Full Version: Thermo Nuclear Weapons Of India/pakistan
I have to my surprise discovered that during the nuclear tests in 1999 India tested both atomic & hydrogen bombs.
With the biggestr thermo nuclear warehead around 60kt.
But Pakistan only tested atomic war heads of lower yeilds.
Can some body confirm with source if Pakistan too has Thermo nuclear warheads..
QUOTE(el nino @ Feb 24 2008, 02:50 PM) 
I have to my surprise discovered that during the nuclear tests in 1999 India tested both atomic & hydrogen bombs.
With the biggestr thermo nuclear warehead around 60kt.
But Pakistan only tested atomic war heads of lower yeilds.
Can some body confirm with source if Pakistan too has Thermo nuclear warheads..
With the biggestr thermo nuclear warehead around 60kt.
But Pakistan only tested atomic war heads of lower yeilds.
Can some body confirm with source if Pakistan too has Thermo nuclear warheads..
I do not think India tested hydrogen bomb. Both countries do not have these bombs..
QUOTE(camber @ Feb 25 2008, 09:38 AM)
I do not think India tested hydrogen bomb. Both countries do not have these bombs..
i also said same thing.
Neither country has a Fusion-, Hydrogen-, or Thermo-Nuclear Nuclear Weapon. India's test failed because its yield was in kilotons and not in megatons.
Aoa
60kt is not what you call a H-Bomb. It's in lower region of a A-Bomb. H-bombs are mostly in MTs not sub-centurion KT.
btw where did you exactly discover this?
w/salaam
QUOTE(el nino @ Feb 24 2008, 03:50 PM)
I have to my surprise discovered that during the nuclear tests in 1999 India tested both atomic & hydrogen bombs.
With the biggestr thermo nuclear warehead around 60kt.
But Pakistan only tested atomic war heads of lower yeilds.
Can some body confirm with source if Pakistan too has Thermo nuclear warheads..
With the biggestr thermo nuclear warehead around 60kt.
But Pakistan only tested atomic war heads of lower yeilds.
Can some body confirm with source if Pakistan too has Thermo nuclear warheads..
60kt is not what you call a H-Bomb. It's in lower region of a A-Bomb. H-bombs are mostly in MTs not sub-centurion KT.
btw where did you exactly discover this?
w/salaam
it is not easy to make hydrogen bomb! 
only advanced nuclear powers like china france and usa have such capacity. they even trying to get electricity from fusion!!
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/h-bomb.htm
Hydrogen Bomb / Fusion Weapons
The process of combining nuclei (the protons and neutrons inside an atomic nucleus) together with a release of kinetic energy is called fusion. This process powers the Sun, it contributes to the world stockpile of weapons of mass destruction and may one day generate safe, clean electrical power.
This powerful but complex weapon uses the fusion of heavy isotopes of hydrogen, deuterium, and tritium to release large numbers of neutrons when the fusile (sometimes termed "fusionable") material is compressed by the energy released by a fission device called a primary. Fusion (or ‘‘thermonuclear’ weapons derive a significant amount of their total energy from fusion reactions. The intense temperatures and pressures generated by a fission explosion overcome the strong electrical repulsion that would otherwise keep the positively charged nuclei of the fusion fuel from reacting.
The first thermonuclear devices used liquid fuel, such as deuterium, which required significant developments in cryogenics to keep the fuel below its boiling point of –250°C. Later devices used lithium deuteride fuel, in solid form, which breeds tritium when exposed to neutrons.
It is inconvenient to carry deuterium and tritium as gases in a thermonuclear weapon, and certainly impractical to carry them as liquefied gases, which requires high pressures and cryogenic temperatures. Instead, one can make a “dry” device in which 6Li is combined with deuterium to form the compound 6Li D (lithium-6 deuteride). Neutrons from a fission “primary” device bombard the 6 Li in the compound, liberating tritium, which quickly fuses with the nearby deuterium.
The a particles, being electrically charged and at high temperatures, contribute directly to forming the nuclear fireball. The neutrons can bombard additional 6Li nuclei or cause the remaining uranium and plutonium in the weapon to undergo fission. This two-stage thermonuclear weapon has explosive yields far greater than can be achieved with one point safe designs of pure fission weapons, and thermonuclear fusion stages can be ignited in sequence to deliver any desired yield. Such bombs, in theory, can be designed with arbitrarily large yields: the Soviet Union once tested a device with a yield of about 59 megatons.
In a relatively crude sense, 6 Li can be thought of as consisting of an alpha particle ( 4He) and a deuteron ( 2H) bound together. When bombarded by neutrons, 6 Li disintegrates into a triton ( 3 H) and an alpha:
6 Li + Neutron = 3 H + 3 He + Energy.
This is the key to its importance in nuclear weapons physics. The nuclear fusion reaction which ignites most readily is
2 H + 3 H =
4 He + n + 17.6 MeV,
or, phrased in other terms, deuterium plus tritium produces 4He plus a neutron plus 17.6 MeV of free energy:
D + T = 4 He + n + 17.6 MeV.
Lithium-7 also contributes to the production of tritium in a thermonuclear secondary, albeit at a lower rate than 6Li. The fusion reactions derived from tritium produced from 7 Li contributed many unexpected neutrons (and hence far more energy release than planned) to the final stage of the infamous 1953 Castle/BRAVO atmospheric test, nearly doubling its expected yield.
History
The ultimate success of the United States thermonuclear program rested on five factors. First, was the discovery of a method to overcome the fundamental problem that thermonuclear systems lose as much energy as they create. Second, Los Alamos had to significantly increase the size of its scientific staff. The hydrogen bomb problem required complex interactions among physicists, chemists, and metallurgists. Third, to start a thermonuclear fire, smaller and more efficient fission bombs were needed. Fourth, computational ability had to be greatly enhanced. Fifth, the political decision had to be made to marshal the resources necessary to accomplish the task.
The idea for a hydrogen bomb came from the thermonuclear study of stars conducted in the 1930s by Hans Bethe. Unlike fission weapons, which derive their energy from splitting atoms of the heavy elements uranium and plutonium, hydrogen bombs derive their power from fusing atoms of the light element hydrogen. Since fusion can only be achieved with stellar temperatures, hydrogen bombs were not possible until such a heat source (fission bombs) became available.
By the end of the 1940s, American scientists began to acknowledge the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon. Though the technical challenges were daunting, few doubted they could be overcome. However, an even more fundamental question arose: even if hydrogen bombs could be built, should they be? A debate ensued, which included world renowned scientists, politicians, civil servants, and eventually the president himself.
Pressure to build it seemed to mount with the discovery that Manhattan Project scientist Klaus Fuchs had passed nuclear secrets-including concepts for a hydrogen bomb-to the Soviets. Fuchs left Los Alamos on June 15, 1946. By January 1949 suspicion of Fuch's involvement in espionage had grown. Fuchs soon confessed to his part in the theft of atomic secrets.
On March 1, 1950, Fuchs was found guilty of communicating information to the Soviets concerning atomic research. But the theoretical work of 1950 had shown that every important point of the 1946 thermonuclear program had been wrong. If the Russians started a thermonuclear program on the basis of the information received from Fuchs, Bethe argued that it must have led to the same failure. Teller later claimed that radiation-implosion -- the key concept behind the successful hydrogen bomb -- had also been discussed at the Los Alamos meeting. Bethe disagreed, and the question remained unresolved.
Indeed, the Russian account of matters gives Fuchs credit for radiation implosion. "In the spring of 1946, another concept, whose paramount importance became evident afterwards, was suggested during work on the `classical Super.' Klaus Fuchs, with the participation of John von Neumann, proposed a new triggering device. It included an additional secondary unit with liquid D± T mixture that would be heated, compressed, and, as a result, ignited by radiation from the primary nuclear bomb. ... Fuchs's configuration was the first physical scheme using radiation implosion and a precursor of Teller ± Ulam's configuration proposed later. Fuchs's proposal, remarkable for its wealth of novel ideas, was well ahead of its time and could not be developed, given the current state of the mathematical modelling of complex physical processes. ... on May 28, 1946, Fuchs and von Neumann filed a joint patent application for the invention of the new design of the triggering system for the `classical Super' using radiation implosion." None of this is attested by American accounts of these matters.
The "Mike" test of Operation Ivy, 1 November, 1952, was the first explosion of a true two-stage thermonuclear device.
Some were convinced that there was another spy still at large in the US weapons program, and that the most likely candidate was Oppenheimer. But the American atmospheric tests of 1954 provided the scientific information necessary for the Soviets to deduce and confirm key features about its design, leading them to develop their own bomb in a short time.
Information about the new powerful explosion conducted by the USA team on March 1, 1954, renewed the drive of Soviet researchers to invent an efficient design of a high-yield thermonuclear bomb. It became clear to the Soviets that there was an efficient design technique, which had been invented by the American team. The only configuration left was a two-stage gadget. A new mechanism for compression of the secondary thermonuclear core by radiation from the primary nuclear charge had been discovered finally. This happened in March and April 1954.
Design Details
The main unknowns to the public are the design of the casing, and the shape and size of the secondary, relative to the primary. Whether the hot plastic does the pushing or transmits its heat to a designated ablator which does the pushing a matter of continuing discussion.
It would seem to be difficult to shape the secondary like a cylinder, and get a compression wave travelling just before fast neutrons from the sparkplug cause fission - although not impossible. Another problem with the cylindrical shape is that compressing from the sides is like squeezing a tube of toothpaste. If the compression is not fast enough, the material will squirt out the ends.
The early secondaries were cylindrical, because the original goal was to make the largest possible multi-megaton explosion with a device whose diameter was more tightly constrained than its length, in order to be dropped from a bomber.
But when the goal became to fit a warhead in the nosecone of the Polaris missile, length and diameter were of comparable dimensions. The Polaris warhead, the W47, which was tested in 1958 and deployed in the 1960s, contained the first spherical secondary, an arrangement which was soon to become the standard design. The advantage of a spherical secondary is higher compression.
only advanced nuclear powers like china france and usa have such capacity. they even trying to get electricity from fusion!!http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/h-bomb.htm
Hydrogen Bomb / Fusion Weapons
The process of combining nuclei (the protons and neutrons inside an atomic nucleus) together with a release of kinetic energy is called fusion. This process powers the Sun, it contributes to the world stockpile of weapons of mass destruction and may one day generate safe, clean electrical power.
This powerful but complex weapon uses the fusion of heavy isotopes of hydrogen, deuterium, and tritium to release large numbers of neutrons when the fusile (sometimes termed "fusionable") material is compressed by the energy released by a fission device called a primary. Fusion (or ‘‘thermonuclear’ weapons derive a significant amount of their total energy from fusion reactions. The intense temperatures and pressures generated by a fission explosion overcome the strong electrical repulsion that would otherwise keep the positively charged nuclei of the fusion fuel from reacting.
The first thermonuclear devices used liquid fuel, such as deuterium, which required significant developments in cryogenics to keep the fuel below its boiling point of –250°C. Later devices used lithium deuteride fuel, in solid form, which breeds tritium when exposed to neutrons.
It is inconvenient to carry deuterium and tritium as gases in a thermonuclear weapon, and certainly impractical to carry them as liquefied gases, which requires high pressures and cryogenic temperatures. Instead, one can make a “dry” device in which 6Li is combined with deuterium to form the compound 6Li D (lithium-6 deuteride). Neutrons from a fission “primary” device bombard the 6 Li in the compound, liberating tritium, which quickly fuses with the nearby deuterium.
The a particles, being electrically charged and at high temperatures, contribute directly to forming the nuclear fireball. The neutrons can bombard additional 6Li nuclei or cause the remaining uranium and plutonium in the weapon to undergo fission. This two-stage thermonuclear weapon has explosive yields far greater than can be achieved with one point safe designs of pure fission weapons, and thermonuclear fusion stages can be ignited in sequence to deliver any desired yield. Such bombs, in theory, can be designed with arbitrarily large yields: the Soviet Union once tested a device with a yield of about 59 megatons.
In a relatively crude sense, 6 Li can be thought of as consisting of an alpha particle ( 4He) and a deuteron ( 2H) bound together. When bombarded by neutrons, 6 Li disintegrates into a triton ( 3 H) and an alpha:
6 Li + Neutron = 3 H + 3 He + Energy.
This is the key to its importance in nuclear weapons physics. The nuclear fusion reaction which ignites most readily is
2 H + 3 H =
4 He + n + 17.6 MeV,
or, phrased in other terms, deuterium plus tritium produces 4He plus a neutron plus 17.6 MeV of free energy:
D + T = 4 He + n + 17.6 MeV.
Lithium-7 also contributes to the production of tritium in a thermonuclear secondary, albeit at a lower rate than 6Li. The fusion reactions derived from tritium produced from 7 Li contributed many unexpected neutrons (and hence far more energy release than planned) to the final stage of the infamous 1953 Castle/BRAVO atmospheric test, nearly doubling its expected yield.
History
The ultimate success of the United States thermonuclear program rested on five factors. First, was the discovery of a method to overcome the fundamental problem that thermonuclear systems lose as much energy as they create. Second, Los Alamos had to significantly increase the size of its scientific staff. The hydrogen bomb problem required complex interactions among physicists, chemists, and metallurgists. Third, to start a thermonuclear fire, smaller and more efficient fission bombs were needed. Fourth, computational ability had to be greatly enhanced. Fifth, the political decision had to be made to marshal the resources necessary to accomplish the task.
The idea for a hydrogen bomb came from the thermonuclear study of stars conducted in the 1930s by Hans Bethe. Unlike fission weapons, which derive their energy from splitting atoms of the heavy elements uranium and plutonium, hydrogen bombs derive their power from fusing atoms of the light element hydrogen. Since fusion can only be achieved with stellar temperatures, hydrogen bombs were not possible until such a heat source (fission bombs) became available.
By the end of the 1940s, American scientists began to acknowledge the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon. Though the technical challenges were daunting, few doubted they could be overcome. However, an even more fundamental question arose: even if hydrogen bombs could be built, should they be? A debate ensued, which included world renowned scientists, politicians, civil servants, and eventually the president himself.
Pressure to build it seemed to mount with the discovery that Manhattan Project scientist Klaus Fuchs had passed nuclear secrets-including concepts for a hydrogen bomb-to the Soviets. Fuchs left Los Alamos on June 15, 1946. By January 1949 suspicion of Fuch's involvement in espionage had grown. Fuchs soon confessed to his part in the theft of atomic secrets.
On March 1, 1950, Fuchs was found guilty of communicating information to the Soviets concerning atomic research. But the theoretical work of 1950 had shown that every important point of the 1946 thermonuclear program had been wrong. If the Russians started a thermonuclear program on the basis of the information received from Fuchs, Bethe argued that it must have led to the same failure. Teller later claimed that radiation-implosion -- the key concept behind the successful hydrogen bomb -- had also been discussed at the Los Alamos meeting. Bethe disagreed, and the question remained unresolved.
Indeed, the Russian account of matters gives Fuchs credit for radiation implosion. "In the spring of 1946, another concept, whose paramount importance became evident afterwards, was suggested during work on the `classical Super.' Klaus Fuchs, with the participation of John von Neumann, proposed a new triggering device. It included an additional secondary unit with liquid D± T mixture that would be heated, compressed, and, as a result, ignited by radiation from the primary nuclear bomb. ... Fuchs's configuration was the first physical scheme using radiation implosion and a precursor of Teller ± Ulam's configuration proposed later. Fuchs's proposal, remarkable for its wealth of novel ideas, was well ahead of its time and could not be developed, given the current state of the mathematical modelling of complex physical processes. ... on May 28, 1946, Fuchs and von Neumann filed a joint patent application for the invention of the new design of the triggering system for the `classical Super' using radiation implosion." None of this is attested by American accounts of these matters.
The "Mike" test of Operation Ivy, 1 November, 1952, was the first explosion of a true two-stage thermonuclear device.
Some were convinced that there was another spy still at large in the US weapons program, and that the most likely candidate was Oppenheimer. But the American atmospheric tests of 1954 provided the scientific information necessary for the Soviets to deduce and confirm key features about its design, leading them to develop their own bomb in a short time.
Information about the new powerful explosion conducted by the USA team on March 1, 1954, renewed the drive of Soviet researchers to invent an efficient design of a high-yield thermonuclear bomb. It became clear to the Soviets that there was an efficient design technique, which had been invented by the American team. The only configuration left was a two-stage gadget. A new mechanism for compression of the secondary thermonuclear core by radiation from the primary nuclear charge had been discovered finally. This happened in March and April 1954.
Design Details
The main unknowns to the public are the design of the casing, and the shape and size of the secondary, relative to the primary. Whether the hot plastic does the pushing or transmits its heat to a designated ablator which does the pushing a matter of continuing discussion.
It would seem to be difficult to shape the secondary like a cylinder, and get a compression wave travelling just before fast neutrons from the sparkplug cause fission - although not impossible. Another problem with the cylindrical shape is that compressing from the sides is like squeezing a tube of toothpaste. If the compression is not fast enough, the material will squirt out the ends.
The early secondaries were cylindrical, because the original goal was to make the largest possible multi-megaton explosion with a device whose diameter was more tightly constrained than its length, in order to be dropped from a bomber.
But when the goal became to fit a warhead in the nosecone of the Polaris missile, length and diameter were of comparable dimensions. The Polaris warhead, the W47, which was tested in 1958 and deployed in the 1960s, contained the first spherical secondary, an arrangement which was soon to become the standard design. The advantage of a spherical secondary is higher compression.
I remember reading an interview of Dr. Samarmubarakband I think in which he said that Pak believes that one of the tests that the Indians tried to conduct was an H-bomb test however the bomb malfunctioned and actually 'fizzled' out rather than blow up as it should have.
I don't think either country has the technology at present...
I don't think either country has the technology at present...
Its not that neither india nor pakistan cannot make H-bombs. India did try in 98 but the either the fusion or the initial fission did not sustained and the device fizzled out, there was a much smaller explosion. Happens all the time to first timers. But why do they need an H-bomb? Do they need to take out Lahore or what?
QUOTE
But why do they need an H-bomb? Do they need to take out Lahore or what?
it is like ego! "we have hydrogen bomb", nothing else i think. normal ato bomb is enough to destroy a city!
QUOTE(ZJoseph @ Feb 25 2008, 03:26 PM)
it is like ego! "we have hydrogen bomb", nothing else i think. normal ato bomb is enough to destroy a city!
Depends on what you mean by normal. Some atom bombs can be very small (in yield) and some can be humongous, it all depends.
QUOTE(bojangles @ Feb 25 2008, 04:04 PM)
Depends on what you mean by normal. Some atom bombs can be very small (in yield) and some can be humongous, it all depends.
i do not mentioned yet but types of nuclear bombs. i think generally hydrogen bomb is much more dangerous, powerfull and difficult to make than normal fission bomb.
thats why when we talk nuclear power projects, its only fission but not fusion because huge power come out from that can not be controlled. for that big nuclear powers like us and china join hand to develop ITER.
Aoa
Obviously, cause when they are going to use it, they should destroy Lahore and all the major cities completely.. cause that is what exactly I think Pakistan should do as well... when it comes to that. Don't bruse 'em, kill 'em...
w/salaam
QUOTE(BelligerentPacifist @ Feb 25 2008, 02:13 PM)
Its not that neither india nor pakistan cannot make H-bombs. India did try in 98 but the either the fusion or the initial fission did not sustained and the device fizzled out, there was a much smaller explosion. Happens all the time to first timers. But why do they need an H-bomb? Do they need to take out Lahore or what?
Obviously, cause when they are going to use it, they should destroy Lahore and all the major cities completely.. cause that is what exactly I think Pakistan should do as well... when it comes to that. Don't bruse 'em, kill 'em...
w/salaam
its called MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction. Chances are neither of us will be stupid enought to use them on the other. This is a conflict in which there are no winners, only losers.
QUOTE(el nino @ Feb 25 2008, 01:50 AM)
I have to my surprise discovered that during the nuclear tests in 1999 India tested both atomic & hydrogen bombs.
With the biggestr thermo nuclear warehead around 60kt.
But Pakistan only tested atomic war heads of lower yeilds.
Can some body confirm with source if Pakistan too has Thermo nuclear warheads..
With the biggestr thermo nuclear warehead around 60kt.
But Pakistan only tested atomic war heads of lower yeilds.
Can some body confirm with source if Pakistan too has Thermo nuclear warheads..
Both India and Pakistan have thermonuclear capability, which is possible through the production of "fusion fuel" in the form of Dueterium-Tritium. This is produced in heavy water moderated reactors which not only produce weapons-grade plutonium but tritium as well. Tritium is also used to boost the yield of fission (atomic) bombs and all Pakistani bombs tested in the 1998 tests were boosted fission devices. Chairman PAEC 1972-91, Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan while talking about the boosted devices at the time of the 1998 tests said, "These boosted devices are like a half way stage towards a thermonuclear bomb. They use elements of the thermonuclear process, and are effectively stronger Atom bombs."
This has been possible in Pakistan because the PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan launched the indigenously designed and manufactured 50 MW heavy water reactor at Khushab in 1985-86 which became operational by 1998. It not only produces enough plutonium for atleast 4-5 atomic bombs per year but is also the source of tritium. When the Khushab project was launched, work was also initiated simulatenously for an indigenous heavy water plant and in 1987 a tritium production/purification plant.
Building thermonuclear weapons after the fusion fuel is available is a matter of producing a workable "two-stage" bomb design. This shows that the India bomb designs did not meet the desired technical performance levels predicated by their theoretical physicists, which implies a faulty bomb design. Having all the materials for an atomic or thermonuclear bomb is only useful if the bomb is manufactured to meet all the theoretical design parameters.
Pakistan may or may not have the H-bomb, BUT WE DEFINITELY HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO BUILD THE H-BOMB.
QUOTE(XDesiguyonFireX @ Feb 27 2008, 01:23 PM)
Pakistan may or may not have the H-bomb, BUT WE DEFINITELY HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO BUILD THE H-BOMB.
AMEEN!
Any confrontation in the subcontinent will be at close quarters. It is only the megalomaniacs in India who wanted an H-bomb. If they use it, the fall out will come back at them.
What we need are smaller and more compact warheads, for use in tactical situations, e.g., troop concentrations. That is why we are going for the plutonium bombs. That part of the Pakistani nuclear program has never been revealed. There are surprises that await us.
What we need are smaller and more compact warheads, for use in tactical situations, e.g., troop concentrations. That is why we are going for the plutonium bombs. That part of the Pakistani nuclear program has never been revealed. There are surprises that await us.
QUOTE(Momin-e-mubtila @ Mar 3 2008, 02:25 AM)
Any confrontation in the subcontinent will be at close quarters. It is only the megalomaniacs in India who wanted an H-bomb. If they use it, the fall out will come back at them.
What we need are smaller and more compact warheads, for use in tactical situations, e.g., troop concentrations. That is why we are going for the plutonium bombs. That part of the Pakistani nuclear program has never been revealed. There are surprises that await us.
What we need are smaller and more compact warheads, for use in tactical situations, e.g., troop concentrations. That is why we are going for the plutonium bombs. That part of the Pakistani nuclear program has never been revealed. There are surprises that await us.
Most of the Pakistani warheads are Uranium devices whereas those in the Indian inventory are Plutonium devices with larger yield,even the Indians have much greater stockpile of Plutonium.Wonder why Pakistan did not opt for the Plutonium design since day one.
ALL exploded Pak bombs have been uranium bombs. We went this route first as this is very cheap. Ultracentrifugation is technically very difficult but cheap once you master it. There is no need for running uranium thru a research reactor and then a reprocessing plant. India tried to do ultracentrifugation and failed.
If all one wants to do is to drop bombs from an F-16, then there is not much difference between a uranium or plutonium bomb. But missile warheads are another story. Plutonium warheads are lighter, meaning greater missile range. With missile warheads, rather than F-16s as the delivery platform of choice, now we need plutonium devices.
Our plutonium program has been quietly working for decades. No one knows how far we have gotten, except those at the highest levels. But interestingly, facilities at Khushab are being expanded tremendously. We would not be doing this, unless we were very sure of our technology. Next time India explodes some devices, I can bet we will test plutonium ones. We don't need megaton H-bombs. We need sub-kiloton tactical nukes and medium yield devices--the lighter, the better.
The fact that we did not test plutonium devices in 1998 was confirmed by a special US plane with a mass spectrometer that sniffed for radioactive gases released in a plutonium explosion. Only one atom was detected and was attributed to the earlier Indian explosions.
If all one wants to do is to drop bombs from an F-16, then there is not much difference between a uranium or plutonium bomb. But missile warheads are another story. Plutonium warheads are lighter, meaning greater missile range. With missile warheads, rather than F-16s as the delivery platform of choice, now we need plutonium devices.
Our plutonium program has been quietly working for decades. No one knows how far we have gotten, except those at the highest levels. But interestingly, facilities at Khushab are being expanded tremendously. We would not be doing this, unless we were very sure of our technology. Next time India explodes some devices, I can bet we will test plutonium ones. We don't need megaton H-bombs. We need sub-kiloton tactical nukes and medium yield devices--the lighter, the better.
The fact that we did not test plutonium devices in 1998 was confirmed by a special US plane with a mass spectrometer that sniffed for radioactive gases released in a plutonium explosion. Only one atom was detected and was attributed to the earlier Indian explosions.
QUOTE(Momin-e-mubtila @ Mar 4 2008, 02:16 AM)
India tried to do ultracentrifugation and failed.
Any proof...?
QUOTE(Momin-e-mubtila @ Mar 4 2008, 02:16 AM)
Next time India explodes some devices, I can bet we will test plutonium ones.
Why are you waiting for India for everything..Why can't test of ur own?Are you afraid to do it alone?
QUOTE(Momin-e-mubtila @ Mar 4 2008, 07:16 PM)
ALL exploded Pak bombs have been uranium bombs. We went this route first as this is very cheap. Ultracentrifugation is technically very difficult but cheap once you master it. There is no need for running uranium thru a research reactor and then a reprocessing plant. India tried to do ultracentrifugation and failed.
If all one wants to do is to drop bombs from an F-16, then there is not much difference between a uranium or plutonium bomb. But missile warheads are another story. Plutonium warheads are lighter, meaning greater missile range. With missile warheads, rather than F-16s as the delivery platform of choice, now we need plutonium devices.
Our plutonium program has been quietly working for decades. No one knows how far we have gotten, except those at the highest levels. But interestingly, facilities at Khushab are being expanded tremendously. We would not be doing this, unless we were very sure of our technology. Next time India explodes some devices, I can bet we will test plutonium ones. We don't need megaton H-bombs. We need sub-kiloton tactical nukes and medium yield devices--the lighter, the better.
The fact that we did not test plutonium devices in 1998 was confirmed by a special US plane with a mass spectrometer that sniffed for radioactive gases released in a plutonium explosion. Only one atom was detected and was attributed to the earlier Indian explosions.
If all one wants to do is to drop bombs from an F-16, then there is not much difference between a uranium or plutonium bomb. But missile warheads are another story. Plutonium warheads are lighter, meaning greater missile range. With missile warheads, rather than F-16s as the delivery platform of choice, now we need plutonium devices.
Our plutonium program has been quietly working for decades. No one knows how far we have gotten, except those at the highest levels. But interestingly, facilities at Khushab are being expanded tremendously. We would not be doing this, unless we were very sure of our technology. Next time India explodes some devices, I can bet we will test plutonium ones. We don't need megaton H-bombs. We need sub-kiloton tactical nukes and medium yield devices--the lighter, the better.
The fact that we did not test plutonium devices in 1998 was confirmed by a special US plane with a mass spectrometer that sniffed for radioactive gases released in a plutonium explosion. Only one atom was detected and was attributed to the earlier Indian explosions.
If im not getting it wrong we have already tested Platinoum based weapons and to futher elborate on it i think most of our wear heads if not all are Platenioum....
Y well we conducted severl tests on may 28th and than there was one on 30th... Now the last test was new design which was lighter in weight and packed more punch which is hinting toward a platenioum device.
QUOTE(COBRA007ANIZER @ Mar 4 2008, 01:00 AM)
Most of the Pakistani warheads are Uranium devices whereas those in the Indian inventory are Plutonium devices with larger yield,even the Indians have much greater stockpile of Plutonium.Wonder why Pakistan did not opt for the Plutonium design since day one.
Check again... ur in for a surprise.
QUOTE(pluto @ Mar 7 2008, 05:49 AM)
Why are you waiting for India for everything..Why can't test of ur own?Are you afraid to do it alone?
Because we aren't idiots. By testing after India does, it gives us a viable excuse.
QUOTE(1pakistani @ Mar 7 2008, 04:55 PM)
Y well we conducted severl tests on may 28th and than there was one on 30th... Now the last test was new design which was lighter in weight and packed more punch which is hinting toward a platenioum device.
I also read the same.... if I remember correctly, the tests were conducted by different organizations... KRL had their own design & tested on 28th while PAEC had worked on their design & tested on 30th...
QUOTE(Erudite @ Mar 8 2008, 03:51 PM)
I also read the same.... if I remember correctly, the tests were conducted by different organizations... KRL had their own design & tested on 28th while PAEC had worked on their design & tested on 30th...
Well according to Dr Samarkand both were done by one organisation howevr, the last test was latest design and it is the one which is equiped on our missiles.....
This is indeed a very interesting discussion. All six nuclear tests that Pakistan conducted were bombs that were designed, built and tested by the Directorate of Technical Development of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). US aircraft had picked up traces of weapons grade plutonium from the May 30 test, but then the American weapons laboratories lost the sample and could not come up with a definitive conclusion.
As mentioned above, the last test was that of the most modern, compact and powerful design that Pakistan had cold tested in 1992 and this could only be a plutonium device.
This is because miniaturization with uranium becomes impossible after a certain point. The critical mass of uranium is 47-52 kg, while the critical mass of plutonium-239 is only 8 kg. If warheads for a true nuclear arsenal consisting of ballistic and cruise missile are to be produced, these can only be built with plutonium-239. It takes one-fifth of plutonium by weight to make the core of one bomb, compared to a bomb that uses highly enriched uranium. The bomb that destroyed Nagasaki used only 6 kg of plutonium while the Hiroshima bomb (a gun-type) device used 60 kg of highly enriched uranium.
Implosion type bombs which PAEC had developed, may use between 15-25 kg of highly enriched uraniun. However, it would take only about 2-4 kg of plutonium for the same bomb to produce a 20 kt explosion, equal to Hiroshima, if a sophisticated implosion design is used. That is why plutonium has been the pre-dominant and first choice of all countries that have built an arsenal of nuclear weapons.
This has been possible because once you are able to produce plutonium in a heavy water reactor like Khushab or KANUPP, you also get tritium as a by product from spent fuel, or you may be able to produce tritium by irradiating Lithium-6 targets in such a reactor. If 4-5 grams of tritium is used in each fission atomic bomb, it increases the yield by a factor of two to three.
And all six atomic bombs tested by PAEC in May 1998 at Chaghi and Kharan were "boosted" fission devices, which means they used tritium, which is the fusion fuel used in to make hydrogen or thermonuclear weapons. If a fission bomb using highly enriched uranium (20-25 kg) is to be made, it will require a heavy neutron reflector material like beryllium metal, which increases the weight of the bomb, making it too bulky and heavy to be suitable for missiles, and their yield would also be much less than plutonium fuelled bombs.
So as the leader of the 1998 nuclear tests and then Member (Technical) PAEC, who then was also the head of the organization in PAEC that fathered Pakistan's solid fuelled missiles, the NDC, Dr. Samar Mubarakmand has pointed to this fact when the said that the May 30 test was that of our most advanced and compact design for our missiles, which can logically only be plutonium.
Sub-kiloton and megaton devices both can easily be produced by using tritium and small amounts of plutonium.
Producing enriched uranium either through gas-centrifuges or gassious-diffusion is not a simple matter. One has to master the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle which begins at uranium exploration, mining and refining and production of uranium ore or yellow cake. Then this has to be converted into uranium dioxide (which is also used in making nuclear fuel for natural uranium reactors like Khushab and KANUPP). This dioxide is then converted into uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) which is also a prerequisite in producing uranium metal, and then this UF4 has to be converted into the feedstock of uranium enrichment, uranium hexalflouride gas or UF6, which has to be of very high purity, by the ton. Iran is still struggling to produce high purity UF6. It is this UF6 which is passed through the centrifuges and then enriched after which it is again converted into uranium dioxide and then then into UF4 and then into uranium metal (the form in which HEU is used in the core of an atomic bomb).
All this requires complete mastery over nuclear chemistry and requires the production of several fluorine compounds and hydroflouric acid, all of which is extremely toxic and corrosive. Fluorine chemistry is perhaps the most challenging of all fields in chemistry. If you have a reactor, you only have to irradiate natural uranium fuel rods which become irradiated and and then the next challenging task arises, reprocessing spent fuel which is as difficult and sophisticated as uranium enrichment. But once the back end of the fuel cycle is also mastered, reprocessing becomes a reality.
Pakistan always had a parallel plutonium program being developed in PAEC throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This was part of acquiring complete mastery over the nuclear fuel cycle which PAEC scientists and engineers were able to accomplish by the early 1980s. The fuel cycle not only provided the crucial raw material or feedstock for the Kahuta enrichment project in the form of uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) but also produced indigenous nuclear fuel for the Karachi nuclear power plant (KANUPP) after the Canadians cut off supplies in 1976.
Also by the early 1980s, PAEC completed the New Labs reprocessing plant in PINSTECH where cold test were carried out during the 1980s. This meant that Pakistan was ready for reprocessing of spent fuel. Now KANUPP had enough spent fuel by then for almost 200 atomic bombs, but since it was under safeguards, Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state (unlike India in 1974) did not use it for military purposes, even though the capability was always there.
So PAEC began work in 1985-86 on the Khushab plutonium production reactor, a heavy water production and tritium purification plant which today has given Pakistan a full plutonium production capability. The decision makers today seem to have realized the importance of plutonium for achieving full nuclear capability and for fully joining the nuclear club, so they are now constructing two more Khushab type reactors and another reprocessing plant at Chashma (work on which was postponed in the wake of the French cancellation of the reprocessing contract in 1978).
All this has been possible because the nuclear infrastructure development and manpower training in nuclear weapons design, development and testing, reactor construction, nuclear fuel cycle, uranium purification, conversion and enrichment, nuclear fuel fabrication and reprocessing technologies that took place during the 1970s and 1980s in PAEC under Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan and his team, the fruits of which are now being harnessed.
As for India, they successfully produced enriched uranium through gas-centrifuges during the 1980s and are continuing to work on their secret gas-centrifuge program which is on a pilot-scale basis at the Rare Materials Project Plant. Since India has plenty of plutonium, highly enriched uranium is not that critical for them.
As mentioned above, the last test was that of the most modern, compact and powerful design that Pakistan had cold tested in 1992 and this could only be a plutonium device.
This is because miniaturization with uranium becomes impossible after a certain point. The critical mass of uranium is 47-52 kg, while the critical mass of plutonium-239 is only 8 kg. If warheads for a true nuclear arsenal consisting of ballistic and cruise missile are to be produced, these can only be built with plutonium-239. It takes one-fifth of plutonium by weight to make the core of one bomb, compared to a bomb that uses highly enriched uranium. The bomb that destroyed Nagasaki used only 6 kg of plutonium while the Hiroshima bomb (a gun-type) device used 60 kg of highly enriched uranium.
Implosion type bombs which PAEC had developed, may use between 15-25 kg of highly enriched uraniun. However, it would take only about 2-4 kg of plutonium for the same bomb to produce a 20 kt explosion, equal to Hiroshima, if a sophisticated implosion design is used. That is why plutonium has been the pre-dominant and first choice of all countries that have built an arsenal of nuclear weapons.
This has been possible because once you are able to produce plutonium in a heavy water reactor like Khushab or KANUPP, you also get tritium as a by product from spent fuel, or you may be able to produce tritium by irradiating Lithium-6 targets in such a reactor. If 4-5 grams of tritium is used in each fission atomic bomb, it increases the yield by a factor of two to three.
And all six atomic bombs tested by PAEC in May 1998 at Chaghi and Kharan were "boosted" fission devices, which means they used tritium, which is the fusion fuel used in to make hydrogen or thermonuclear weapons. If a fission bomb using highly enriched uranium (20-25 kg) is to be made, it will require a heavy neutron reflector material like beryllium metal, which increases the weight of the bomb, making it too bulky and heavy to be suitable for missiles, and their yield would also be much less than plutonium fuelled bombs.
So as the leader of the 1998 nuclear tests and then Member (Technical) PAEC, who then was also the head of the organization in PAEC that fathered Pakistan's solid fuelled missiles, the NDC, Dr. Samar Mubarakmand has pointed to this fact when the said that the May 30 test was that of our most advanced and compact design for our missiles, which can logically only be plutonium.
Sub-kiloton and megaton devices both can easily be produced by using tritium and small amounts of plutonium.
Producing enriched uranium either through gas-centrifuges or gassious-diffusion is not a simple matter. One has to master the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle which begins at uranium exploration, mining and refining and production of uranium ore or yellow cake. Then this has to be converted into uranium dioxide (which is also used in making nuclear fuel for natural uranium reactors like Khushab and KANUPP). This dioxide is then converted into uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) which is also a prerequisite in producing uranium metal, and then this UF4 has to be converted into the feedstock of uranium enrichment, uranium hexalflouride gas or UF6, which has to be of very high purity, by the ton. Iran is still struggling to produce high purity UF6. It is this UF6 which is passed through the centrifuges and then enriched after which it is again converted into uranium dioxide and then then into UF4 and then into uranium metal (the form in which HEU is used in the core of an atomic bomb).
All this requires complete mastery over nuclear chemistry and requires the production of several fluorine compounds and hydroflouric acid, all of which is extremely toxic and corrosive. Fluorine chemistry is perhaps the most challenging of all fields in chemistry. If you have a reactor, you only have to irradiate natural uranium fuel rods which become irradiated and and then the next challenging task arises, reprocessing spent fuel which is as difficult and sophisticated as uranium enrichment. But once the back end of the fuel cycle is also mastered, reprocessing becomes a reality.
Pakistan always had a parallel plutonium program being developed in PAEC throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This was part of acquiring complete mastery over the nuclear fuel cycle which PAEC scientists and engineers were able to accomplish by the early 1980s. The fuel cycle not only provided the crucial raw material or feedstock for the Kahuta enrichment project in the form of uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) but also produced indigenous nuclear fuel for the Karachi nuclear power plant (KANUPP) after the Canadians cut off supplies in 1976.
Also by the early 1980s, PAEC completed the New Labs reprocessing plant in PINSTECH where cold test were carried out during the 1980s. This meant that Pakistan was ready for reprocessing of spent fuel. Now KANUPP had enough spent fuel by then for almost 200 atomic bombs, but since it was under safeguards, Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state (unlike India in 1974) did not use it for military purposes, even though the capability was always there.
So PAEC began work in 1985-86 on the Khushab plutonium production reactor, a heavy water production and tritium purification plant which today has given Pakistan a full plutonium production capability. The decision makers today seem to have realized the importance of plutonium for achieving full nuclear capability and for fully joining the nuclear club, so they are now constructing two more Khushab type reactors and another reprocessing plant at Chashma (work on which was postponed in the wake of the French cancellation of the reprocessing contract in 1978).
All this has been possible because the nuclear infrastructure development and manpower training in nuclear weapons design, development and testing, reactor construction, nuclear fuel cycle, uranium purification, conversion and enrichment, nuclear fuel fabrication and reprocessing technologies that took place during the 1970s and 1980s in PAEC under Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan and his team, the fruits of which are now being harnessed.
As for India, they successfully produced enriched uranium through gas-centrifuges during the 1980s and are continuing to work on their secret gas-centrifuge program which is on a pilot-scale basis at the Rare Materials Project Plant. Since India has plenty of plutonium, highly enriched uranium is not that critical for them.
SSPanzer, this is simply not true. China gave us few atomic bombs and ballistic missiles! 
By the way, thanks for a good and detailed analysis.
Also, I saw the Geo Interview of Dr Samar Mubarakmand. According to him the last test on May 30, 1998 was a Plutonium core nuclear weapon. It was the size of a basketball and can easily fit in the nose cone of a ballistic missile.
By the way, thanks for a good and detailed analysis.
Also, I saw the Geo Interview of Dr Samar Mubarakmand. According to him the last test on May 30, 1998 was a Plutonium core nuclear weapon. It was the size of a basketball and can easily fit in the nose cone of a ballistic missile.
QUOTE(Saeed Khan @ Mar 8 2008, 02:49 PM)
SSPanzer, this is simply not true. China gave us few atomic bombs and ballistic missiles!
By the way, thanks for a good and detailed analysis.
Also, I saw the Geo Interview of Dr Samar Mubarakmand. According to him the last test on May 30, 1998 was a Plutonium core nuclear weapon. It was the size of a basketball and can easily fit in the nose cone of a ballistic missile.
By the way, thanks for a good and detailed analysis.
Also, I saw the Geo Interview of Dr Samar Mubarakmand. According to him the last test on May 30, 1998 was a Plutonium core nuclear weapon. It was the size of a basketball and can easily fit in the nose cone of a ballistic missile.
What is not true? China gave us Chashma-I nuclear power plant and the 27 Kw Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor-2. A chinese bomb design from the fourth chinese test of 1966 was passed on to Libya and Iran by AQ Khan. But Pakistan never used this bomb design as all Pakistani atomic bomb designs were developed by the PAEC.
No country in the world has ever or will ever give atomic bombs to any other country. Dr. Samar categorically dismissed all such accusations in his speech delivered on Nov. 28, 1998, given at GC, Lahore. Yes Pakistan did get M-11 missiles from China in the late 80s and early 90s and afew ring magnets in the mid-90s for centrifuges. That's it.
Aoa
SSPanzer thanks for the detailed and informative post. Learnt alot.
Much appriciated.
w/salaam
SSPanzer thanks for the detailed and informative post. Learnt alot.
Much appriciated.
w/salaam
QUOTE(SSPanzer @ Mar 8 2008, 06:41 PM)
What is not true? ...
SSPanzer, the sarcasm part was for Indians, not you. I was responding to their comments.
Also, the Nuclear weapon whose design was provided to Iran and Libya by A Q Khan was a dud and doesn't work.
This was supposedly the design A Q Khan Labs were working on but they later abandoned it.
I need to post a correction to my earlier post regarding no plutonium bombs tested by Pakistan. It turns out that the US plane with the mass spectrometer lost the sample and, therefore, there was no proof that we tested one. However, it appears from all the other facts available, that the last test (May 30th) was indeed a plutonium bomb.
We will see a great expansion in our stockpiled warheads now that we are seriously going the plutonium route.
India did try to do an H-bomb explosion, but it fizzled out. All Pakistani bomb tests yields were exactly as predicted by our theoretical physicists. That means we are very confident in our ability and an H-bomb is going to be easy for us to do, when we choose to do it.
We will see a great expansion in our stockpiled warheads now that we are seriously going the plutonium route.
India did try to do an H-bomb explosion, but it fizzled out. All Pakistani bomb tests yields were exactly as predicted by our theoretical physicists. That means we are very confident in our ability and an H-bomb is going to be easy for us to do, when we choose to do it.
QUOTE(SSPanzer @ Mar 8 2008, 12:54 AM)
This is indeed a very interesting discussion. All six nuclear tests that Pakistan conducted were bombs that were designed, built and tested by the Directorate of Technical Development of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). US aircraft had picked up traces of weapons grade plutonium from the May 30 test, but then the American weapons laboratories lost the sample and could not come up with a definitive conclusion.
As mentioned above, the last test was that of the most modern, compact and powerful design that Pakistan had cold tested in 1992 and this could only be a plutonium device.
This is because miniaturization with uranium becomes impossible after a certain point. The critical mass of uranium is 47-52 kg, while the critical mass of plutonium-239 is only 8 kg. If warheads for a true nuclear arsenal consisting of ballistic and cruise missile are to be produced, these can only be built with plutonium-239. It takes one-fifth of plutonium by weight to make the core of one bomb, compared to a bomb that uses highly enriched uranium. The bomb that destroyed Nagasaki used only 6 kg of plutonium while the Hiroshima bomb (a gun-type) device used 60 kg of highly enriched uranium.
Implosion type bombs which PAEC had developed, may use between 15-25 kg of highly enriched uraniun. However, it would take only about 2-4 kg of plutonium for the same bomb to produce a 20 kt explosion, equal to Hiroshima, if a sophisticated implosion design is used. That is why plutonium has been the pre-dominant and first choice of all countries that have built an arsenal of nuclear weapons.
This has been possible because once you are able to produce plutonium in a heavy water reactor like Khushab or KANUPP, you also get tritium as a by product from spent fuel, or you may be able to produce tritium by irradiating Lithium-6 targets in such a reactor. If 4-5 grams of tritium is used in each fission atomic bomb, it increases the yield by a factor of two to three.
And all six atomic bombs tested by PAEC in May 1998 at Chaghi and Kharan were "boosted" fission devices, which means they used tritium, which is the fusion fuel used in to make hydrogen or thermonuclear weapons. If a fission bomb using highly enriched uranium (20-25 kg) is to be made, it will require a heavy neutron reflector material like beryllium metal, which increases the weight of the bomb, making it too bulky and heavy to be suitable for missiles, and their yield would also be much less than plutonium fuelled bombs.
So as the leader of the 1998 nuclear tests and then Member (Technical) PAEC, who then was also the head of the organization in PAEC that fathered Pakistan's solid fuelled missiles, the NDC, Dr. Samar Mubarakmand has pointed to this fact when the said that the May 30 test was that of our most advanced and compact design for our missiles, which can logically only be plutonium.
Sub-kiloton and megaton devices both can easily be produced by using tritium and small amounts of plutonium.
Producing enriched uranium either through gas-centrifuges or gassious-diffusion is not a simple matter. One has to master the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle which begins at uranium exploration, mining and refining and production of uranium ore or yellow cake. Then this has to be converted into uranium dioxide (which is also used in making nuclear fuel for natural uranium reactors like Khushab and KANUPP). This dioxide is then converted into uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) which is also a prerequisite in producing uranium metal, and then this UF4 has to be converted into the feedstock of uranium enrichment, uranium hexalflouride gas or UF6, which has to be of very high purity, by the ton. Iran is still struggling to produce high purity UF6. It is this UF6 which is passed through the centrifuges and then enriched after which it is again converted into uranium dioxide and then then into UF4 and then into uranium metal (the form in which HEU is used in the core of an atomic bomb).
All this requires complete mastery over nuclear chemistry and requires the production of several fluorine compounds and hydroflouric acid, all of which is extremely toxic and corrosive. Fluorine chemistry is perhaps the most challenging of all fields in chemistry. If you have a reactor, you only have to irradiate natural uranium fuel rods which become irradiated and and then the next challenging task arises, reprocessing spent fuel which is as difficult and sophisticated as uranium enrichment. But once the back end of the fuel cycle is also mastered, reprocessing becomes a reality.
Pakistan always had a parallel plutonium program being developed in PAEC throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This was part of acquiring complete mastery over the nuclear fuel cycle which PAEC scientists and engineers were able to accomplish by the early 1980s. The fuel cycle not only provided the crucial raw material or feedstock for the Kahuta enrichment project in the form of uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) but also produced indigenous nuclear fuel for the Karachi nuclear power plant (KANUPP) after the Canadians cut off supplies in 1976.
Also by the early 1980s, PAEC completed the New Labs reprocessing plant in PINSTECH where cold test were carried out during the 1980s. This meant that Pakistan was ready for reprocessing of spent fuel. Now KANUPP had enough spent fuel by then for almost 200 atomic bombs, but since it was under safeguards, Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state (unlike India in 1974) did not use it for military purposes, even though the capability was always there.
So PAEC began work in 1985-86 on the Khushab plutonium production reactor, a heavy water production and tritium purification plant which today has given Pakistan a full plutonium production capability. The decision makers today seem to have realized the importance of plutonium for achieving full nuclear capability and for fully joining the nuclear club, so they are now constructing two more Khushab type reactors and another reprocessing plant at Chashma (work on which was postponed in the wake of the French cancellation of the reprocessing contract in 1978).
All this has been possible because the nuclear infrastructure development and manpower training in nuclear weapons design, development and testing, reactor construction, nuclear fuel cycle, uranium purification, conversion and enrichment, nuclear fuel fabrication and reprocessing technologies that took place during the 1970s and 1980s in PAEC under Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan and his team, the fruits of which are now being harnessed.
As for India, they successfully produced enriched uranium through gas-centrifuges during the 1980s and are continuing to work on their secret gas-centrifuge program which is on a pilot-scale basis at the Rare Materials Project Plant. Since India has plenty of plutonium, highly enriched uranium is not that critical for them.
As mentioned above, the last test was that of the most modern, compact and powerful design that Pakistan had cold tested in 1992 and this could only be a plutonium device.
This is because miniaturization with uranium becomes impossible after a certain point. The critical mass of uranium is 47-52 kg, while the critical mass of plutonium-239 is only 8 kg. If warheads for a true nuclear arsenal consisting of ballistic and cruise missile are to be produced, these can only be built with plutonium-239. It takes one-fifth of plutonium by weight to make the core of one bomb, compared to a bomb that uses highly enriched uranium. The bomb that destroyed Nagasaki used only 6 kg of plutonium while the Hiroshima bomb (a gun-type) device used 60 kg of highly enriched uranium.
Implosion type bombs which PAEC had developed, may use between 15-25 kg of highly enriched uraniun. However, it would take only about 2-4 kg of plutonium for the same bomb to produce a 20 kt explosion, equal to Hiroshima, if a sophisticated implosion design is used. That is why plutonium has been the pre-dominant and first choice of all countries that have built an arsenal of nuclear weapons.
This has been possible because once you are able to produce plutonium in a heavy water reactor like Khushab or KANUPP, you also get tritium as a by product from spent fuel, or you may be able to produce tritium by irradiating Lithium-6 targets in such a reactor. If 4-5 grams of tritium is used in each fission atomic bomb, it increases the yield by a factor of two to three.
And all six atomic bombs tested by PAEC in May 1998 at Chaghi and Kharan were "boosted" fission devices, which means they used tritium, which is the fusion fuel used in to make hydrogen or thermonuclear weapons. If a fission bomb using highly enriched uranium (20-25 kg) is to be made, it will require a heavy neutron reflector material like beryllium metal, which increases the weight of the bomb, making it too bulky and heavy to be suitable for missiles, and their yield would also be much less than plutonium fuelled bombs.
So as the leader of the 1998 nuclear tests and then Member (Technical) PAEC, who then was also the head of the organization in PAEC that fathered Pakistan's solid fuelled missiles, the NDC, Dr. Samar Mubarakmand has pointed to this fact when the said that the May 30 test was that of our most advanced and compact design for our missiles, which can logically only be plutonium.
Sub-kiloton and megaton devices both can easily be produced by using tritium and small amounts of plutonium.
Producing enriched uranium either through gas-centrifuges or gassious-diffusion is not a simple matter. One has to master the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle which begins at uranium exploration, mining and refining and production of uranium ore or yellow cake. Then this has to be converted into uranium dioxide (which is also used in making nuclear fuel for natural uranium reactors like Khushab and KANUPP). This dioxide is then converted into uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) which is also a prerequisite in producing uranium metal, and then this UF4 has to be converted into the feedstock of uranium enrichment, uranium hexalflouride gas or UF6, which has to be of very high purity, by the ton. Iran is still struggling to produce high purity UF6. It is this UF6 which is passed through the centrifuges and then enriched after which it is again converted into uranium dioxide and then then into UF4 and then into uranium metal (the form in which HEU is used in the core of an atomic bomb).
All this requires complete mastery over nuclear chemistry and requires the production of several fluorine compounds and hydroflouric acid, all of which is extremely toxic and corrosive. Fluorine chemistry is perhaps the most challenging of all fields in chemistry. If you have a reactor, you only have to irradiate natural uranium fuel rods which become irradiated and and then the next challenging task arises, reprocessing spent fuel which is as difficult and sophisticated as uranium enrichment. But once the back end of the fuel cycle is also mastered, reprocessing becomes a reality.
Pakistan always had a parallel plutonium program being developed in PAEC throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This was part of acquiring complete mastery over the nuclear fuel cycle which PAEC scientists and engineers were able to accomplish by the early 1980s. The fuel cycle not only provided the crucial raw material or feedstock for the Kahuta enrichment project in the form of uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) but also produced indigenous nuclear fuel for the Karachi nuclear power plant (KANUPP) after the Canadians cut off supplies in 1976.
Also by the early 1980s, PAEC completed the New Labs reprocessing plant in PINSTECH where cold test were carried out during the 1980s. This meant that Pakistan was ready for reprocessing of spent fuel. Now KANUPP had enough spent fuel by then for almost 200 atomic bombs, but since it was under safeguards, Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state (unlike India in 1974) did not use it for military purposes, even though the capability was always there.
So PAEC began work in 1985-86 on the Khushab plutonium production reactor, a heavy water production and tritium purification plant which today has given Pakistan a full plutonium production capability. The decision makers today seem to have realized the importance of plutonium for achieving full nuclear capability and for fully joining the nuclear club, so they are now constructing two more Khushab type reactors and another reprocessing plant at Chashma (work on which was postponed in the wake of the French cancellation of the reprocessing contract in 1978).
All this has been possible because the nuclear infrastructure development and manpower training in nuclear weapons design, development and testing, reactor construction, nuclear fuel cycle, uranium purification, conversion and enrichment, nuclear fuel fabrication and reprocessing technologies that took place during the 1970s and 1980s in PAEC under Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan and his team, the fruits of which are now being harnessed.
As for India, they successfully produced enriched uranium through gas-centrifuges during the 1980s and are continuing to work on their secret gas-centrifuge program which is on a pilot-scale basis at the Rare Materials Project Plant. Since India has plenty of plutonium, highly enriched uranium is not that critical for them.
good analysis. learned many new...
What about the Neutron Bomb. this light, low yield, low radiation design is perfectly suited for battlefield use where the areas cleared by the bomb can be quickly occupied by our ground forces.
Is there any work going on the neutron bomb. We NEED the neutron bomb.
Is there any work going on the neutron bomb. We NEED the neutron bomb.
Aoa
Neutron bomb is low radiation? lolz
Neutron bomb is called neutron bomb because it releases much of its energy in form of radiation (neutrons?)...
w/salaam
QUOTE(wulff @ Apr 18 2008, 01:52 PM)
What about the Neutron Bomb. this light, low yield, low radiation design is perfectly suited for battlefield use where the areas cleared by the bomb can be quickly occupied by our ground forces.
Is there any work going on the neutron bomb. We NEED the neutron bomb. quick.
Is there any work going on the neutron bomb. We NEED the neutron bomb. quick.
Neutron bomb is low radiation? lolz
Neutron bomb is called neutron bomb because it releases much of its energy in form of radiation (neutrons?)...
w/salaam
QUOTE(noxiouspython @ Apr 19 2008, 12:37 AM)
Aoa
Neutron bomb is low radiation? lolz
Neutron bomb is called neutron bomb because it releases much of its energy in form of radiation (neutrons?)...
w/salaam
Neutron bomb is low radiation? lolz
Neutron bomb is called neutron bomb because it releases much of its energy in form of radiation (neutrons?)...
w/salaam
By low radiation, I meant that since the neutron bombs are low yield devices [sub kiloton or a few kilotons], the fallout is much less compared to a boosted fission device. A neutron bomb is called an enhanced radiation bomb because, as you said, it releases most of its energy in the form of a neutron burst. Radiation fallout is lesser which makes it ideal for use against enemy troop and armor formations inside our territory [In fact, the neutron bomb was originally intended to stop a soviet armored strike into western europe, without destroying western europe iteself in the process]. The range of the neutron burst is limited, however, because the neutrons are absorbed by air, and so even a high yield neutron bomb will not be able to cause major radiation effects beyond its blast range. A compact explosion, or as the americans might call it, a surgical nuclear bomb.
Neutron bombs were found impractical since modern armored vehicles feature potent protection from the radiation. All neutron bombs were withdrawn from service in US and then-USSR. I doubt Pak would bother with that kind of bombs. Its a collosal waste of time and money.
Agreed the N-bomb wouldn't do too much harm to, say, a T90 crew.
But, what ab't those who aren't tank crews.......1.3+ Million indian army wouldn't have too much of a protection for the next 50 years.
1000 Million - 180 Million = 820 Mn indians wouldn't have it for the next 500 years.
But, what ab't those who aren't tank crews.......1.3+ Million indian army wouldn't have too much of a protection for the next 50 years.
1000 Million - 180 Million = 820 Mn indians wouldn't have it for the next 500 years.
QUOTE(SSPanzer @ Mar 8 2008, 06:41 PM)
What is not true? ...
SSPanzer, the sarcasm part was for Indians, not you. I was responding to their comments.
Saeed & SSPanzer .. according to the Indian newspapers before our tests even the button for the bomb was made in China !
As a reminder of the old Indian bias !
http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/i...8/14850784.html
"Pak may have nukes based on Chinese design"
PRESS TRUST OF INDIA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LONDON, May 27: Pakistan may have foregone a retaliatory atomic test in response to the Indian explosions because it may have a "nuclear arsenal which works" based on a Chinese design handed over to it in the 80s, says the Jane's Intelligence weekly.
In its latest edition, the weekly said the reason for what it called "China's extra-ordinary generosity" might have been Pakistani nuclear scientists sharing secrets of processes to enrich uranium to weapons grade using high-speed centrifuges.
The Chinese handed over the nuclear bomb design which it tested at the Lop Nor ranges in the southwestern part of the country in 1966 producing a yield equivalent to about 20,000 tonnes of conventional high explosive, it said.
"In Pakistani hands, the Chinese design was changed so (that) it could be carried by an American-supplied F-16 fighter bomber, three squadrons of which were delivered before the Americans cut off supplies in 1990," Jane's reported.
The help from Beijing is thought to haveextended to a test firing of the modified Pakistani design carried out in the late 80s during one of China's series of tests.
The magazine said China is also said to have helped Pakistan build a research reactor which can produce small amounts of plutonium, a vital ingredient for hydrogen bombs.
"Pakistan has nuclear devices which can be quickly turned into bombs. The country's scientists claim they need seven days' notice and experts reckon Pakistan may have upto 30 bombs already," the prestigious defence weekly said.
But the magazine as well as defence experts doubted whether Pakistan had acquired the capability of producing thermo-nuclear bombs which would give it the capacity of making nuclear warheads for its Ghauri and other surface-to-surface missiles.
Experts have been bewildered that almost two weeks into the Indian test, Pakistan has not yet been able to respond despite claims by its scientists and politicians of producing a nuclear bomb within days.
"By failing to respond to publicclamour for retaliatory nuclear test, it can be deduced that Pakistan is still wrestling with trigger devices and that its nuclear programme despite tall claims may still be in the exploratory stage," the experts said.
They pointed out that Islamabad may be facing the same problem as it has with the firing of its medium-range surface-to-surface missile Ghauri, "which did not go beyond 600 km, though it was claimed it has a range of 1,500 km."
The weekly said in comparison to Pakistan's "part acquired, part clandestine and part developed nuclear programme", India's nuclear programme was far advanced and largely "home grown".
The recent nuclear tests conducted by India had confirmed that it had the design and capability of a warhead that could be fitted into missiles, the magazine said.
It predicted India, in the next stage, might go in for developing and deploying its intermediate range ballistic missile Agni by improving its range from 1,500 km to 2,500 km.
The weekly said India had enforced a`nuclear doctrine' for its armed forces, which meant that though the nuclear warheads would be produced they would not be fitted on the missile until top level political clearance was received.
Copyright © 1998 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.
What is not true? ...
SSPanzer, the sarcasm part was for Indians, not you. I was responding to their comments.
Saeed & SSPanzer .. according to the Indian newspapers before our tests even the button for the bomb was made in China !
As a reminder of the old Indian bias !
http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/i...8/14850784.html
"Pak may have nukes based on Chinese design"
PRESS TRUST OF INDIA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LONDON, May 27: Pakistan may have foregone a retaliatory atomic test in response to the Indian explosions because it may have a "nuclear arsenal which works" based on a Chinese design handed over to it in the 80s, says the Jane's Intelligence weekly.
In its latest edition, the weekly said the reason for what it called "China's extra-ordinary generosity" might have been Pakistani nuclear scientists sharing secrets of processes to enrich uranium to weapons grade using high-speed centrifuges.
The Chinese handed over the nuclear bomb design which it tested at the Lop Nor ranges in the southwestern part of the country in 1966 producing a yield equivalent to about 20,000 tonnes of conventional high explosive, it said.
"In Pakistani hands, the Chinese design was changed so (that) it could be carried by an American-supplied F-16 fighter bomber, three squadrons of which were delivered before the Americans cut off supplies in 1990," Jane's reported.
The help from Beijing is thought to haveextended to a test firing of the modified Pakistani design carried out in the late 80s during one of China's series of tests.
The magazine said China is also said to have helped Pakistan build a research reactor which can produce small amounts of plutonium, a vital ingredient for hydrogen bombs.
"Pakistan has nuclear devices which can be quickly turned into bombs. The country's scientists claim they need seven days' notice and experts reckon Pakistan may have upto 30 bombs already," the prestigious defence weekly said.
But the magazine as well as defence experts doubted whether Pakistan had acquired the capability of producing thermo-nuclear bombs which would give it the capacity of making nuclear warheads for its Ghauri and other surface-to-surface missiles.
Experts have been bewildered that almost two weeks into the Indian test, Pakistan has not yet been able to respond despite claims by its scientists and politicians of producing a nuclear bomb within days.
"By failing to respond to publicclamour for retaliatory nuclear test, it can be deduced that Pakistan is still wrestling with trigger devices and that its nuclear programme despite tall claims may still be in the exploratory stage," the experts said.
They pointed out that Islamabad may be facing the same problem as it has with the firing of its medium-range surface-to-surface missile Ghauri, "which did not go beyond 600 km, though it was claimed it has a range of 1,500 km."
The weekly said in comparison to Pakistan's "part acquired, part clandestine and part developed nuclear programme", India's nuclear programme was far advanced and largely "home grown".
The recent nuclear tests conducted by India had confirmed that it had the design and capability of a warhead that could be fitted into missiles, the magazine said.
It predicted India, in the next stage, might go in for developing and deploying its intermediate range ballistic missile Agni by improving its range from 1,500 km to 2,500 km.
The weekly said India had enforced a`nuclear doctrine' for its armed forces, which meant that though the nuclear warheads would be produced they would not be fitted on the missile until top level political clearance was received.
Copyright © 1998 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.
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