live on PTV News. Man it was really fantastic.
Saeed, the interview you posted originally appeared on http://www.ahmedquraishi.com.

Reuters Alertnet

US helps Pakistan protect nuclear arms

NEW YORK, Nov 17 (Reuters) - The Bush administration has spent almost $100 million in the past six years on a classified program to help Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf secure his country's nuclear weapons, The New York Times reported in Sunday editions.

Citing current and former senior administration officials, the Times said the aid was buried in secret portions of the federal budget and was used to fund training of Pakistani personnel in the United States and construction of a nuclear security training center in Pakistan which is still far from operational.

"Everything has taken far longer than it should," the Times quoted a former official involved in the program as saying. "And you are never sure what you really accomplished."

Recent unrest in Pakistan and questions over Musharraf's staying power have rekindled internal administration debate over the program, the Times said.

Pakistan, locked in regional rivalry with its nuclear-armed neighbor India, emerged as a nuclear power in 1998 when it carried out six underground tests.

Equipment ranging from helicopters and night-vision goggles to nuclear detection equipment was given to Pakistan to help secure its nuclear material, warheads, and laboratories that were "the site of the worst known case of nuclear proliferation in the atomic age," according to the Times.

U.S. officials said they believed the arsenal is safe at present and accept Pakistan's assurances that security has been greatly improved, although Pakistan has often held back on providing details about how or where the equipment is being used.

The newspaper said it knew about facets of the secret program for more than three years through contacts with U.S. officials and nuclear experts, but held off on reporting about it when the Bush administration argued that disclosing it could damage efforts to secure the weapons.

SEPT. 11

The secret U.S. program was put in place after the Sept. 11 attacks as Washington debated sharing with Pakistan U.S. nuclear protection technology known as "permissive action links," which protects against weapons detonating without proper coding and authorization, the Times said.

But the Bush administration decided against sharing this technology -- some officials cited risks that Pakistan might learn too much about U.S. arms -- and instead agreed on other types of assistance. A legal analysis also determined that aiding Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, even with just protective gear, would violate U.S. and international law, the newspaper reported.

The leader of Pakistan's nuclear safety effort, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, has since acknowledged receiving "international" help as he sought to assure Washington that Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure was secure, the newspaper said.

The Times said it informed the Bush administration last week it was reopening its examination of the program, in part due to Pakistan's current instability, and the White House withdrew its request to withhold publication, while also refusing to discuss the program.

The less than $100 million spent on the classified nuclear security program makes up less than 1 percent of some $10 billion in known U.S. aid to Pakistan since the 2001 attacks.

The secret program, designed by the Energy and State Departments, drew heavily from efforts over the past decade to secure nuclear weapons, stockpiles and materials in Russia and other former Soviet states, the Times reported.

Much of the money for Pakistan was spent on physical safeguards such as fencing, surveillance systems and tracking equipment for nuclear material that might leave secure areas.

A second phase of the program to provide more equipment, helicopters and safety devices is being discussed, the newspaper said. (Reporting by Chris Michaud; editing by Mohammad Zargham)

Sir , If you use your two eyes [I hope both working correct] this particular report has been discussed in interview above. Stop posting stupid things like this.

with due respect.. its discussed only, but the article in question is not posted itself hence i posted it, Sir.

And for What-? hah

Washington, Saturday, February 02, 2008: A top US military leader on Friday reaffirmed confidence in the security of Pakistan's nuclear assets and praised the steps the Pakistani leadership has taken to ensure their protection. “I am very comfortable that nuclear weapons in Pakistan are secure and Pakistani leadership has taken steps to ensure that security,” Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff told a Pentagon news conference. He said he will be traveling to Pakistan shortly to meet with Pakistani leaders.

D

Islamabad, Saturday, February 09, 2008: Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U S Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on Saturday Pakistan's nuclear weapons were well protected and he was not worried they might fall into the hands of terrorists.

Admiral Mike Mullen met President Pervez Musharraf and military leaders for talks on Saturday. He also met the official in charge of the country's nuclear arsenal, retired Lieutenant-General Khalid Kidwai.

“I'm very comfortable that the nuclear weapons are secure, that there are proper procedures in place,” Mullen told a news conference. “I'm not concerned at all that they're going to fall into the hands of any terrorists.”

Mullen said he was not aware of comments from a U.S. official in Washington on Friday that al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar are operating from Pakistan. “I haven't actually seen that intelligence and have actually not heard that statement. I'm not aware that that's a fact at all,” Mullen said.

Some U.S. politicians have called on President George W. Bush to consider cutting Pakistani aid unless it restored full civil rights and did more to fight terrorism. Mullen said he would like to see conditions “absolutely minimised”.

“Pakistan has been a steadfast and historic ally,” he said. “It would be important for us in the United States to continue to invest in this. This is a threat that isn't going away, it's a mutual threat and one that we together are very intent on working our way through.”

Mullen also said the United States would always respect Pakistan's sovereignty and would help it when asked in whatever way it could.

D

And here we go again--another cockroach giving his expert opinion as if we needed one!!

If you can protect them from the likes of Americans, the British, and Mossad, and their "Al-CIAda", then they are safe. As well as infiltration attempts...so to hunt down and kill "worms".

until musharraf is our president nukes are safe. do not believe western news.